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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE, TURNOVER, AND HUMAN RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT: FOCUSING ON MUNICIPAL POLICE SERVICES 
 
 
 
Regardless of whether organizations are in the private sector or in the public sector, 
there is a general agreement that human resources are critical to keeping organizations 
effective as well as maintaining a high level of organizational performance. While 
more serious effort has been made to empirically examine how human resources 
influence organizational performance (e.g., studies about turnover consequences, 
studies about the relationship between human resource management practices and 
organizational performance) in the private sector, it is rare to find similar empirical 
studies in the public sector partly because it is hard to define public organizational 
performance. In my dissertation, I basically investigate how human resources are 
critical to organizational performance in the public sector with a question, “Do human 
resources really matter in the public sector, too?” Focusing on the crime control 
performance of municipal police departments, I examine the relationships among 
turnover, police performance, and human resource management (HRM) 
characteristics by surveying police departments of the U.S. cities whose population 
range is between 100,000 to 500,000 (Out of 205 surveyed cities, 65 cities 
participated). Firstly, I explore how human resource management practices 
(individually and systematically) influence crime control performance of the police. 
Based on universalistic HRM perspective (i.e., best HRM practices) and control 
theory perspective, I hypothesize that commitment HRM system (and individual 
practices) will have positive effect on crime control performance of the police. 
Secondly, I investigate more specific questions such as if turnover has significant 
effect on crime control performance and if HRM system has moderating effect on 
turnover consequence. Results about turnover effect confirm human capital theory 
that predicts the negative effect of turnover when employees with specific knowledge 
quit.  However, no significant relationships are found between commitment HRM 
system (and individual practices) and organizational performance. The results might 
help municipal police departments deal with sworn officers’ turnover as well as set up 
proper HRM practices. 
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performance, best HRM practices, human capital theory 
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Introduction 
 
I began this research with the fundamental question of how we can achieve and 
maintain higher levels of organizational performance in the public sector. More 
specifically, I focus on human resources that have been regarded as one of the critical 
factors to achieve better organizational performance in both private and public sectors. 
In fact, it is a widely held premise that people provide organizations with an important 
source of sustainable competitive advantage and the effective management of human 
capital may be the ultimate determinant of organizational performance (Youndt, Snell, 
Dean, & Lepak, 1996). Therefore, human resources have received continuous 
attention from researchers in a variety of disciplines and lots of research has been 
conducted to investigate questions related to human resources especially in the public 
sector. For example, researchers have been interested in how human resource 
management (HRM) practices influence organizational performance, how to deal with 
human resource loss (i.e., turnover), how to control human resources to achieve better 
performance (e.g., control theory), and how to understand human resources in a 
different situation (e.g., strategic HRM). In the public sector, however, it is true that 
human resources are also perceived as critical to deliver public services effectively 
but no empirical efforts have been made to confirm the critical role of human 
resources. 
 
This dissertation consists of analyses bearing on two major questions, each of 
which basically investigates the critical role that human resources play in achieving 
better organizational performance. The first question is about how different HRM 
practices would influence organizational performance. I explore the relationships 
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between organizational performance (i.e., crime control performance in this study) 
and different HRM practices (individual HRM practice and HRM system) from 
universalistic, contingency, and control theory perspectives. The second question 
deals with a more specific HR issue. I examine if employee turnover (turnover, 
hereafter) has a significant effect on organizational performance and if HRM practices 
moderate (weaken or strengthen) the effects of turnover on organizational 
performance. I also review the definitions of turnover and its measurement, causes, 
and effects, based on classic turnover studies (e.g., Price, 1977; Mobley, 1982) that 
initiated turnover research and have guided turnover studies for decades. 
 
To answer the two major questions mentioned above, I sent questionnaires to 
205 police departments in U. S. cities whose population range was between 100,000 
and 500,000. In the current study, the term HRM practices generally refers to both 
individual HRM practices and a set of HRM practices. But individual HRM practices 
and HRM systems are also used to refer to individual HRM practices and a bundle of 
HRM practices, respectively.    
 
Although the arguments presented in this research are not new in the private 
sector, this research is one of a few empirical efforts in the public sector to examine if 
human resources (HR) play a critical role in improving organizational performance, if 
HR loss (i.e., turnover) has a significant effect on organizational performance, and if 
HRM practices moderate turnover effects on organizational performance. The results 
of this research will help us to understand the critical role of human resources in the 
public sector in achieving higher level of organizational performance and to set up 
proper HRM policy (e.g., job designs, staffing, rewarding, retaining), especially when 
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quality employees are scarce and turnover rate is high. The results of this research 
may also give us an idea if human resources need to be dealt with differently, 
depending on the sector (i.e., public or private). As a foundation of the whole research, 
I first review some general issues of organizational performance and measurement; 
examine police organization, its goals, and performance indicators; and discuss how 
human resources are dealt with in the public sector.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3
I. Organizational Performance and Measurement 
 
1.1 Organization 
According to Thompson (1967), organizations can be understood from two 
perspectives: closed-system and open-system. In order to search for certainty, the 
closed-system perspectives such as scientific management school1, administrative-
management school 2 3, and bureaucracy school  search for maximized economic 
efficiency, assuming that they are dealing with a determinate system (pp 4-5). The 
open-system perspective expects uncertainty rather than searching for certainty. 
According to Daft (2001, p12), organizations are (1) social entities, (2) goal directed, 
(3) designed as deliberately structured and coordinated activity systems, and (4) 
linked to the external environment. Daft explained that the key elements of an 
organization are not a building or a set of policies and procedures, rather the key 
elements are people and their relationships with one another. Daft also emphasized 
that an organization cannot exist without interacting with customers, suppliers, 
competitors and other elements of the external environment. 
 
Daft (2001) noted that one significant development in the study of 
organization was the distinction between closed and open systems and provided a 
good explanation of both systems. Daft (2001, p14) explains a closed system as 
follows:  
                                            
1 It focuses primarily on manufacturing or similar production activities, and seeks to maximize 
efficiency by planning procedures to ensure conformity with standards. 
2 It focuses on structural relationships among production, personnel, supply, and other service units of 
the organization. It searches for efficiency by specializing tasks and grouping them into departments, 
and fixing responsibility. 
3 If focuses on staffing and structure as means of handling cases. For this school, efficiency can be 
achieved by establishing rules for categories of activity, motivating proper performance of expert 
officials, and appointing experts to offices.  
 4
 
A closed system would not depend on its environment; it would be autonomous, enclosed, and 
sealed off from the outside world. Although a true closed system cannot exist, early 
organization studies focused on internal systems. Early management concepts, including 
scientific management, leadership style, and industrial engineering, were closed-system 
approaches because they took the environment for granted and assumed the organization could 
be made more effective through internal design. The management of a closed system would be 
quite easy. The environment would be stable and predictable and would not intervene to cause 
problems. The primary management issue would be to run tings efficiently. 
Unlike a closed system, an open system must interact with the environment to survive; 
it both consumes resources and exports resources to the environment. It cannot seal itself off. 
It must continuously change and adapt to the environment. Open systems can be enormously 
complex. Internal efficiency is just one issue. 
 
In this paper, although it appears that many pubic organizations are still managed as if 
they are sealed off from their environment, I basically see pubic organizations as open 
systems as Daft (2001) suggested in the figure below. 
 
Figure 1-1. An Open System and Its Subsystems 
 
 
Raw materials  
People 
Information 
resources 
Financial 
resources 
 
 
Input 
 
Transformation 
Process 
 
 
Output 
 
Products 
& 
Services 
Boundary Production, Maintenance Boundary 
Subsystem Spanning Adaptation, Management Spanning 
 
Source: Daft (2001, p15) 
 
In a typical municipal government, there are many departments to provide 
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services such as public safety, parks and recreation, public library, road maintenance, 
and so on. According to Daft’s flow chart of an open system as seen in figure 1-1, all 
of those service departments belong to the “Transformation process,” whereas staff 
departments such as human resources department, finance department, and public 
relations belong to the “Input process” or the “Output process”. While service 
departments (or production departments) of the “Transformation process” are directly 
involved in providing various kinds of service to the citizen, staff departments in the 
“Input process” or the “Output process” are doing boundary spanning4 and are 
indirectly involved in delivering services to the citizen.  
 
In this study, I explore the relationships among human resource management 
(HRM) practices, organizational performance, and turnover at a municipal department 
level rather than at a city government level. Although a police department is one of 
the service departments within a city government that directly provide services to the 
citizen, we can also regard it as a separate organization that not only needs inputs, 
such as human resources, information resources, and financial resources, but also 
produces outputs, such as crime control, traffic control, and so on. For example, when 
police departments are losing their employees for some reasons, we may guess that 
there is a problem at the “transformation process” in providing safety services to the 
citizen, and outputs such as crime clearance rate may decrease, consequently. 
Therefore, we may say that Daft’s flow chart of an open system as seen in figure 1-1 
is also applicable to the current study. 
 
                                            
4 Staff departments that perform boundary spanning are responsible for exchanges with the external 
environment 
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1.2 Organizational goals  
According to Rainey (2003, p130), an organizational goal is a condition that an 
organization seeks to attain but the concept of a goal has many complications, with 
important implications for organizing and managing and for the debate over whether 
public and private organizations differ. These complications include the problem that 
goals are always multiple, that is, a goal is always one of a set of goals that one is 
trying to achieve (Rainey, 1993; Simon, 1973). Rainey (2003, p132) continued that 
the most often repeated observations about public organizations are that their goals 
are particularly vague and intangible, compared to those of private business firms, and 
that they more often have multiple, conflicting goals. For example, police chiefs must 
try to find a balance between keeping the peace, enforcing the law, controlling crime, 
preventing crime, assuring fairness and respect for citizen rights, and operating 
efficiently and with minimal costs (Moore, 1990). 
 
In this study, I focus on so-called official goals of municipal police 
departments that are usually displayed in the mission statements. Mission is a concise 
statement of the unique, fundamental, current and future public purposes of the 
agency and its programs. It is also a statement of what the agency does, why it does it, 
and for whom – that is, the reason for the agency’s existence (ASPA's Center for 
Accountability & Performance (CAP), 2002, p12). Official goals are formal 
expressions of general goals that present an organization’s major values and purposes 
(Rainey, 2003). Although we may still face dilemma when we try to achieve one goal 
against another if the mission statement has conflicting goals, at least, we can 
understand what goals police organizations officially put first (I examine a typical 
mission statement of police departments at chapter two). That is, we are going to be at 
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a better position to measure goals of police organizations and evaluate how well they 
are doing in achieving them once we narrow down various goals to official ones. 
 
1.3 Organizational performance 
In this study, I use the term, “organizational performance” rather than “organizational 
productivity” when we evaluate how well (i.e., how effectively and efficiently) 
organizations are doing in achieving their goals in their mission statements. For 
example, when a police organization performs well in controlling crimes (e.g., high 
crime clearance rates), we can say that their crime control performance is at a high 
level. Although as Kearney and Berman (1999) explained,  performance is similar to 
productivity as the effective and efficient use of resources to achieve outcomes, 
performance in the public sector has broader meaning than productivity, and it is 
guided and assessed by multiple, equally important standards of effectiveness, 
efficiency, and equity.  
 
Even when we choose to use organizational productivity that is the subset of 
the organizational performance, there still exists a problem of interpreting 
productivity as Quinn (1978) pointed out. Quinn (1978) noted that one of the biggest 
problems facing the public productivity movement is the assumption that everyone 
shares a common definition of the term productivity. According to Quinn (1978), 
while economists and industrial engineers have a precise definition (i.e., output over 
input with quality considered) of productivity, administrators (or managers) have an 
ambiguous definition that has to do with overall performance of an organization with 
specific meaning varying from situation to situation. Since we are not free from the 
interpretation concern in any case of using performance or productivity, the best way 
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might be to make the term clear at the outset, regardless whether we choose 
productivity or performance.  
 
In the current study, I measure performance rather than productivity of police 
departments because while productivity focuses on the ratio of input and output, 
performance covers broader aspects of police departments. In addition, performance is 
a more generic term than productivity. As in Hatry’s (1980) definition that 
performance measurement for government is the systematic assessment of how well 
services are being delivered to a community in terms of both how efficiently and how 
effectively, the term performance in this study consists of efficiency and effectiveness, 
in which efficiency concerns the relation of input required to the amount of output 
produced and effectiveness refers to the effects and quality of the service delivery.  
 
1.4 Performance measurement 
Why do we measure performance? Osborne and Gaebler (1992) explained a range of 
good reasons for measuring performance in the public sector: (1) to improve delivery 
of public services, (2) what gets measured, gets done, (3) to detect errors, (4) to 
recognize success, (5) to allow for organizational learning and improvement, (6) to 
mobilize support, (7) to improve accountability for budget expenditures, and (8) to 
improve public communication. Behn (2003) also similarly pointed out eight different 
purposes that public managers have for measuring performance – evaluate, control, 
budget, motivate, promote, celebrate, learn, and improve (pp 588-593)5, and argued 
that the characteristics for performance measurement would be different, depending 
on the different purposes of measuring performance. In the same vein, Kaplan and 
                                            
5 For example, public managers may use performance measurement to evaluate how well their agencies 
are performing, or control their organizations (i.e., how can I ensure the subordinates are doing the 
right things). 
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Norton (1996) developed the Balanced Scorecard to prevent a narrow concentration 
on financial measures in business auditing and control systems in the private sector. 
The Balanced Scorecard requires an organization to develop goals, measures, and 
initiatives for four perspectives: (1) the financial perspective, in which typical 
measures include return on investment and economic value added, (2) the customer 
perspective, involving such measures as customer satisfaction and retention, (3) 
internal perspective, involving measures of quality, response time, cost and new 
product introduction, and (4) the learning and growth perspective, in which goals and 
measures focus on such matters as employee satisfaction and information system 
availability.  
 
Although there are several reasons for assessing organizational performance as 
mentioned above, selecting the outcomes that should be tracked is essentially a 
judgment call (Hatry, 1999a, p43). Performance measures are objective, quantitative 
indicators of various aspects of the performance of public programs or agencies. 
Therefore, different kinds of performance measures are defined to track particular 
dimensions of performance, such as effectiveness, operating efficiency, productivity, 
service quality, customer satisfaction, and cost-effectiveness (Poister, 2003, p3). Hatry 
(1999b) actually suggested such criteria as validity6 7 8, understandability , timeliness , 
potential for encouraging perverse behavior9 10 11, uniqueness , data collection cost ,  
controllability 12 13, and comprehensiveness  for selecting a set of performance 
                                            
6 Does it measure what it should? 
7 Will the measure be reasonably understandable by government officials? 
8 Can the information be gathered in time for it to be useful to public officials? 
9 Will the measure result in behavior that is contrary to the objectives of the organization? 
10 Does the measure reveal some important aspect of performance that no other measure does? 
11 What does it cost to collect and analyze the data for the measure? 
12 To what extent is the measure controllable by the agency whose performance is being measured? 
13 Does the set of measures cover all or most performance aspects of the organization’s functions? 
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measures. After all, the choice of performance measures is dependent upon our 
objectives, and there are several types of performance measures such as cost-
effectiveness measures14 15, workload-accomplished measures , outcome measures, 
output measures, efficiency measures16 17, productivity measures , and service quality 
measures18 (ASPA's Center for Accountability & Performance (CAP), 2002; Hatry, 
1999b; Poister, 2003). 
 
No matter how important a role measuring performance plays, especially in 
managing for results, if we cannot practically put performance measurement system 
into use or if we do not much use the results of measuring performance, performance 
measurement would turn into merely an impractical proposition, symbolic statement, 
or expensive trial. Therefore, scholars who study performance and its measurement 
usually stress prerequisites or first steps before implementing performance 
measurement. Hatry (1999a) pointed out three prerequisites that are highly desirable 
before processing performance measurement: high-level support for the performance 
measurement effort, reasonable program stability, and at least some computerized 
data-processing capability. Poister (2003) also suggested as desirable a process for 
designing and implementing performance measurement systems that includes 
securing management commitment as a first step.  
 
 
Copyright © Yongbeom Hur 2007 
                                            
14 Unit cost to produce outcome. 
15 Measures of the amount of workload that has been accomplished are the most commonly found 
measurements collected by operating agencies. 
16 Efficiency measures are defined as the relation of the amount of resources applied to a service or 
input to the amount of output (i.e., input divided by output).  
17 This is the converse of efficiency (i.e., ratios of output to input). 
18 This is related to customer satisfaction with the goods or services. 
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II. Police Organization and Performance 
 
2.1 Police evolution and environmental change 
As Kelling (2003) explained in the summary of U.S. police history, during the 1970s, 
social scientists increasingly undertook research into policing, stimulated in part by 
pioneering fieldwork associated with President Johnson’s crime commission. One of 
the studies was the Kansas City experiment in which it was found that preventive 
patrol had little or no effect on citizens’ perception of personal safety or on reported 
crime. In the 1980s and the 1990s, there were growing neighborhood self-help 
movement and worse fiscal realities in the urban areas, which led to reductions in 
police personnel. By the 1990s, police practices, research, and scholarship had come 
together in “community policing.”  
 
Although attention to problem solving and the “broken windows (Wilson & 
Kelling, 1982)”1 concept continued during the 1990s, new ideas gained favor among 
policy makers and practitioners of crime control and fear reduction. Compstat2  
(derived from “computer statistics”) is one of those initiatives of crime prevention. 
Compstat combines crime and problem analysis, and a geographic focus, with strict 
measures of accountability. Since the 21st century began, environments surrounding 
police organizations have become more unstable and unpredictable. Therefore, 
Stephens (2003) noted that managing the issues associated with growth – traffic, 
housing, schools, and infrastructure – consume substantial resources in many 
communities, and rapid demographic and social change continues in cities and towns 
                                            
1 Just as unrepaired broken windows signal that no one cares and it can lead to more serious disorder 
and crime. 
2 This innovation by then-commissioner William Bratton in the New York City police department was 
championed by proponents as probably the most far-reaching administrative innovation in policing 
during the twentieth century (Kelling, 2003)  
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throughout the U. S.  
 
Under these changing circumstances, for the police to perform better, the 
doctrine of tight managerial control may need to be supplanted by doctrines of worker 
participation, total quality management, and shared commitment to excellence, as 
Hatry and Greiner (1986) suggested. More specifically, it may be possible to 
decentralize police organizations, reduce reliance on rules and constant supervision, 
and increase reliance on selection, training, and the formal statement of values to 
create an organizational culture that can properly guide officers’ conduct (Sparrow, 
Moore, & Kennedy, 1990). However, although decentralization in a police 
organization has several advantages3and a number of disadvantages are involved in 
centralization, it is true that centralization continues to be the dominant way of 
structuring decision making in police organizations (Stephens, 2003).   
 
2.2 Police organizational goals and mission statements 
Although it is a complicated job to define police organizational goals (i.e., why they 
exist), I focus on official goals that are usually displayed in the mission statement as 
mentioned previously. As seen in appendix 2-1 that shows some typical mission 
statements of police organizations, there are no specific forms in common. For 
example, some mission statements (e.g., Dayton, OH and Indiana, IN) consist of 
several sentences, whereas others (e.g., Jacksonville, FL; Atlanta, GA; Austin, TX; 
and Phoenix, AZ) have only one simple sentence. In addition, some police 
departments put their mission statements along with vision statement and goal (or 
                                            
3 (1) It frees managers from having to spend all their time and intellectual energy on day-to-day 
operational matters, allowing them to concentrate more time on strategies that will improve the 
organization’s capabilities. (2) It is likely to improve operational decisions because they are made by 
people who are closer to the facts to the situation. (3) It challenges more people to be creative and take 
responsibility for the problems in their area. 
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value) statement, others post mission statements only.  
 
Although they are diverse in form, when we look at the contents of different 
mission statements, we find that most city police organizations want to promote safety 
and the quality of life for each person in the community through protecting their 
citizens’ properties and lives. In doing so, some police organizations emphasize 
community partnerships (e.g., Dayton, OH; Indianapolis, IN; Atlanta, GA), others 
stress respecting individual rights, human dignity, and community values 
(Indianapolis, IN; Jacksonville, FL) according to their mission statements. In addition, 
when we look at the goal in the goal (or value) statements that are usually under 
mission statements, we also find that most city police departments have similar goals 
that they are officially pursuing. That is, most police organizations have such general 
goals as crime fighting (i.e., traditional purpose), crime prevention, and reducing fear 
and enhancing security (Stephens, 2003). That is, through accomplishing these goals 
(i.e., mainly crime control and prevention), police may provide high quality of life to 
their citizens after all. 
 
2.3 Performance measurement and performance indicators  
Even after we narrowed down organizational goals (or purpose) of municipal police 
departments to one or two official goals, measuring how well an organization does in 
achieving those goals is not simple. For one reason, goals are usually vague and 
intangible in the public sector as Rainey (2003) pointed out. Therefore, as a way of 
measuring performance, it is usual to develop some performance indicators, which 
allow us to measure performance. For example, measuring workload is a form of 
performance indicators that Ammons (1996) called “bean counting” because of easy 
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measurement. However, Ammons warned that for anyone wanting to get ahead in the 
bean business, it is also important to know the quality of the beans and the efficiency 
with which they are grown and harvested. 
 
Despite an abundance of potential benchmarks for police services, their use as 
measuring rods for judging or comparing municipal police departments has been 
controversial (Ammons, 1996). First of all, the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) 
maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the most widely used crime 
statistics, also has a fundamental problem - i.e., some crimes go unreported. In fact, 
the most frequently used performance indicators for crime control are crime 
occurrence and crime clearance rates, and in England, for example, the only 
performance indicators listed in the Public Expenditure White Paper are also the 
crime rates and the clear-up rates (Carter, Klein, & Day, 1995). Police agencies of 
most countries are usually required to maintain those data and this leads to high 
availability of those data.  
 
Carter and colleagues (1995), however, discussed some issues including 
reporting problems when we use crime rate as an indicator for measuring crime 
control performance. As Harrison and Gretton (1986) raised a question about the 
increased crime rate, suggesting that a large part of the increase in the official crime 
rate may be due to the greater propensity of victims to report crime, rather than 
reflecting a rise in the actual level. That is, recent changes such as greater telephone 
ownership, wider insurance cover, better recording practices, and changing public 
attitudes are likely to contribute to increasing propensity to report crimes. Therefore, 
Carter and colleagues (1995) concluded that the most useful figure was the clear-up 
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4rate per sworn officer  (HM Treasury, 1990), considering that it can more reflect the 
efforts the police have made to control crimes and it is not affected by environmental 
changes including greater propensity of victims to report crimes. 
 
Now, I take a brief look at the English government’s efforts to develop proper 
performance indicators of crime control, which may show us how hard it is to define 
and measure police performance, based on Carter and colleagues (1995). Since 
Financial Management Initiative (FMI)5 of England provided an opportunity for each 
center (e.g., Home Office in this case) to develop systems, a ‘financial information 
system’ based on a system of functional costing was constructed and costs were 
allocated to eight functional categories of the police. That is, as an operational activity, 
the functional categories are patrol, crime, traffic, public order, community relations, 
and others; and as a non-operational activity, the functional categories are training and 
management. Later, to provide a guide to matters of efficiency in the principal 
functional areas for police activity, the matrix was developed, consisting of 435 
indicators. For example, there were 43 indicators in the traffic category, including the 
number of officers dedicated to traffic duty, the number of police vehicle accidents, 
the number of breath tests conducted, and so on. Although unrealistic and unfair 
comparisons were made at the initial stage, subsequently more useful national 
comparisons across regions could be possible between ‘families’ of forces with a 
similar sized establishment, or on urban/rural lines or various other demographic and 
geographical dimensions.  
                                            
4 One of the questions about clear-up rate was why the clear-up rate has remained constant over a 
period (1984-1988) in which the police benefited from extra staff, new technology, and improved 
training (HM Treasury, 1990).  
5 In 1982, the Thatcher administration of England launched this initiative with the question, ‘where is 
the money going and what are we getting for it?’ According to Carter and colleagues (1995), it was as 
dramatic as the French Revolution.  
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In the U.S., there has been also an effort to develop a set of good performance 
indicators for each category of service (e.g., police service) at the local government 
level. The Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) recommended a set of 
indicators for police performance as part of its series on Service Efforts and 
Accomplishments (SEA) (Drebin & Brannon, 1992). GASB recommended input 
measurement indicators such as budget expenditures, equipment, facilities, vehicles; 
number of personnel, and hours expended; output measurement indicators such as 
hours of patrol, responses to calls for service, crimes investigated, and number of 
arrests; and outcome measurement  indicators such as death and bodily injury 
resulting from crime, value of property lost due to crime, crimes committed per 
100,000 population, crime clearance rate, response time, and citizen satisfaction.  
 
To measure effectiveness of crime control services, Hatry and his colleagues 
(1992) also suggested more extensive indicators in the areas of crime prevention, 
offender apprehension, responsiveness, security feeling, and fairness and courtesy. For 
example, Hatry et al. developed a set of performance indicators to measure 
effectiveness of apprehending offenders in several quality practices. To measure 
crimes solved at least in part, they suggested performance indicators such as 
“percentage of reported crimes cleared by type of crime and whether cleared by arrest 
or by exception6.” To measure the completeness of apprehension, they suggested 
“percentage of person-crimes 7  cleared by type of crimes.” To measure 
quality/effectiveness of arrest, they suggested “percentage of adult arrests that survive 
                                            
6 Cases are said to be “cleared by arrest” when primary suspects have been arrested for that offense and 
turned over to the court. Cases are said to be “cleared by exception” when the victim refuses to 
cooperate, extradition is denied, the offender is deceased, or other extraordinary circumstances 
preclude the placing of charges. 
7 If one person committed three crimes, it would be three “person-crimes.” 
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preliminary court hearing by type of crime, and percentage of adult arrests resulting in 
conviction.” To measure stolen property recovery, they suggested “percentage of 
stolen property (vehicles and other property) that is subsequently recovered.”  
 
As seen in the efforts of the Home Office of England and suggestions by 
GASB and Hatry et al., we need many performance indicators to measure even one 
aspect (e.g., crime control) of police performance. In addition to developing a proper 
set of performance indicators to measure a specific aspect of organizational 
performance, we also need to consider whether or not we can measure those 
developed performance indicators with reasonable time and costs. If too much time 
and costs are required for collecting the data to measure a set of developed 
performance indicators, the performance measurement system would lack feasibility 
and we are likely to abandon efforts for measuring performance at some point. As 
Hatry (1999b, p43) noted, selecting the outcomes that should be tracked is essentially 
a judgment call. Likewise, selecting the performance indicators (i.e., what 
performance indicators and how many performance indicators) can be also dependent 
on the purpose of measurement and management commitment. Therefore, Behn 
(2003) argued that difference purposes require different measures8. For example, the 
organization might need to measure outcomes, combined with inputs and with the 
effects of exogenous factors if they want to evaluate how well it performs. But when 
executives want to motivate line staff and middle managers to do the things necessary 
to improve performance, they might need to measure almost-real-time outputs, 
compared with production targets. 
 
                                            
8 According to Behn (2003), there are eight purposes that pubic managers have measuring performance: 
evaluate, control, budget, motivate, promote, celebrate, learn, and improve. (see pp 588-592 for more 
details).   
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2.4 Crime rates and clearance rates  
In the current study, I chose crime clearance rates as a measure (i.e., performance 
indicator) of municipal police’s crime control performance (I discuss police 
performance measures in more depth at chapter eight). Although crime rates are also 
widely used measures, there is a concern of controllability – to what extent is the 
measure controllable by the agency whose performance is being measured? Therefore 
I followed Hatry’s (1980) suggestion about performance measures that the more 
control government managers have over a measure, the more the agency can be held 
accountable for it, other things being equal. For example, Sir Kenneth Newman, then 
Chief Constable of the Metropolitan Police, deflected criticism about large increases 
in London crime figures during 1986 by pointing to the effect of environmental 
factors on levels by saying, “figures that are supposed to be performance measures of 
the police are in fact a performance measure of society as a whole” (Carter et al., 
1995). In fact, several external factors may be involved in crime occurrence such as 
the poverty level, unemployment rate, demographic ratios, and so on.  
 
Although crime clearance rates are better performance measures of municipal 
police departments than crime rates, especially when we are interested in how well the 
police are performing and how hard they work to reduce crimes, we cannot measure 
crime control performance with only one measure. As Behn (1996) warned, the search 
for the one best measurement is just as futile as the search for the one best way. 
Kaplan and Norton (1992) also warned that no single measure of performance 
answers the questions from different perspectives9. Now I need to go back to the 
                                            
9 They want performance measures that answer four questions from four different perspectives: 
• How do customers see us? (customer perspective) 
• What must we excel at? (internal business perspective) 
• Can we continue to improve and create value? (innovation and learning perspective) 
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question raised by Behn (2003), “What is the purpose of measuring the 
performance?” because the characteristics of performance measures may vary, 
depending on the answer to this question. In this study, I am basically interested in 
how human resource management characteristics and turnover influence police 
performance. Although it is desirable to look at the several aspects of police 
performance to be sure of the real influence of those HR related factors, I narrowed 
down the scope of police performance to crime control performance, and chose crime 
clearance rates among various suggested measures (e.g., GASB, 1992; Hatry et al., 
1992) mainly due to data availability10. 
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• How do we look to shareholders? (financial perspective) 
 
10 Other than crime clearance data were not available at the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In most 
cities, even crime clearance data were not available according to the survey I conducted.  
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III. Human Resources and Effectiveness in the Public Sector 
 
Generally speaking, there is no doubt that human resources play a critical role in 
effectively achieving organizational goals, regardless of sector (i.e., private and public 
sectors). According to Porter (1985), human resource management (HRM) can help a 
firm obtain competitive advantage by lowering costs, by increasing sources of product 
and service differentiation, or by both. In this chapter, I review some efforts that 
explored effectiveness (or organizational performance) and effectiveness-related 
factors in the public sector to help understand how human resources are regarded in 
the public sector, especially when organizational performance or effectiveness is 
concerned. 
 
3.1 Governance  
1According to Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill (2000a), governance  regimes, even those with 
substantial extant controls, create or allow for substantial discretion at the street or 
front-line levels of public organizations, where the primary work of service delivery 
and regulation is performed. That is, front-line workers and their supervisors may 
have substantial influence on government outcomes by virtue of their interpretations 
of rules and standards and their judgments in individual cases. In the reduced form of 
governance that shows what factors are involved in producing organizational 
outcomes (i.e., organizational performance) as seen in table 3-1, we see that the 
importance of human resources is reflected in the managerial roles and actions (M). 
As examples of variables in the table show, managerial roles and actions include 
                                            
1 According to Lynn et al. (2000), the term "governance" may be defined as regimes of laws, 
administrative rules, judicial rulings, and practices that constrain, prescribe, and enable government 
activity, where such activity is broadly defined as the production and delivery of publicly supported 
goods and services 
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leadership practices, monitoring and controlling of human resources, and 
accountability for the outcomes. In sum, we see that the management of human 
resources is regarded as critical to effective service delivery (i.e., desired level of 
organizational performance) within the governance framework.  
 
 
Table 3-1. Reduced Form of Governance and Examples of Its Variables 
 
Reduced form of governance: O = f (E, C, T, S, M) 
Reduced form model 
components Examples of variables 
O = outputs/outcomes Individual level or organizational level 
E = environmental factors Political structures 
Level of external authority 
Market structure/degree of competition 
Funding constraints 
C = client characteristics Client attributes/characteristics/behavior 
T = treatments (primary work 
or core process or technology) 
Program treatment/technology 
Organizational mission/objectives 
Determination of target population 
S = structures Organization type 
Level of integration/coordination 
Centralization of control 
Administrative rules/incentives 
Institutional culture/values 
M = managerial roles and 
actions 
Leadership practices (e.g., innovation and goal setting, worker 
motivation, recognition and support, and delegation of 
authority or work tasks) 
Monitoring/control/accountability mechanisms 
Source: Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill (2000b) 
 
 
In studying governance, however, the research problem is complicated by the 
fact that effectiveness or efficient performance may or may not be the goal of a 
legislative coalition. In other words, rational actors in legislatures do not necessarily 
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create rational organizations to execute their mandates (Lynn et al., 2000b). Therefore, 
if public organizations are inefficiently created or have structural problems that may 
impede effective operation, focusing on other factors (including human resources) to 
improve organizational performance may have only limited results. That is, 
organizational performance (i.e., outcomes (O)) is not likely to improve by paying 
attention to other factors such as environment (E), client characteristics (C), treatment 
(T), managerial roles and actions (M) rather than remedying structural problems (S) if 
public organizations have had structural problems since they were created.  
 
3.2 The Government Performance Project (GPP)  
2The Government Performance Project (GPP)  began with a charge to identify and 
create sustainable improvements at all levels of American government and to help 
restore citizens’ trust and faith in government and government performance. It is an 
unprecedented research initiative evaluating the management capacity of federal, state, 
and local government entities (Beekman, 2003). Before checking how human 
resources are viewed in the GPP, I briefly outline the theoretical framework of the 
GPP model, based on Ingraham and Donahue’s (2000) explanation.  
 
In the previous section, I reviewed that the importance of human resources is 
reflected in the reduced form of governance as a form of managerial roles and 
activities variable (M). In the GPP, Ingraham and Donahue (2000) noted that one of 
the questions3 that the GPP seeks to answer is “How management influences the 
                                            
2 Beginning in 1996, under the auspices of the Pew Charitable Trusts, the Maxwell School of 
Citizenship and Public Affairs of Syracuse University and Governing Magazine had rated the 
management capacity of local and state governments and selected federal agencies in the United States. 
This activity is now carried out by the coalition of universities and Governing Magazine. 
3 The other two questions that the GPP seeks to answer are: (1) how well do public entities perform? 
and (2) how can management be assessed? 
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performance of public entities.” According to Ingraham and Donahue (2000), 
government management can be divided into two complementary sets of 
organizational structures, procedures, and technology: those related to administrative 
functions, and those related to policy implementation. And these distinct dimensions 
of government management (i.e., administrative support and policy implementation) 
operate simultaneously and interact in highly complex ways to influence a 
government’s performance, and the GPP is interested in examining government’s 
management capacity4. Figure 3-1 shows where government management is located 
in the classical policy/performance equation and how management capacity is 
involved in producing outputs/outcomes. 
 
 
Figure 3-1. The Classical Performance Equation and Government Management 
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Political 
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Technology 
(Inputs) 
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(Outputs/outcomes) 
Source: Ingraham and Donahue (2000) 
                                            
4 This is government’s intrinsic ability to marshal, develop, direct, and control its human, physical, and 
information capital to support the discharge of its policy directions (Ingraham and Donahue, 2000). 
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In the figure, government management (i.e., the center box), which was regarded as a 
black box in the classical policy/performance equation, is now understood as 
management capacity and implementation technology. Management capacity supports 
implementation technology, which is more directly related to policy outcomes and 
government performance.  
 
When we take a closer look at management capacity, management subsystems 
consist of financial management, human resources management, capital management, 
and information technology management; and those subsystems are integrated by 
exercise of leadership, use of information, and allocation of resources as seen in 
figure 3-2. The GPP model also emphasizes the existence of managing-for-results as 
the dominant mechanism by which leaders identify, collect, and use the information 
necessary to evaluate the institution’s performance in pursuit of key objectives 
(Ingraham and Donahue, 2000, p303). The Managing-for-results is not an isolated 
function, but one that substantively interacts with the management subsystems via 
activities surrounding leadership, information, and resources (p305).  
 
As seen in figure 3-2, human resources management (HRM) is one of four 
management subsystems, and HRM refers to the policies, systems, and practices that 
influence employees' behaviors, attitudes, and performance, and subsequently the 
performance of the organization (Selden and Jacobson, 2003: p101). A government 
that does not have the right people and expertise to perform critical functions is likely 
to be ineffective in delivering services and meeting citizen expectations, and high-
performing governments are more likely to assume a strategic HRM plan (Beekman, 
2003: p9-10). According to Selden and Jacobson (2003), a strategic perspective of 
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HRM suggests that an organization should be forward thinking and consider human 
capital to be valuable assets. In contemporary governance, the role of HRM 
departments is shifting from a preoccupation with policing the merit system and rules 
to a broader human resources focus that emphasizes collaboration and partnership 
with leaders and managers to achieve government and agency goals. Selden and 
Jacobson also argue that to acquire and retain the right people, governments need the 
right systems, practices, and policies in place to attract them. Thus, we may say that 
the HRM system plays a critical role in delivering service effectively and meeting 
citizen expectations within governmental organizations, according to the GPP. 
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Figure 3-2. The Government Performance Project Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In order to characterize sound human resource management (HRM) in state, 
city, and county governments, the GPP study used five criteria5 (Selden and Jacobson, 
p102). The key components of good HRM include workforce and strategic planning, 
the ability to facilitate timely and quality hiring, sophisticated professional 
development programs, meaningful reward and evaluation structures, and disciplinary 
procedures. In addition, organizations with strategic human resource management are 
less likely to lose skilled workers and workers are more likely to be motivated to 
perform effectively in support of the government's goals. Figure 3-3 shows the 
shifting trend of the HRM department’s role. 
 
Figure 3-3. The Changes in the Role of Human Resource Management Department 
 
 
 
 
 
Administrative Operational Strategic 
Source: Selden and Jacobson (2003) 
 
Selden and Jacobson explained the shifting of the HRM department’s role as follows. 
Initially, HRM departments performed primarily administrative functions, such as 
record keeping, pay roll, and compliance monitoring, and their general focus was on 
day-to-day operations. Over time, HRM departments began to respond to and initiate 
requests from their customers for developing programs, providing services, and 
addressing problems. They offered a full array of personnel services and were focused 
on short-term tactical goals. Most recently, the emphasis has shifted toward HRM 
                                            
5 (1) government conducts strategic analysis of present and future human resources needs, (2) 
government obtains a skilled workforce, (3) government maintains an appropriately skilled workforce, 
and (4) government motivates the workforce to perform effectively in support of the government's 
goals, and (5) government structures the workforce. 
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strategic leadership, and this approach focuses on creating and implementing long-
term goals, building partnerships, and aligning human capital to meet the 
government’s needs.  
 
In sum, the GPP designates human resource management as one of the 
important management subsystems that comprise management capacity. Since the 
GPP believes that more management capacity leads to a higher level of organizational 
performance or policy outcomes, human resources (i.e., human resource management 
in the GPP) are regarded as an essential component to achieve better performance. 
The GPP also found that strategic management of human resources is more likely to 
lead to a higher level of organizational performance than managing human resources 
independently without considering or aligning with organizational goals.  
 
3.3 Bureaucratic effectiveness theories  
Wolf (1993) explored what factors most influence bureaucratic effectiveness, using 
the case survey method (similar to meta-analysis) to aggregate the collective 
judgments of previous case-study researchers regarding bureaucratic effectiveness and 
other key practices of the U. S. cabinet agencies. After identifying effectiveness-
affecting factors, Wolf (1993) tested the competing theories that explain bureaucratic 
effectiveness to see which theory explains best. Although different theories have been 
tried to explain bureaucratic effectiveness, little agreement has been reached at the 
theoretical level as to which practices of an agency most contribute to performance. 
The arguments of each school of thought are summarized in table 3-2. 
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Table 3-2. Schools of Thought Regarding the Effectiveness of America’s 
Bureaucracies 
 
School 
of 
Thought 
Arguments Scholars 
Agency  The influence of distributional coalitions (interest groups) in bureaucratic decision-
making biases decisions, causing ineffectiveness. 
Bernstein (1955),  
Downs (1967),  Life Cycle 
 Lowi (1979),  
Therefore, inspired bureaucrats eventually capitulate and the effectiveness of the 
agency declines. 
Moe (1989),  
Olson (1982) 
Quality 
Leadership  
Agency effectiveness is largely attributed to the leadership skills, styles, and 
characters of their chiefs. 
Barnard (1938), 
Machiavelli 
(1965),  
Nash (1952) 
Weberian 
Institution-
alism 
The ideal type of Weberian bureaucracy is separate from politics and is 
characterized by a rigid hierarchical structure; functional specialization; separation 
of professional from private life; and behavior based on general, stable, strict, 
exhaustive, learnable rules. 
Weber (1965),  
Goodnow (1900),  
Wilson (1887) 
 
The Weberian ideal of the “rational-legal” bureaucracy remains a viable theory of 
bureaucratic effectiveness.  
Profession- 
alism 
Professionalism describes the ideal bureaucracy as composed of careerists who 
operate freely based on an institutional memory and their own extensive 
professional training. 
Barnard (1938),  
Bernstein (1955), 
Kaufman (1960), 
 Simon (1976),  
Careerists are motivated by a strong “sense of mission” Heclo (1977),  
DiIulio (1987) 
Economic 
Responsive-
ness 
Inspired by economists and public choice scholars, this school of thought argued 
that the ideal bureaucracy is characterized by the alignment of incentives within the 
agency to those of its owners (i.e., taxpaying citizens in the governmental context).  
Downs (1967),  
Hirschman 
(1970), 
 Niskanen (1971), 
Therefore, The proper alignment of incentives is enforced by the effective 
monitoring of the agency by citizens or their representatives. 
Tullock (1965) 
 
Due to collective action problem, there is no incentive for individual 
owners/citizens to monitor bureaucratic activities. In this situation, performance is 
enhanced through mechanisms that foster competition between agencies, 
particularly if they allow clients to “vote with their feet.” 
Population 
Ecology 
Organizations are imbued with their essential characteristics at the time of their 
founding. 
Lawrence and 
Lorsch (1986) 
 
Their survival and performance depend on the characteristics of their environment 
or their capacity to manage change 
Political 
Theory  
Agencies that are politically autonomous and possess key political resources such as 
executive support are best able to manage change effectively. 
Peterson (1989),  
Chubb (1990) 
 of the Firm 
Competition from other institutions and strong sense of mission will motivate 
employees to succeed, not just to survive. 
Natural 
Selection 
Agencies survive and thrive when their characteristics match a volatile 
environment. 
Kaufman (1985) 
 
Blind chance, not skill or flexibility, determines an agency’s ability to match. 
Source: Adapted from Wolf (1993) 
 
To identify factors that are likely to affect bureaucratic effectiveness, Wolf 
(1993) employed case survey method and selected fourteen independent variables, 
based on two criteria: (1) whether they were crucial to one or more of the schools of 
thought on bureaucratic effectiveness, and (2) whether there was disagreement among 
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6theories as to their likely effect. From forty-four cases  that were randomly selected 
from an extensive bibliography of four thousand executive branch studies (Goehlert & 
Reynolds, 1989), Wolf identified the following independent variables:  
 
(1) Age of the organization 
(2) Leadership skills of agency head 
7 (3) Political autonomy
(4) Hierarchical structure 
(5) Formalization 
8(6) Identification with the agency  
(7) Government monopoly on mission 
9(8) Sense of mission  
(9) Resources targeted on critical task 
(10) Delegation of operational decision-making authority 
10(11) Adaptability  
(12) Difficulty of agency mission 
11(13) Controversial mission  
(14) Presidential support 
 
                                            
6 Each case had to (1) be a study of a U.S. federal agency, (2) not be authored by a current employee of 
the agency, (3) contain a distinct effectiveness evaluation, (4) have a source with citation and/or a 
bibliography. 
7 The extent to which the agency had universal political support 
8 Based on the factors such as careerism, living on the jobsite, uniforms/badges, and other indicators 
that the agency was an integral part of all aspects of the person’s life 
9 Based on evidence that agency personnel saw their work as important and were zealous in executing 
it 
10 Based on indications that the agency used innovative approaches on the application of agency 
functions to new missions. 
11 Extent to which necessary agency policies and operations clashed with long-held American traditions 
or threatened entrenched interested. 
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Among these variables, some factors such as (2) leadership skills of agency head, (8) 
sense of mission, (9) resources targeted on critical task, and (10) delegation of 
operational decision-making authority, are related to human resource management. As 
we reviewed previously, leadership is emphasized by the Government Performance 
Project (GPP) model because it integrates different subsets of management and leads 
to good management capacity. The delegation of operational decision-making 
authority and sense of mission among Wolf’s (1993) identified variables can be also 
understood from the viewpoint of strategic human resource management in the GPP. 
 
After identifying important variables that are likely to influence bureaucratic 
effectiveness, Wolf (1993) tested competing theories of bureaucratic effectiveness as 
seen in table 3-2 and found that "Political theory of the firm" is most likely to explain 
bureaucratic effectiveness in the U.S. federal government agencies. According to 
Wolf (1993), the political theory of the firm is a newly formulated theory that draws 
heavily from population ecology and supplements this core with the principles of 
professionalism and the economic responsiveness. Population ecology theory explains 
that an organization's survival and performance depends on the practices of its 
environment or its capacity to manage change (Lawrence et al., 1986). As the results 
of maximum likelihood estimation, five independent variables such as autonomy, 
monopoly, sense of mission, adaptability, and presidential support are significantly 
related to the effectiveness of an agency. Citing Chubb and Moe (1990), Wolf (1993) 
explained that strong sense of mission and competition from other agencies provide 
incentives for superior performance and adaptability enables agencies to maintain or 
increase these and other conditions that contribute to effectiveness.  
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3.4 Government agency effectiveness model  
Although the topic of organizational effectiveness is not simple and involves different 
kinds of models such as goal models, internal process models, and stakeholder models, 
Rainey and Steinbauer (1999) used a relatively straightforward definition of agency 
effectiveness in their study: the agency performs well in discharging the 
administrative and operational functions pursuant to the mission. Therefore, the 
concept of effectiveness in their study refers to whether the agency does well what it 
is supposed to, whether people in the agency work hard and well, whether the actions 
and procedures of the agency and its members are well suited to achieving its mission, 
and whether the agency actually achieves its mission.  
 
In order to develop government agency effectiveness model, Rainey and 
Steinbauer (1993) formulated some propositions about agency effectiveness drawing 
on government effectiveness studies. Before reviewing the propositions Rainey and 
Steinbauer (1999) developed, I take a brief look at the characteristics of leadership 
and managing employees that effective government agencies tend to have, based on 
Rainey (2003) and Hale’s (1996) literature review of high performance government 
agencies. Gold (1982) found that effective government agencies focus on treating 
employees fairly and respectfully through honest and open communication, 
emphasize delegation of responsibility and authority as widely as possible, and 
emphasize innovative ways of managing. Wilson (1989) summarized that in an 
effective government agency, discretionary authority for operators is maximized, and 
leaders have a bottom-up implementation perspective. Denhardt (1993) found that 
manager clearly articulates values and employees accept responsibility and 
performance accountability in effective government agencies. Holzer and Callahan 
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(1998) noted that effective government agencies develop human resources, empower 
employees through team building, recognition, and balancing employee and 
organizational needs. In sum, effective government agencies appear to have 
commitment human resource management (HRM) practices12.  
 
According to propositions about high performance government agencies that 
Rainey and Steinbauer (1999) developed, public agencies are more likely to perform 
effectively when there are higher levels of the following conditions: 
 
- Relations with oversight authorities are attentive, supportive, and delegative 
- Relations with other stakeholders are characterized by general public support, effective 
relations with partners and suppliers, effective negotiation network 
 
- Autonomy in operationalization and pursuit of agency mission 
- Mission valence (the attractiveness of mission) including difficult but feasible, 
reasonably clear and understandable, worthy/legitimate, interesting/exciting, and 
important/influential 
 
- Strong organizational culture, linked to mission 
- Leadership characterized by stability, commitment to mission, effective goal setting, 
and effective coping with political and administrative constraints 
 
- Task design characterized by intrinsic innovation and extrinsic rewards 
- Development of human resources such as effective recruitment, selection, placement, 
training, and development  
 
- Professionalism among members: commitment to task and mission accomplishment 
 
- Motivation among members: public service motivation, mission motivation, and task 
motivation. 
 
                                            
12 I define and explain the kinds of HRM practices such as control and commitment HRM practices at 
chapter five. Simply put, in an organization with commitment HRM practices, employees are regarded 
as valuable assets and we can expect high level of investments in employees. In addition, employees 
are encouraged to participate in various issues of organizations. 
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In these propositions, we observe that Rainey and Steinbauer (1999) emphasized 
leadership, motivation of employees, and human resource development in addition to 
relationships with oversight authorities and stakeholders; and task design, mission-
related propositions. Again, Rainey and Steinbauer (1999) also regarded the 
management of human resources as critical to becoming an effective government 
agency. That is, human resources need to be treated as valuable assets and something 
must be done to increase employee’s motivations such as public service motivation13, 
mission motivation14, and task motivation15. Rainey and Steinbauer (1999) suggested 
specific relationships among factors emphasized in the propositions, which leads to a 
suggested government agency effectiveness model as seen in figure 3-4.  
 
13 This can be defined as a general altruistic motivation to serve the interests of a community of people, 
a state, a nation, or humankind 
14 While public service motivation focuses on altruistic service that benefits a community or a larger 
population, mission motivation has as its target or objective the mission of the agency. Therefore, when 
motivated, an individual will extend effort and seek to perform well in ways that he or she perceives to 
be related to accomplishing the mission. 
15 This is about the influence of the relatively specific and immediate extrinsic and intrinsic rewards 
available through the person's role in the organization. 
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In the effectiveness model, we observe that the employee motivation is located 
closest (i.e., most directly related) to agency effectiveness. This might mean that if 
employees in a government agency are not motivated enough, it is hard to expect a 
high level of effectiveness in the agency. The model also suggested that motivation 
level is affected by various factors such as organizational culture, leadership, mission 
valence (attractiveness of the mission), and task design. In sum, the Rainey and 
Steinbauer effectiveness model considers human resources not as replaceable parts 
but as specific and valuable assets that managers need to pay special attention to if 
they want their agencies effective in delivering services. 
 
3.5 Summary 
In this chapter, I reviewed how human resources are regarded in the different efforts 
to understand effective public organizations. After reviewing the arguments from the 
different perspectives such as governance frame, the Government Performance 
Project, government agency effectiveness theories, and the effectiveness model of 
government organizations, we found that human resources are commonly regarded 
as a critical factor to becoming an effective organization in the public sector. 
 
As seen in the reduced form of governance equation, the importance of 
human resources in producing outcomes is reflected in managerial roles and 
activities (M). However, as Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill (2000b) pointed out, 
effectiveness or efficient performance may or may not be the goal of a legislative 
coalition. That is, if public organizations are inefficiently created, organizational 
performance (i.e., outcomes (O)) is not likely to improve by paying attention to other 
factors rather than remedying structural problems (S). 
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In the Government Performance Project (GPP) model, human resource 
management (HRM) is one of the major subsystems of management that comprise 
management capacity, and HRM refers to the policies, systems, and practices that 
influence employees' behaviors, attitudes, and performance, and subsequently the 
performance of the organization. The GPP also emphasizes leadership that helps to 
integrate different management subsystems, such as financial management, human 
resources management, capital management, and information technology 
management, and leads to good management capacity. According to the GPP model, 
a government that does not have the right people and expertise to perform critical 
functions is likely to be ineffective in delivering services and meeting citizen 
expectations. Since the HRM system plays a critical role to making governmental 
organizations effective, the GPP model indicates that governments need the right 
systems, practices, and policies in place to attract and retain the right people. 
 
From the forty-four cases that were randomly selected from an extensive 
bibliography of four thousand executive branch studies, Wolf (1993) identified 
fourteen variables that were likely to affect government agency effectiveness. 
Among them are three HRM-related factors: leadership skills of agency head, 
resource targeted on critical tasks, and delegation of operational decision-making 
authority. After identifying effectiveness-related variables, Wolf (1993) tested 
competing theories of bureaucratic effectiveness to examine which theories best 
explained those effectiveness-related variables and confirmed that "Political theory 
of the firm" best explained bureaucratic effectiveness in the U.S. federal government 
agencies. The political theory of the firm is a newly formulated, drawing heavily 
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from population ecology and supplementing with principles of professionalism and 
economic responsiveness. 
 
Rainey and Steinbauer (1999) developed propositions about effective 
government organizations by drawing on government effectiveness studies. In the 
propositions, we observe that as a critical factor to being effective, Rainey and 
Steinbauer (1999) identified leadership, motivation of employees, and human 
resource development in addition to relationships with oversight authorities and 
stakeholders, task design, mission-related propositions. In the suggested model of 
government effectiveness, employee motivations are located closest (i.e., most 
directly related) to agency effectiveness. Therefore, effectiveness is less likely to be 
achieved within government organizations if employees are not highly motivated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © Yongbeom Hur 2007 
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IV. Human Resource Management (HRM) and Organizational Strategy 
 
According to Wright and McMahan (1992), the human resource management (HRM) 
field has sought to become integrated into the strategic management process through 
the development of a new discipline referred to as Strategic Human Resource 
Management (SHRM). This is defined as the pattern of planned human resource 
deployments and activities intended to enable an organization to achieve its goals. In 
this chapter, I review some of the widely cited SHRM studies (e.g., Jackson & 
Schuler, 1995; Lengnick-Hall & Lengnick-Hall, 1988; Miles & Snow, 1984; Schuler 
& Jackson, 1987; Wright et al., 1992) and identify their arguments (including 
typologies) about human resources from a strategic point of view, hoping that the 
concept of relationships between HRM practices and organizational strategies may 
help to understand the results of my study since I explore if HRM characteristics of 
the municipal police departments have effects on crime control performance and 
turnover effects in the dissertation. 
 
1Human resource management (HRM)  consists of the various practices used 
to manage people in organizations. These practices commonly have been grouped 
into subdisciplines of selection, training, appraisal, and rewards (Fombrum, Tichy, & 
Devanna, 1984). Wright and McMahan (1992) argued that whereas each function of 
HRM has evolved through technical innovations generated primarily from a micro-
perspective that focuses only on the particular function, strategic human resource 
management (SHRM) studies have begun to examine the determinants of HR 
practices from a strategic perspective. According to Wright and McMahan (1992), 
                                            
1 According to Jackson and Schuler (1995), HRM encompasses (a) specific human resource practices 
such as recruitment, selection, and appraisal; (b) formal human resource policies; and (c) overarching 
human resource philosophies.  
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SHRM is different from traditional HRM at least in two dimensions: First, vertically, 
it entails the linking of HRM practices with the strategic management process of the 
organization, and second, horizontally, SHRM emphasizes the coordination or 
congruence among the various human resource management practices through a 
pattern of planned action.   
 
4.1 Determinants of human resource management practices 
2In this section, I briefly review Wright and McMahan’s (1992) theoretical models  
that  explain why an organization has a certain kind of HRM practices (i.e., the 
determinants of HRM practices). 
 
In figure 4-1, Wright and McMahan (1992) explained that the four models 
(model 1 through 4) are strategic models (or theories) of HRM that view HRM 
activities as being determined by proactive, strategically intended decisions, and the 
remaining two (model 5 and 6) are non-strategic models (or theories) of HRM, 
which tend to explain non-strategic and possibly even dysfunctional determinants of 
HRM practices.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
2 Jackson and Schuler (1995) also provided the similar summary of these models before suggesting 
internal and external contextual factors of HRM practices. 
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Figure 4-1. A Conceptual Model of Theoretical Framework for Studying Strategic 
Human Resource Management 
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The resource-based view of the firm (i.e., model 1) emphasizes the link 
between strategy and the internal resources of the firm. It sees human resources as 
the essential asset to have sustained competitive advantage. Therefore, training and 
investment in human resources are expected from this perspective. The cybernetic 
systems model (i.e., model 2) sees organizations as input, throughput, and output 
systems in transactions with a surrounding environment. Therefore, HR input such as 
HR Skills, Knowledge, and Abilities (SKAs) affects HR throughput, which in turn 
affects HR outputs, while both input and throughput are influenced by firm strategy, 
and firm strategy got feedback from output such as productivity, satisfaction, and 
turnover. In sum, HRM practices are influenced and decided by various factors such 
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as a surrounding environment, firm strategy, and HR input, throughput and output. 
The agency/transaction cost theory (i.e., model 3) is based on the assumption that 
employees have strong incentives to shirk (i.e., reducing their performance) and free 
ride (i.e., relying on the efforts of others in the group) and no incentive to increase 
their performance unless task conditions allow employees to demonstrate their 
unique contributions and to benefit from those contributions (Jones, 1984). Therefore, 
the role of HRM practices is to allow for the measurement of unique contributions 
and to provide adequate rewards for individual employee performance. The 
behavioral approach (i.e., model 4) focuses on employee behavior as the mediator 
between strategy and firm performance and assumes that the purpose of HRM 
practices is to elicit and control employee attitudes and behaviors. In this approach, it 
is also assumed that strategies lead to HRM practices, which elicit employee role 
behaviors, and those desirable role behaviors eventually lead to a number of 
outcomes that provide benefits to the firm.  
 
Wright and McMahan (1992) also suggested non-strategic models (models 5 
and 6) of HRM in order to fully understand the ways in which HRM practices can 
either support or fail to support a firm’s strategy. According to Wright and McMahan 
(1992), the determinants of HRM practices in these non-strategic models are not the 
results of rational strategic decision-making processes, but rather derived from 
institutional and political forces. The resource dependence model (i.e., model 5 in the 
figure) focuses on power relationships within and among organizations and assumes 
that all organizations depend on a flow of valuable resources (e.g., money, 
technology, skills) into the organization in order to continue functioning. Therefore, 
the ability to exercise control over any of these valued resources provides an 
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individual or group with an important source of power (Pfeffer, 1981). In sum, the 
resource dependence model sees that those power relations tend to affect investments 
in certain HRM practices. The institutional approach (i.e., model 6 in the figure) sees 
that many structures, programs, and practices in organizations attain legitimacy 
through the social construction of reality. According to this view, many HRM 
practices may be the result of social construction processes whereby external entities 
influence the creation. 
 
4.2 Contextual factors of human resource management practices 
As determinants of HRM practices, Jackson and Schuler (1995) also identified 
internal and external contextual factors. As internal factors, they identified (1) 
technology, (2) structure, (3) size, (4) life cycle stages, and (5) business strategy. As 
external factors, they identified (1) legal, social, and political environments, (2) 
unionization, (3) labor market conditions, (4) industry characteristics, and (5) 
national culture.  
 
(1) Technology refers to a system’s processes for transforming inputs into 
usable outputs. For example, Jackson and Schuler argued that HRM practices would 
be directly influenced by the presence of advanced manufacturing technology 
(AMT) and total quality management, based on Snell and Dean’s (1992) study. For 
example, Snell and Dean found that firms using traditional technologies were less 
likely than firms using AMT to engage in selective hiring, comprehensive training, 
and externally equitable compensation. (2) Organizational structure describes the 
allocation of tasks and responsibilities among individuals and departments, and the 
impact of structure on HRM practices is particularly evident in discussion of 
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multinational firms and international joint ventures. With respect to (3) size, based 
on institutional theory, Jackson and Schuler (1995) noted that larger organizations 
should adopt more sophisticated and socially responsive HRM activities because 
these more visible organizations are under more pressure to gain legitimacy. Based 
on economic theories, Jackson and Schuler also argued that because of the costs 
associated with many aspects of HRM, acceptable economies of scale must be 
reached before sophisticated HRM systems can be implemented. (4) Organizational 
life cycle stages are associated with changing managerial priorities, and these 
changing priorities, in turn, have implications for HRM. For example, Jackson and 
Schuler argued that selection criteria and assessment methods for top-level 
executives need to be matched to life cycle stages, based on Gerstein and Reisman 
(1983). (5) Business strategy also affects HRM practices. Citing Miles and Snow’s 
(1978) typology of business (i.e., prospectors, analyzers, and defenders), Jackson and 
Schuler (1995) argued that the postures toward the environment should have 
implications for the quantity and pace of human resource flows. For example, 
defenders who seek to maintain the same limited product line with emphasis on high 
volume and low cost, are less concerned about recruiting new applicants externally 
and more concerned about developing current employees.  
 
As a first external contextual factor, Jackson and Schuler (1995) identified 
the legal, social, and political environments and argued that those environments 
affect almost all aspects of HRM, based on institutional and resource dependence 
theories3. Taking an example that in the U.S., unionized employees have received 
wages about 33% greater than those of nonunion employees, Jackson and Schuler 
                                            
3 I explained these theories when Wright and McMahan (1992) was reviewed in the previous section. 
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identified unionization as a second external contextual factor and noted that unions 
give voice to their members; establish policies and procedures for handling wage and 
working condition grievances; provide for job security; and secure health and 
retirement benefits. As a third external contextual factor, labor market conditions can 
be characterized by unemployment levels, labor diversity, labor market structure, etc. 
For example, when unemployment rate is high, recruiting process is likely to be 
more selective due to abundant applicants. Industrial characteristics, as a fourth 
external factor, differ depending on the sectors (i.e., the private and the public 
sectors), the extent of regulations, and so on. For example, the definition of 
effectiveness or behaviors evaluation is different depending on whether 
organizations are in the private sector or in the public sector. National culture is also 
identified as an external contextual factor since multinational enterprises have long 
before appeared and national economies are not within their national boundaries any 
more.  
 
4.3 Organizational characteristics and human resource management practices 
Miles and Snow (1984) explored relationships between organizational characteristics 
and HRM practices, and suggested three types of organizational characteristics. After 
investigating several hundreds companies in a dozen different industries, Miles and 
Snow observed that there were three types of organizational characteristics (or 
strategic behavior): defenders, prospectors, and analyzers. Defenders have narrow 
and relatively stable product-market domains and devote primary attention to 
improving the efficiency of their existing operations. Defender characteristics 
include a limited product line, capital-intensive technology, a functional structure, 
and skills in product efficiency. Prospectors continually search for product and 
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market opportunities and regularly experiment with potential responses to emerging 
environmental trends. Prospector characteristics include a diverse product line; 
multiple technology; geographically divisionalized structure, and skills in product 
research and development. Analyzers operate in two types of product-market 
domains – one is relatively stable, and the other is changing. Analyzer characteristics 
include a limited basic product line; search for a small number of related product; 
mixed structure; and skills in production efficiency, process engineering, and 
marketing. After three types of organizational characteristics were proposed, Miles 
and Snow (1984) called organizations reactors if strategy-environment inconsistency 
exists, and strategy, structure, and process are poorly aligned in organizations.  
 
Table 4-1 shows how HRM practices can be different depending on 
organizational characteristics, and Miles and Snow (1984) argued that because the 
demand for human resources services derives from strategic considerations in most 
organizations, the development of HRM systems has tended to lag behind 
developments in strategy and structure.  
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Table 4-1. Organizational Characteristics and HRM Practices 
 
Defender Prospector Analyzer  
Basic HRM 
Strategy 
Building  Acquiring Allocating 
Human resources Human resources Human resources 
Emphasis: “make” Emphasis: “buy” 
Recruitment, 
Selection, 
Little recruitment above Sophisticated recruiting  Emphasis: “make and buy” 
Mixed recruiting and selection 
approaches 
entry level at all levels 
Selection based on weeding out 
undesirable employees 
Selection may involve 
psychological testing 
& Placement 
Staff Planning, 
Training, 
Informal, limited skill 
identification and acquisition 
Formal, extensive skill building 
and acquisition Formal, extensive skill building Extensive training programs Limited training programs Extensive training programs & Development 
Mostly process-oriented 
procedures Results-oriented procedures Identification of training and 
staffing needs 
Process-oriented procedures Identification of staffing needs Performance 
appraisal 
Identification of training needs Comparison with other 
companies during the same 
period 
Comparison with previous 
years’ performance 
Mostly comparison with 
previous years’ performance, 
some comparison with other 
companies 
Oriented toward hierarchy, some 
performance Oriented toward position in 
organization hierarchy Oriented toward performance Internal consistency and 
external competitiveness Internal consistency External competitiveness Compensation Compensation driven by 
superior/subordinate 
differentials 
Compensation driven by 
recruitment needs 
Compensation driven by 
superior/subordinate 
differentials and recruitment 
needs 
Source: Adapted from Miles and Snow (1984) 
 
 
4.4 Strategic situation and human resource management practices 
Arguing that achieving competitive advantage through human resources requires that 
theses activities be managed from a strategic perspective, Lengnick-Hall and 
Lengnick-Hall (1988) explained why it is desirable to integrate human resources 
management and strategic choice as follows. First, integration provides a broader 
range of solutions for solving complex organizational problems. Second, integration 
ensures that human, financial, and technological resources are given consideration in 
setting goals and assessing implementation capabilities. Third, through integration 
organizations must explicitly consider the individuals who comprise them and must 
implement policies. Finally, reciprocity in integrating human resource and strategic 
concerns limits the neglect of human resources as a vital source of organizational 
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competence and competitive advantage.  
 
Lengnick-Hall and Lengnick-Hall (1988) proposed a typology for strategic 
management of human resources through the “Growth/Readiness” matrix shown in 
figure 4-2, and contended that movement from one strategic situation to another (i.e., 
from one quadrant to another in the figure) results from an interaction between 
environmental conditions and organizational choice. 
 
Figure 4-2. Growth / Readiness Matrix 
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Lengnick-Hall and Lengnick-Hall explained that corporate growth expectations (i.e., 
Y-axis) are a proxy for the goals of the organization and high growth generally 
means increased opportunities, high cash flow, and expansion. Organizational 
readiness (i.e., X-axis) measures availability or obtainability of human resources 
skills, numbers, styles, and experience needed for strategy implementation, therefore 
it is a proxy for implementation feasibility. Lengnick-Hall and Lengnick-Hall argued 
 49
 
that since current techniques or skills become less competitive over time, strategic 
situations tend to change from left to right (i.e., from high readiness to obsolescence) 
while growth expectation moves from top to bottom (i.e., from high growth 
expectation to lower growth goals) because markets become saturated and new 
competitors enter the marketplace.  
 
Quadrant 1 (development) is characterized by high growth expectations and a 
poor level of readiness between strategy and human resources skills as seen in the 
figure. In this situation, a firm may choose to invest heavily in its human resources to 
improve implementation feasibility or a firm may decide to change corporate goals 
to reflect the lack of readiness. When an organization is located in quadrant 2 
(expansion) characterized by high grow expectations and good readiness indications 
between strategy and skills, the primary question involves resource allocation: what 
proportion of resources should be devoted to achieving continued growth and what 
proportion should be channeled into managing the effects of growth (e.g., updating 
planning systems, managing information, socializing new employees). Lengnick-
Hall and Lengnick-Hall explained that the resolution to resource allocation depends 
on the level of human resources investment required to maintain desired growth and 
continued readiness, profitability, and other performance measures that are important 
to the firm. In quadrant 3 (productivity) where characteristics includes low growth 
expectation and strong readiness, the key question is how to channel the results of 
productive activities because a firm in this quadrant has an established competitive 
advantage and operations are highly effective and efficient. The redirection quadrant 
(quadrant 4) is characterized by low growth expectations and poor readiness. Firms 
located in this quadrant are typically in declining industries or have maintained 
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obsolete products or manufacturing processes that are no longer competitive, 
therefore they must decide whether to redirect employee activities or to alter the 
business focus (i.e., exit). For example, if a firm decides to redirect employee 
activities, retaining, restructuring, and realignment are needed. If a firm decided to 
exit, turnover is often required. Based on MacMillan and Jones (1986), Lengnick-
Hall and Lengnick-Hall suggested that firms in this quadrant must examine 
organization culture and employment philosophy because firms that reach this stage 
usually have an organization culture that is firmly established and values that have 
dominated during times of growth and implementation are often maladaptive. In 
conclusion, Lengnick-Hall and Lengnick-Hall suggested a testable hypothesis that 
firms engaging in a strategy formulation process that systematically and reciprocally 
considers human resources and competitive strategy will perform better over the 
long term than firms that manage competitive strategy and human resources 
independently of each other 
 
 
4.5 Competitive strategy and human resource management practices 
Based on Porter’s (1980; 1985) discussion of a firm’s competitive advantage, 
Schuler and Jackson (1987) suggested three competitive strategies and their proper 
HRM practices that organizations may use to gain competitive advantage: innovation, 
quality enhancement, and cost reduction. According to Schuler and Jackson (1987), a 
certain type of role behavior is needed from an employee apart from the specific 
technical skills, knowledge, and abilities required to perform a specific task, and this 
employee role behavior is associated with HRM practices. Table 4-2 shows several 
dimensions along which employee’s role behavior can vary. 
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Table 4-2. Employees role behaviors for competitive strategies 
 
1. Highly repetitive, predictable behavior …. Highly creative, innovative behavior 
2. Very short-term focus …. Very long-term behavior 
3. Highly cooperative, interdependent behavior …. Highly independent autonomous behavior 
4. Very low concern of quality …. Very high concern for quality 
5. Very low concern of quantity …. Very high concern for quantity 
6. Very low risk taking …. Very high risk taking 
7. Very high concern for process …. Very high concern for results 
8. High preference to avoid responsibility …. High preference to assume responsibility 
9. Very inflexible to change …. Very flexible to change 
…. Very tolerant of ambiguity and 
unpredictability 10. Very comfortable with stability 
11. Narrow skill application …. Broad skill application 
12. Low job involvement …. High job involvement 
 
Source: Schuler (1988) 
 
Schuler and Jackson (1987) argued that since an organization pursuing an 
innovation strategy is to be the most unique producer, conditions for innovation must 
be created either formally through official corporate policy or more informally. 
Therefore, the role behavior for this organization includes: a high degree of creative 
behavior, a longer-term focus, a relatively high level of cooperative, interdependent 
behavior, moderate concern for quality and quantity, an equal degree of concern for 
process and results, a greater degree of risk taking, and a high tolerance of ambiguity 
and unpredictability. Quality improvement can be possible through the employee’s 
commitment to work, changing processes of production, and others, therefore an 
organization with a quality-enhancement strategy needs the employee’s role behavior 
such as relatively repetitive and predictable behaviors, a more long-term focus, a 
modest amount of cooperative, interdependent behavior, a high concern for quality, a 
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modest concern for quantity of output, high concern for process, low risk-taking 
activity, and commitment to the goals of the organization. Since a firm with cost-
reduction strategy typically attempts to gain competitive advantages by being the 
lowest cost producer, Schuler and Jackson (1987) argued that the profile of employee 
role behaviors includes relatively repetitive and predictable behaviors, rather short-
term focus, primary autonomous and individual activity, high concern for quantity of 
output, primary concern for results, low risk-taking, and a relatively high degree of 
comfort with stability.  
 
Based on role behaviors in each competitive strategy (i.e., innovation, 
quality-enhancement, and cost-reduction), Schuler and Jackson (1987) suggested 
proper HRM practices in each case. Firms pursuing innovation strategy are likely to 
have the following HRM characteristics: (1) jobs that require close interaction and 
coordination among groups of individuals, (2) performance appraisals that are more 
likely to reflect longer-term and group-based achievements, (3) jobs that allow 
employees to develop skills that can be used in other positions in the firm, (4) 
comparison systems that emphasize internal equity rather than external or market-
based equity, (5) pay rates that tend to be low, but that allow employees to be 
stockholders and have more freedom to choose the mix of components, and (6) broad 
career paths to reinforce the development of a broad range of skills. The key HRM 
practices in a firm with quality-enhance strategy are: (1) relatively fixed and explicit 
job description, (2) high levels of employee participation in decisions relevant to 
immediate work conditions and the job itself, (3) a mix of individual and group 
criteria for performance appraisal that is mostly short term and results-oriented, (4) 
relatively egalitarian treatment of employees and some guarantees of employment 
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security, and (5) extensive and continuous training and development of employees. 
An organization with cost-reduction strategy is likely to have HRM practices such as 
(1) Relatively fixed and explicit job descriptions that allow little room for ambiguity, 
(2) narrowly designed jobs and narrowly defined career paths that encourage 
specialization, expertise, and efficiency, (3) short-term, results-oriented performance 
appraisals, (4) close monitoring market pay level for use in making compensation 
decisions, and (5) minimal levels of employee training and development. Schuler 
and Jackson (1987) concluded that although all firms are not seeking to gain 
competitive strategy, for those attempting to do so, the experiences of other firms 
suggest that effectiveness can be increased by systematically melding HRM practices 
with the selective competitive strategy.  
 
4.6 Summary  
So far I reviewed some strategic human resource management (SHRM) studies in 
which human resources are understood from the strategic perspective. Although 
these studies mainly focus on organizations in the private sector, we may get some 
hints about how to understand HRM characteristics and HRM practices that 
municipal police departments may have. For example, we may interpret the 
influence of HRM practices and characteristics on crime control performance (i.e., 
performance indicator in this study) in the municipal police departments from the 
strategic viewpoint. If we find a significant relationship between HRM 
characteristics and crime control performance, we may interpret that HRM 
characteristics are well tuned to organizational strategies. Likewise, if no significant 
results are found, we may interpret that there might be inconsistency between HRM 
practices and their organizational strategies or that HRM practices are irrelevant for 
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crime control performance. 
 
Schuler and Jackson (1987) argued that HRM practices are associated with 
expected role behaviors that are different depending on competitive strategies (i.e., 
innovation, quality enhancement, and cost reduction) that an organization pursues. 
According to Lengnick-Hall and Lengnick-Hall (1988), HRM practices would be 
different depending on strategic situations (i.e., development, expansion, productivity, 
and redirection), that can be explained with corporate growth expectation and 
organizational readiness. Miles and Snow (1984) observed three basic types of 
organizational characteristics (i.e., defenders, prospectors, and analyzers) and 
suggested appropriate HRM practices for each type of organizational characteristics. 
For example, defenders are likely to have little recruitment above entry level 
whereas prospectors are likely to have sophisticated recruiting at all levels.  
 
Wright and McMahan (1992) summarized HRM literature and answered the 
question, “what determines HRM practices?” by suggesting strategic and non-
strategic models. Strategic models of HRM practices view HRM activities (or 
practices) as being determined by proactive and strategically intended decisions, and 
Wright and McMahan (1992) suggested four strategic models: resource-based view, 
cybernetic system, agency/transaction cost, and behavioral approach. The authors 
also suggested non-strategic models that do not see HRM practices as the results of 
proactive decision-making. Instead, in non-strategic models, HRM practices are 
viewed as results of institutional and political forces that do not consider 
organizational goals or strategic end. In addition to Wright and McMahan’s (1992) 
strategic and non-strategic models that explain the determinants of HRM practices, 
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Jackson and Schuler (1995) argued that HRM practices are also influenced by 
contextual factors of an organization. That is, they identified internal contextual 
factors (i.e., technology, structure, size, life cycle stages, and business strategy) and 
external contextual factors (i.e., legal, social, and political environments, 
unionization, labor market conditions, industry characteristics, and national culture), 
both of which are likely to influence HRM practices an organization adopts.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © Yongbeom Hur 2007 
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V. HRM Practices, Organizational Performance, and Hypotheses 
 
From the perspective of strategic human resource management (SHRM), HRM 
practices may be determined according to organizational characteristics (i.e., Miles 
and Snow, 1984: defender, prospector, and analyzer), strategic situations (i.e. 
Lengnick-Hall and Lengnick-Hall, 1988: development, expansion, productivity, and 
redirection), or competitive strategies (i.e., Schuler and Jackson, 1987: innovation, 
quality-enhancement, and cost reduction). While those typologies are suggested as 
strategic models, Wright and McMahan (1992) also suggested non-strategic models 
since sometimes HRM practices can fail to support a firm’s strategy. According to 
Wright and McMahan, the determinants of HRM practices in some organizations 
(especially public organizations) may not be the results of rational strategic decision-
making processes, but rather derived from institutional and political forces.  
 
In this chapter, I review HRM practices from both universalistic and 
contingency perspectives, focusing on the link between HRM practices and 
organizational performance. From the universalistic perspective, there are HRM best 
practices that always lead to better organizational performance in any circumstances, 
whereas the contingency perspective argues that we can expect better performance 
only when HRM practices are integrated with organizational strategy because 
different employee behaviors are required under different organizational strategy and 
different HRM practices will elicit and control employees’ behaviors. After 
reviewing arguments of both universalistic and contingency perspectives, I review 
some empirical studies that tested if HRM practices are correlated with 
organizational performance from the universalistic and the contingency perspectives. 
Since control theories also appear to explain the link between HRM practices and 
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organizational performance, I also review some arguments from the control theory 
perspective, too. At the end of this chapter, I establish some hypotheses that predict 
the relationships between HRM practices and crime control performance, based on 
the arguments of universalistic, contingency, and control theory perspectives.  
 
5.1 The universalistic perspective on HRM practices 
There are generally two primary perspectives to describe the link between HRM 
practices and organizational performance; one is the universalistic (or best practices) 
and the other is the contingency (Youndt et al., 1996). In this section and the next, I 
outline these two perspectives based on HRM studies that provide summaries about 
either one of those perspectives or both (e.g., Arthur, 1992; Becker & Gerhart, 1996; 
Delaney & Huselid, 1996; Delery & Doty, 1996; Walton, 1985; Youndt et al., 1996).  
 
The universalistic approach has an assumption that certain HRM practices 
have positive and direct effects on organization performance. In fact, a fair amount 
of empirical evidence that supports this assumption has been accumulated. Some 
studies (e.g., Bartel, 1994; Becker & Huselid, 1992; Gerhart & Milkovich, 1992; 
Ichniowski, 1986; Wagner, 1994) focus on the effect of individual HRM practices, 
others (e.g., Arthur, 1994; Huselid, 1995; MacDuffie, 1995; Walton, 1985), 
especially recently, focus on bundles or systems of HRM practices. For example, 
some studies focus on individual HRM practices such as selectivity in staffing (e.g., 
Becker et al., 1992; Schmidt, Hunter, McKenzie, & Muldrow, 1979), training (e.g., 
Bartel, 1994; Knoke & Kalleberg, 1994), incentive compensation (e.g., Gerhart et al., 
1992), formal grievance procedure (e.g., Ichniowski, 1986), and employee 
participation (e.g., Wagner, 1994), and found that each of those individual HRM 
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practices has positive effects on organizational performance.  
 
More recently, researchers have found that bundles, or systems, of HRM 
practices have more influences on organizational performance than individual 
practices working in isolation (e.g., Youndt et al., 1996). For example, Arthur (1992; 
1994) found that commitment-maximizing HRM systems have more positive effects 
on manufacturing performance than cost-reduction HRM systems. According to 
Arthur (1992, 1994), the commitment-maximizing HRM system is characterized by 
broadly defined jobs, high level of employee participation, formal dispute resolution, 
regularly share business information with employees, more extensive general 
training, and relatively high wages. Youndt et al. (1996) and Becker and Gerhardt 
(1996) similarly argued that there are the best HRM practices that lead to better 
organizational performance, but they noted that those best HRM practices may vary 
depending on researchers. Table 5-1 shows some examples of the best HRM 
practices that are suggested by different researchers.  
 
Although there are some variations in defining the best HRM practices 
depending on the studies, Youndt et al. (1996) observed that at their roots, most 
studies focus on enhancing the skill base of employees through human resource 
activities such as selective staffing, comprehensive training, and broad 
developmental efforts like job rotation and cross-utilization as seen in the table. 
Youndt et al. (1996) explained the reasons why those best HRM practices might 
result in high performance, based on two different theories. According to human 
capital theory, people who possess Skills, Knowledge, and Abilities (SKAs) are 
valuable to firm, so HRM practices that help improve employees’ SKAs are more 
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likely to increase organizational performance.  
 
Table 5-1. Summaries of HRM Best Practices 
 
Authors HRM best practices 
- Flexible definition of duties 
- Frequent use of teams as accountable unit 
- Flat organization structure with mutual influence system 
- Management emphasis on problem solving and relevant expertise 
- Individual pay linked to skills and mastery Walton (1985) - Job security 
- Priority for training 
- Employee participation encouraged on wide range of issues 
- Business data shared widely 
- Mutuality in labor relations/joint planning on expanded agenda 
- Employment security  
- Selective recruiting 
- High wages/Incentive pay 
- Employee ownership 
- Information sharing 
Pfeffer (1994) - Participation 
- Empowerment 
- Job redesign/teams 
- Training and skill development/Cross-training 
- Wage compression 
- Promotion from within 
- Personnel selection 
- Performance appraisal 
- Incentive compensation 
- Formal grievance procedures Huselid (1995) - Information sharing 
- Labor/management participation 
- Recruiting intensity 
- More training hours 
- Work teams 
- Problem-solving groups 
- Job rotation 
MacDuffie (1995) - Decentralization 
- Recruitment and hiring 
- Contingent compensation 
- More training hours 
- Self-directed work teams 
Kochan and Osterman 
(1994) 
- Job rotation 
- Problem-solving groups/quality circles 
- Total Quality Management 
- Self-directed work teams 
- Problem-solving groups/quality circles Cutcher-Gershenfeld (1991) - Feedback on production goals 
- Formal conflict resolution 
Source: Adapted from Walton (1985), Youndt et al. (1996), and Becker and Gerhardt (1996) 
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Youndt et al. (1996) also explained with resource-based theory.  The 
resource-based theory emphasizes that internal resources like employees play a 
critical role to developing and maintaining a firm’s competitive capabilities (see 
Wright and McMahan’s (1992) determinants of HRM practices). Researchers (e.g., 
Barney, 1995; Pfeffer, 1994; Ulrich & Lake, 1991; Wright et al., 1992) noted that 
people may be the ultimate source with which we can sustain competitive advantage 
because other sources such as technology, financial capital, and scale economies can 
be easily imitated and have been weakened by globalization and environmental 
changes.  
 
5.2 The contingency perspective on HRM practices 
The contingency perspective posits that the impact of HRM practices on 
organizational performance is conditioned by organizations’ strategic postures that 
may be determined by organizational characteristics, strategic situations, or 
competitive strategies. Therefore, if a firm’s approach to competition does not rely 
on the talents and capabilities of employees, HRM practices may not have an effect 
on organizational performance (Youndt et al., 1996).  
 
Delery and Doty (1996) noted that contingency arguments are more complex 
than universalistic arguments because contingency arguments imply interactions 
rather than the simple linear relationships incorporated in universalistic theories. 
According to Delery and Doty (1996), the organization’s strategy is considered to be 
the primary contingency factor, therefore a contingency perspective requires a 
researcher to select a theory of firm strategy and then specify how the individual 
HRM practices will interact with firm strategy to result in organizational 
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performance.  
 
Youndt et al. (1996) explained the link between contingency approach to 
HRM practices and a high level of organizational performance from two 
perspectives: the behavioral perspective and control theory perspective. From the 
behavioral perspective, organizational characteristics or strategies require unique 
attitudes and role behaviors if performance is to be effective. According to this 
perspective, HRM practices can be the means to elicit and reinforce the kinds of 
employee behaviors that an organization needs. That is, strategic context influences 
individual HRM practices such as employee selection (e.g., Hambrick, 1983), job 
design (e.g., Keefe & Katz, 1990), and performance appraisal and compensation (e.g., 
Kerr, 1985). For example, under the cost reduction strategy in which organizations 
can create customer value by reducing costs, emphasis is placed on efficiently 
managing a low-skilled, manual workforce. Therefore, in that situation, 
comprehensive employment testing to find the best qualified candidates (e.g., 
Hofstede, 1978) or elaborate training system (e.g., Cascio, 1991) may have a 
negligible impact on organizational performance. However, under the quality 
strategy that focuses on continually improving manufacturing processes to increase 
product reliability and customer satisfaction, the ultimate determinants of 
organizational competitiveness may be the intellectual capital of organizations. 
Therefore, human-capital-enhancing HRM systems with such features as selective 
staffing, comprehensive training, developmental behavior-based performance 
appraisal, and group incentives are likely to have positive impacts on organizational 
performance (Youndt et al. 1996).  
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5.3 HRM practices and organizational performance 
As we reviewed in the previous sections, some strategic HRM (SHRM) researchers 
argued that there are so-called best HRM practices (i.e., universalistic HRM 
practices) which may lead to a high level of organizational performance, whereas 
other SHRM researchers argued that HRM practices need to be integrated with 
organizational strategies to be effective (i.e., contingency perspective). In this section, 
I review some empirical research that explored the relationships between HRM 
practices and organizational performance from either universalistic or contingency 
perspectives. 
 
As one of the first empirical efforts to evaluate the effect of HRM system on 
organizational performance from the strategic viewpoint, Arthur (1994) investigated 
the effects of HRM practices on organizational performance, using an empirical 
taxonomy of HRM practices such as control and commitment HRM categories. 
Arthur found that an organization with commitment HRM practices had higher 
organizational performance than an organization with control HRM practices. With a 
sample of 30 existing U.S. steel minimills where they begin the steel making process 
with steel scrap instead of iron ore, Arthur (1994) categorized their HRM practices 
into control and commitment HRM systems (or bundles of HRM practices), 
compared their organizational performance (i.e., scrap rate and labor hours) among 
minimills with different HRM systems, and found that minimills with the 
commitment HRM system had fewer labor hours per ton and fewer scrap rate (i.e., 
higher performance). Although Arthur (1994) found that HRM system had a 
significant effect on organizational performance in this study, he raised a question if 
HRM system has similar effect in the public sectors. 
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Huselid (1995) argued that if superior HRM practices (i.e., the best HRM 
practices) increase employees’ discretionary effort, their use would increase a firm’s 
productivity, drawing on the theoretical literature (e.g. Barney, 1991) that suggests 
HRM practices can affect individual employee performance through their influence 
over employees’ skills, motivation, and organizational structures. Huselid also 
argued that complementarities among HRM practices (i.e., internal fit) and alignment 
of HRM practices with a firm’s competitive strategy (i.e., external fit) would 
increase a firm’s productivity, too. Testing with a sample consisting of 968 firms that 
had more than a hundred employees in the U. S., Huselid found that best HRM 
practices led to increased productivity (i.e., sales per employee in the study). 
However, the results did not support the external fit argument (i.e., contingency 
argument) and showed only modest support for the effect of internal fit among HRM 
practices on productivity.  
 
Based on Levine and Tyson’s (1990) study, MacDuffie (1995) argued that 
three conditions must be met for any HRM system to contribute to improving 
performance: (1) when employees possess knowledge and skills that managers lack; 
(2) when employees are motivated to apply these skills and knowledge through 
discretionary efforts; and (3) when the firm’s business or production strategy can 
only be achieved when employees contribute such discretionary effort. Between two 
historical production strategies (i.e., mass production and flexible production 
strategies), Macduffie (1995) argued that under flexible (or lean) production strategy 
workers are given a more central role in the production system, and extensive 
training, broad job classifications, and job rotations are required for employees to 
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develop skills for problem-solving. He also argued that workers would only 
contribute their discretionary efforts to problem-solving if they believe that their 
individual interests are aligned with those of the company, and that the company will 
make a reciprocal investment in their well-being. Using an international data set 
comprising 62 automotive assembly plants, MacDuffie (1995) tested his argument 
that HRM system contributes more to productivity1 2 and quality  of assembly plant 
when HRM system is integrated with manufacturing policies from contingency 
perspective. The result showed that flexible production strategy consistently led to 
better performance than the mass production approach, and that result confirmed the 
universalistic arguments rather than contingent approach about the effects of HRM 
practices. That is, the argument that either mass or flexible production plants with a 
good fit between their HRM systems and production strategies would better perform 
was not supported. 
 
With the data collected from about 200 banks, Delery and Doty (1996) tested 
three modes of SHRM theories to see the effects of HRM practices on financial 
performance: universalistic, contingency, and configurational. As reviewed 
previously, the universalistic view refers to best HR practices that lead to better 
performance if an organization adopts them, and the contingency view means HRM 
practices need to be consistent with business or production strategy if high 
performance is to be achieved. According to Delery and Doty, while the contingency 
view focuses on individual HRM practices, the configurational view is more 
concerned about the pattern of multiple independent variables (i.e., internal fit 
between HRM practices) – that is, synergistic effects are expected if there is 
                                            
1 Labor productivity is defined as hours of actual effort required to build a vehicle. 
2 Consumer-perceived quality, defined as defects per 100 vehicles. 
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consistency among HRM practices. Drawing on SHRM literature (e.g., Miles et al., 
1984; Osterman, 1987; Pfeffer, 1994), Delery and Doty identified seven strategic 
HRM practices: internal career opportunities, formal training systems, appraisal 
measures (behavior or results based), profit sharing, employment security, voice 
mechanism (formal grievance and participation in decision making), and job 
definition. According to the results in their study, the universalistic view was 
relatively more supported than the other views, and especially, three HRM practices 
such as job security, profit-sharing, and results-oriented appraisal had strong and 
positive relationships with organizational finance performance. The results also 
provided some support for the contingency perspective by revealing the links 
between financial performance and three HRM practices such as performance 
appraisal, employee participation, and internal career opportunity when they were 
consistent with organizational strategies. For example, banks that were able to align 
their HRM practices with strategy were estimated to have nearly 50 percent higher 
financial performance (e.g., return-on-assets in the study) than other banks whose 
HRM practices were one standard deviation out of alignment. In addition, the results 
also showed some support for the configurational view. For example, the more 
closely a bank’s employment system resembled the market-type system3, the higher 
level its performance reached. In sum, the results showed that all the three 
perspectives of HRM practices had positive effects on organizational performance 
(i.e., financial performance in the study). 
 
The universalistic and the contingency views of the effects of HRM practices 
                                            
3 The market-type system is characterized by hiring from outside an organization, providing little 
training, and evaluating performance through the use of results measures. Oppositely, the internal 
system is characterized by hiring from internal labor market, and extensive training and socialization 
(Delery and Doty, 1996, p809-810) 
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on performance were also tested by Youndt, Snell, Dean, and Lepak (1996). With the 
sample comprising manufacturing plants in metal-working industry (100 – 150 
managers at different positions participated), Youndt et al. focused on the 
relationships between organizational performance – customer alignment, machine 
efficiency, and employee productivity – and the four most commonly recognized 
areas of HRM practices (i.e., staffing, training, performance appraisal, and 
compensation). The results showed that human-capital-enhancing HRM practices4 
have significant and positive effects on organizational performance (i.e., customer 
alignment, machine efficiency, and employee productivity in the study), which 
supports the universalistic perspective. Further analysis, however, revealed that the 
main effect of human-capital-enhancing HRM practices on performance was 
predominately a function of the performance enhancement obtained when firms 
linked human-capital-enhancing HRM systems with a high quality manufacturing 
strategy5. Therefore, the contingency perspective was much more supported. For 
example, as seen in figure 5-1, machine efficiency, one of the operational 
performance measures, appears to increase as a plant adopts more human-capital-
enhancing HRM practices. When the data are analyzed further by categorizing 
participating plants according to the manufacturing strategy they adopt (i.e., high 
quality manufacturing strategy and cost reduction manufacturing strategy), we 
observe that machine efficiency increases only when a plant adopts high quality 
manufacturing strategy. 
                                            
4 According to Youndt et al. (1996), human-capital-enhancing HRM practices are characterized by 
selective staffing, comprehensive training, developmental behavioral-based appraisal, and group 
incentive and external equity compensation. Administrative HRM practices have opposite 
characteristics. 
5 High quality strategy focuses on continually improving manufacturing processes to increase product 
reliability and customer satisfaction, whereas organizations with cost reduction strategy creates 
customer value by reducing costs and this can be done by diminishing the amount of human capital 
needed in the production process. (Youndt et al, 1996) 
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Figure 5-1. Human-Capital-Enhancing HRM Practices and Manufacturing Strategies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Machine 
Efficiency 
Human-Capital-
Enhancing HRM 
High 
Low 
Low High 
High quality 
Manufacturing strategy 
Overall participants 
without differentiating 
strategies they adopt 
Cost reduction 
Manufacturing strategy 
 
Source: Youndt, Snell, Dean, and Lepak (1996) 
 
In sum, mixed results have existed. Some studies (Huselid, 1995; Arthur, 
1994; Macduffie, 1995) found the results that supported the universalistic 
perspective, and other studies (Delery and Doty, 1996; Youndt et al., 1996) revealed 
that the contingency perspective better predicted the relationship between HRM 
practices and organizational performance. 
 
5.4 Control theory and HRM practices 
In order to achieve better performance through effective control over employees, 
control researchers have suggested different control methods (or strategies), based on  
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6 7task programmability  and outcome measurability ; the control methods, in turn, 
lead to different HRM practices (Eisenhardt, 1985; Ouchi, 1979). For example, 
Thompson (1967) suggested control methods such as computational8 9, compromise , 
judgmental10 11, and inspirational  strategies; Ouchi (1979) and Eisenhardt (1985) 
suggested behavioral control, output/outcome control, and input/clan controls, 
depending on the task programmability (or knowledge of cause/effect relations) and 
the outcome measurability (standards of desirable performance). Figure 5-2 
summarizes the arguments of control theory researchers.   
 
Figure 5-2. Administrative Information and HRM Control 
 
  Knowledge of Cause/Effect Relations 
  Complete Incomplete 
(Computational Strategy) (Judgmental Strategy) 
  
Behavior Control Output Control 
Crystallized Output Control - Decentralization 
Or Both - Results Criteria 
 - Performance-Rewards 
Link  Outcome 
(Compromise Strategy) (Inspirational Strategy) Measurability   
Behavior Control Socialization/Clan Control 
- Centralization  Ambiguous - Articulated Procedures Input Control 
- Close Supervision - Rigorous Staffing 
- Behavior Appraisal - Training-Development 
- Socialization 
 
Source: Adapted from Snell (1992), Thompson (1967), Ouchi (1979), and Eisenhardt (1985) 
Note:  
- Computational, judgmental, compromise, and inspirational strategies are Thompson’s (1967) terms. 
- Behavior, output, and socialization/clan control are Ouchi’s (1979) terms 
 
                                            
6 When we have knowledge about cause and effect of the task, it is task-programmable.  
7 If outcomes are tangible, they are measurable 
8 Where there is certainty regarding both cause/effect relations and outcome preferences, computers 
have been most widely employed for making decisions. 
9 Where there is certainty regarding cause/effect but uncertainty regarding outcome preferences. 
10 Where outcome preferences are clear but cause/effect relationships are uncertain. 
11 Where there uncertainty on both cause/effect relationships and outcome preferences 
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From the perspective of control theory, we may say that better organizational 
performance can be achieved through less control costs, and less control costs can be 
possible through appropriate control methods and induced HRM practices. Of course, 
any control methods can entail some costs. As Ouchi (1979) noted, for example, 
costs for search and acquisition are associated with input control, and costs for 
monitoring and evaluating are expected when we adopt behavioral and output 
control. However, if we do not properly consider the task programmability (or 
knowledge of cause/effect relations) and the outcome measurability (or standards of 
desirable performance) that control theory scholars suggested before choosing any 
type of control methods, more costs would be necessary. 
 
According to Thompson (1967), as a classic control theory, decision issues in 
controlling a complex organization always involve two major dimensions: beliefs 
about cause/effect relations and preferences regarding possible outcomes. Therefore, 
each type of decision issue calls for a different strategy of controlling. For example, 
as seen in figure 5-2, when there is certainty regarding both causation and outcome 
preferences, computational strategy is proper. In an opposite situation where there is 
uncertainty on both dimensions, inspirational strategy is proper for controlling the 
organization. However, judgmental or compromise strategy is necessary when either 
of those two dimensions is not clear. 
 
Ouchi (1979) introduced three fundamentally different mechanisms (i.e., 
markets, bureaucracies, and clans) through which organizations can seek to cope 
with the problem of evaluation and control. According to Ouchi, bureaucratic form is 
preferred in many situations despite its inadequacies since pure markets rarely exist. 
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Informal social structure (i.e., clans) as an input control is effective in control when 
behavior control or outcome control costs too much and is not possible. Ouchi 
argued that a control mode which relies heavily on selecting the appropriate people 
can expect high commitment as a result of internalized values, whereas a control 
mode heavily depending on monitoring and evaluation in an explicit manner is likely 
to offend people’s sense of autonomy and of self-control and result in an 
unenthusiastic, purely compliant response, based on Etzioni (1965).  
 
Eisenhardt (1985) considered control variables such as reward structure, task 
characteristics, and information systems for organizational design from two 
perspectives: organizational theory and agency theory. Based on Thompson’s (1967) 
and Ouchi’s (1979) arguments, Eisenhardt argued that the control strategy an 
organization would adopt is a function of task characteristics (or task 
programmability) and outcome measurement from the perspective of organizational 
theory. Eisenhardt also argued that the control strategy is a function of costs of 
information systems and uncertainty from the perspective of agency theory. For 
example, if a task is neither programmed nor has a measurable outcome from 
organizational perspective, input control such as a selective recruiting becomes 
appropriate, and the input control in this situation would also minimize divergence of 
preferences and be least expensive among control means from the perspective of 
agency theory. In sum, Eisenhardt (1985) integrated both organizational and agency 
theory perspectives and predicted the type of control strategy for an organization. In 
fact this integrated perspective can provide more practical choices than any single 
perspective. From economic perspective (i.e., agency theory), the costs of 
information system may become a major practical barrier to adopting behavioral or 
output control system in many cases. Consequently an organization tends to rely on 
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input control when monitoring and evaluating employee’s behavior or outcomes cost 
too much and/or task is neither programmable nor measurable.  
 
Snell (1992) empirically tested the theoretical arguments of control theory 
that the type of control (behavioral, output, or input controls) an organization relies 
on would depend on the knowledge of cause/effect relations as well as standards of 
desirable performance. That is, Snell tested if an organization relies on a specific 
type of control, depending on the administrative information that managers might 
have. According to the results, Snell (1992) concluded that the input, behavior, and 
output controls did not appear to be mutually exclusive and, therefore those control 
types might serve different purposes and could be implemented together although the 
three control types are different from each other with distinct patterns of practices. In 
this section I reviewed the arguments of some control studies such as Thompson 
(1967), Ouchi (1979), Eisenhardt (1985), and Snell (1992) in order to better 
understand HRM practices that might be induced by control methods we choose.  
 
5.5 Control/Commitment HRM practices, police organizations, and hypotheses 
Although the best HRM practices are different depending on the researchers (see 
table 5-1 for the summary of various best HRM practices) – that is, the concept of 
“the best practices” is still developing, at their roots most studies focus on enhancing 
the skill base of employees through HR activities such as selective staffing, 
comprehensive training, and broad developmental efforts like job rotation and cross-
utilization, as Youndt et al. (1996) observed.  
 
One strategic HRM researcher, Walton (1985) categorized HRM practices 
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into control and commitment systems and argued that workers respond best not when 
they are tightly controlled (i.e., under control HRM system), but when they are given 
broader responsibilities, encouraged to contribute, and helped to take satisfaction in 
their work (i.e., under commitment HRM system). As seen in table 5-2, Walton 
compared control and commitment HRM system in various aspects and argued that 
any organizations that adopt commitment HRM practices would achieve better 
organizational performance than an organization with control HRM practices from 
the universalistic perspective of HRM.  
 
Among various typologies of HRM practices, I chose Walton’s (1985) HRM 
typology as a basic perspective in my study because of two reasons. First, Walton’s 
control/commitment HRM typology includes comprehensive aspects of HRM 
practices that cover most of the common best practices summarized in table 5-1. 
Second, although commitment HRM system is basically suggested from the 
universalistic perspective, we also find that it is associated with human-capital-
enhancing strategy and control HRM system matches with cost-reduction strategy 
when we compare the characteristics of commitment and control HRM system with 
those of the strategies. Therefore, it is also possible to investigate the connection 
between the type of HRM system an organization has and the strategy an 
organization adopts and to interpret the effect of HRM practices on organizational 
performance from the contingency perspective. That is, if we find the positive effects 
of commitment HRM system on organizational performance, we may interpret that 
the organization likely to have HRM practices that are consistent with the 
organizational strategy. Likewise if we find no significant relationship between the 
effects of commitment HRM system and organizational performance, we may 
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interpret that the organization likely to have HRM practices that are not consistent 
with the organizational strategy. This interpretation is possible because the effects of 
HRM practices on organizational performance can be explained by either 
universalistic perspective or contingency perspective (Wright and McMahan, 1992).  
 
Table 5-2. Comparison between Control and Commitment HRM Practices 
 
 
Control HRM practices Commitment HRM practices 
Source: Walton (1985) 
 
 
If the best HRM practices are universal, then they can be applied to any 
organizations regardless of the characteristics an organization has. Likewise, if 
police organizations have the best HRM practices that are likely to lead to better 
Individual attention limited to Performing 
individual job 
Individual responsibility extended to upgrading 
system performance 
Job design deskills and fragments work and 
separate doing and thinking 
Job design enhances content of work, emphasizes 
whole task, and combines doing and thinking 
Job design 
principles 
 
Accountability focused on individual Frequent use of teams as basic accountable unit 
Fixed job definition Flexible definition of duties, contingent on 
changing conditions 
Performance 
expectation 
Measured standards define minimum 
performance. Stability seen as desirable. 
Emphasis placed on higher, “stretch objectives, 
which tend to be dynamic and oriented to the 
marketplace. 
Structure tends to be layered, with top-down 
controls. 
Flat organization structure with mutual influence 
systems 
Coordination and control rely on rules and 
procedures 
Coordination and control based more on shared 
goals, values, and traditions. 
Management 
organization:  
More emphasis on prerogatives and positional 
authority 
Management emphasis on problem solving and 
relevant information and expertise. 
structure, system, 
and style 
Status symbols distributed to reinforce hierarchy Minimum status differentials to de-emphasize 
inherent hierarchy 
Variable pay where feasible to provide individual 
incentive. 
Variable rewards to create equity and to reinforce 
group achievements: gain sharing, profit sharing 
Individual pay geared to job evaluation Individual pay linked to skills and mastery 
Compensation 
policies 
In downturn, cuts concentrated on hourly payroll. Equality of sacrifice. 
Employment 
assurance 
Employees regarded as variable costs. Priority for training and retaining existing 
workforce. 
Employee input allowed on relatively narrow 
agenda. 
Employee participation encouraged on wide 
range of issues. 
Employee voice 
policies 
Business information distributed on strictly 
defined on strictly defined “need to know” basis. 
Business data shared widely. 
Labor- Adversarial labor relations; emphasis on interest 
conflict. 
Mutuality in labor relations. Unions, 
management, and workers redefine their 
respective roles. management relations 
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performance under any circumstances, we can predict the positive effect of the best 
practices, too. More specifically, in the context of police organizations, I expect a 
positive relationship between crime control performance and individual HRM 
practices such as broad job design, more discretion allowed, formal grievance 
resolution mechanism, information sharing policy, employee participation 
encouraged, and more selective staffing, based on the HRM literature that explored 
the correlations between organizational performance and individual HRM practices 
from the universalistic perspective (e.g., Bartel, 1994; Becker et al., 1992; Gerhart et 
al., 1992; Knoke et al., 1994; Schmidt et al., 1979; Wagner, 1994). I also expect a 
positive relationship between crime control performance and commitment HRM 
system (i.e., the bundle of best HRM practices) according to Walton (1985) and 
Arthur (1992, 1994).  
 
In addition to the best HRM practices concept that supports the positive 
relationships between commitment HRM practices (individually and as a system) 
and crime control performance from the universalistic perspective, the control theory 
also suggests that commitment HRM practices will have more positive effects on 
effective crime control performance than control HRM practices in the context of 
police organizations because we see neither clear outcome measurability nor 
complete knowledge of cause and effect relations. Actually it is doubtful that police 
organizations themselves choose those organizational strategies and HRM practices 
like other organizations in the private sector. According to Wright and McMahan 
(1992), firms in the private sector tend to choose best strategies to be competitive 
and are likely to have specific organizational characteristics and HRM practices that 
may elicit and reinforce desirable behaviors from the employees (i.e., behavioral 
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approach). In the public sector, however, organizations characteristics and HRM 
practices are determined not by strategy, instead, but by non-strategy such as 
institutional and political forces as explained in the resource-dependent model and 
the institutional model. Simply put, in the public sector the behavioral approach (i.e., 
universalistic and contingency perspectives) may not explain well the HRM practices 
in the context of public sector where organizational strategies are not usually 
determined by organizations themselves and therefore consequent HRM practices are 
not likely to be consistent with organizational strategies.  
 
As a different approach to explain the link between HRM practices and 
organizational performance (Youndt et al., 1996), control theory supports 
commitment HRM practices in improving the crime control performance of the 
municipal police departments. As seen in figure 5-2, employee control strategies are 
categorized along two dimensions such as knowledge of cause and effect relations, 
and outcome measurability (as we reviewed, these dimensions are differently named 
by different control theory researchers). Although some costs are expected regardless 
of the control methods we choose, we expect more overall cost (including loss) to an 
organization when we do not choose a right control method, based on those two 
dimensions. For example, if we choose output control even when knowledge of 
cause and effect is incomplete and outcome measurability is ambiguous, monitoring 
and evaluating costs would be tremendous and we are not likely to get the goals we 
wants even with more money spent. Usually, costs of information system can be a 
major barrier that prevents organizations from adopting behavioral or output control 
system especially when we lack the knowledge of cause and effect relations and 
outcome is not easily measurable as Eisenhardt (1985) noted.  
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In the context of police organizations, we can imagine that there are lots of 
demands and expectations from citizens that the police officers are to meet. Among 
various demands that citizens want the police to take care of, the police do not seem 
to have a clear idea about how to effectively reduce crimes, based on their crime 
control statistics – that is, there is lack of knowledge of cause/effect relations. We 
also do not properly measure the outcomes of crime control police activities, either. 
The main reason for this is the fact that goals are usually vague and intangible in the 
public sector. As we reviewed previously, the case of England Financial 
Management Initiative (FMI) that adopted 435 performance indicators can be a good 
example to show that police performance is not measurable with ease. Therefore, in 
the municipal police departments in which we lack the knowledge of cause and 
effect relations and outcome measurability is incomplete, input control (or clan 
control) appears to be appropriate for police organizations. That is, as an input 
control, we can adopt HRM practices such as rigorous staffing, developmental 
training, and socialization for a police department as seen in figure 5-2, and those 
HRM practices are part of commitment HRM characteristics.  
 
In sum, we expect that commitment HRM system and its individual HRM 
practices are more likely to result in better crime control performance in the police 
organizations, based on the best HRM practice concept and control theory. In fact, 
this expectation is consistent with Hatry and Greiner’s (1986) and Sparrow, Moore, 
and Kennedy’s (1990) suggestion that for the police to perform better, the doctrine of 
tight managerial control may need to be supplanted by doctrines of worker 
participation, total quality management, and shared commitment to excellence as we 
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reviewed in chapter two. This expectations is also consistent with Rainey and 
Steinbauer’s (1999) effectiveness model, and government effectiveness studies such 
as Hale’s (1996), Gold (1982), Wilson (1989), Denhardt (1993), and Holzer and 
Callahan (1998) as we reviewed at chapter three. Therefore, I establish hypotheses 
about the effects of individual HRM practices and HRM systems on crime control 
performance of the municipal police departments as below. 
    H1: Municipal police departments that have individual HRM practices as below 
(individual practices of commitment HRM system) are more likely to have 
better crime control performance respectively.  
(1) Broad job classification,  
(2) More discretion allowed 
(3) Formal complaint/grievance resolution mechanism 
12(4) Information-sharing-policy   
(5) Employees’ participation encouraged in a wide range of issues,  
(6) No bonus or incentive system for individuals, and  
(7) More selective staffing  
 
H2: Municipal police departments that have commitment HRM systems are 
more likely to have better crime control performance. 
 
 
 
Copyright © Yongbeom Hur 2007 
                                            
12 Most information is usually shared among employees regardless whether or not the information is 
directly necessary to them. 
 78
 
VI. Turnover, Measures, and Causes and Effects 
 
In this chapter, I briefly review some basics of turnover study such as definitions, 
turnover measures, and causes and effects of turnover, mainly based on Price (1977) 
and Mobley (1982), which have been regarded as the most comprehensive, classic 
turnover studies and have provided guidance for turnover studies so far. Later in this 
chapter, I review some turnover studies in the context of police organization that 
mainly focused on why police officers leave. 
 
6.1 Voluntary and involuntary turnover 
As Tai, Bame, and Robinson pointed out (1998), turnover researchers have not used 
a consistent definition of turnover. Price (1977) defined turnover as the degree of 
individual movement across the membership boundary of a social system. Mobley 
(1982) defined turnover as the cessation of membership in an organization by an 
individual who receives monetary compensation from the organization. Simply put, 
turnover is defined as employees leaving their organizations due to whatever reasons. 
Under the traditional turnover perspective, it is assumed that people leave 
organizations due to either voluntary or involuntary reasons. Price (1977) and 
Mobley (1982) also distinguished voluntary turnover (i.e., initiated by individual) 
from involuntary turnover (i.e., initiated by organization, plus death and mandatory 
retirement) and explained that the term "quits" is probably the most frequent label for 
voluntary turnover and "quits" and "resignations" are generally used interchangeably.  
 
Turnover researchers usually argue that the differentiation between voluntary 
and involuntary turnovers is necessary. According to Shaw, Delery, Jenkins, and 
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Gupta (1998), treating quits (i.e., voluntary turnover), discharge (i.e., involuntary 
turnover), and total turnover as synonymous ignores the markedly different 
etiologies and effects of those phenomena. For example, in an organization with high 
quit rates, for various reasons employees find it more attractive to leave than to stay, 
whereas in an organization with high discharge rates, presumably incorrect hiring 
decisions are remedied through termination. Therefore, Shaw et al. (1998) 
emphasized that voluntary and involuntary turnover must be treated differently 
because their difference is not just superficial, but fundamental. McElroy, Morrow, 
and Rude (2001) also stressed that the failure to separate the types of turnover might 
mask or even exacerbate the effects of any single form of turnover on organizational 
performance. In fact, voluntary turnover is more often studied than involuntary 
turnover because of the following reasons that Price (1977) explained. First of all, 
most turnover is voluntary. Second, the formation of theory is easier when the 
phenomenon to be explained is homogeneous (i.e., it is very difficult to explain both 
quits and dismissals by the same theory). Finally, voluntary turnover is more subject 
to control by managers. That is, retirements and deaths are less easily controlled than 
quits and it is natural for managers to focus their attention on phenomena over which 
they have some degree of control.  
 
Even when we differentiate voluntary turnover from involuntary turnover, 
retirement needs special attention since the elimination of mandatory retirement 
policies has had the effect of making retirement “a voluntary organizational 
behavior” (Hanisch & Hulin, 1990). Therefore, voluntary retirement should be 
differentiated from mandatory retirement (i.e., involuntary turnover). However, there 
are important conceptual differences between voluntary retirement and quitting even 
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after we differentiate voluntary retirement from mandatory retirement. Although they 
are similar in that workers may withdraw from their current workplace due to work-
related variables such as job satisfaction and stress, quitting is usually followed by 
continued regular employment whereas voluntary retirement is usually followed by 
some type of decreased commitment to work (Adams & Beehr, 1998; Feldman, 
1994). According to Adams and Beehr (1998), the differences between quitting and 
voluntary retirement can be explained in terms of personal finances1, perception of 
alternatives2 3 4 5, level of pay , age , and marital status . In the present study, I basically 
distinguish voluntary retirements from mandatory retirements, but no further 
differentiation is made between voluntary retirements and quitting because most 
municipal police departments do not keep turnover data in that detail and the results 
of pilot survey6 confirmed it. 
 
According to Shaw et al. (1998), employee may find it more attractive to 
leave than to stay when an organization has a high quit rate. High quit rate (i.e., high 
voluntary turnover rate) may mean that an organization is less likely to have proper 
human resource management (HRM) policies or practices, and consequently quality 
employees are more likely to leave. If voluntary turnover has significant negative 
effects on organizational performance, it is necessary to make serious efforts to 
                                            
1 There is positive relationship between good financial condition and intent of voluntary retirement, 
whereas no relationship between good financial condition and intent of quitting. 
2  Workers considering voluntary retirement weigh their current situation against decreased 
participation in the work force but workers considering quitting more often weigh their current 
situation against other possible work alternatives. 
3 Low pay may lead workers to quit their current jobs in favor of those that pay better, but voluntary 
retirement workers are leaving their jobs for choosing to decrease participation in the work force. 
4 Age would have a negative relationship with quitting intention but have a positive relationship with 
the intention of voluntary retirement. 
5 It is expected that there is a positive relationship between having spouse and voluntary retirement 
but a negative relationship between being married and quitting. 
6 Before conducting main survey, I surveyed 12 police departments with different population ranges to 
see if the questionnaires are proper and if they can provide the data as requested. 
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reduce voluntary turnover through adopting proper HRM policy or practices (e.g., 
direct investment, such as pay or benefit; and indirect investment, such as training, 
job stability, or procedural justice).  
 
6.2 Turnover measures 
There are various turnover measures that we can use for the research but each 
measure has both advantages and disadvantages. Table 6-1 summarizes the formula 
for each measure, based on Price (1977) and Mobley (1982). 
 
Table 6-1. Different Turnover Measures 
 
Turnover Formula Measure 
Sum of length of service for each member 1. Average length of = Service (stayers) # of members 
Median length of service of all members 2. Average length of = Service (leavers) who leave during a period 
# of new members added during the period 
3. Accession rate = 
Average # of members on payrolls during the period 
(# of quit) or (# of discharges) or (# of total separation) 
4. Separation rate = 
Average # of members on payrolls during the period 
# of beginning members who remain during the period 
5. Stability rate = 
# of members at beginning of period 
# of beginning members who leave during the period 
6. Instability rate = 
Average # of payroll during the period being studied 
# of stayers in the cohort with specified length at service 
7. Survival rate = 
# in the original cohort 
# of leavers in the cohort with specified length at service 
8. Wastage rate = 
# in the original cohort 
Source: Adapted from Price (1977) and Mobley (1982) 
 
7Average length of service  for stayers (i.e., the first measure in the table) has 
advantages such as easy computation and understandability, but this measure does 
                                            
7 Price (1977) preferred to use service rather than employment to encompass both work organizations 
and voluntary associations such as churches and fraternal orders. 
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not indicate the total number of members exposed to the possibility of turnover 
during a period. As shown in Price’s (1977) example, even when an organization 
experiences a very large rate of turnover among its low-service members (i.e., new 
members), if an organization has a relatively large core of members with long tenure, 
the average length of service for stayers would be high. That is, this measure will not 
indicate most of the turnover of the low-service members. Although we can 
overcome this disadvantage by using Van der Merwe and Miller’s (1971; 1973) 
average length of service for leavers (i.e., the second measure in the table), it would 
take a fairly large unit to have sufficient leavers to yield a stable statistic. Accession 
rate and separation rate (i.e., the third and the fourth measures in the table) can 
enhance the utility of turnover rates because they indicate how much turnover 
characterizes an organization. These rates, however, have no precise meaning and 
therefore their utility is limited. For example, a 100 percent separation rate (i.e., 
turnover rate is one) could indicate (1) the entire labor force had turned over once 
during the year, (2) half the labor force had turned over twice, the other half 
remaining stable, or (3) a quarter of the labor force had turned over four times, and 
so on. Even with this drawback, however, the separation rate is probably the most 
frequently used turnover measure in the literature as Price (1977) pointed out, and 
the current study also adopted separation rate as turnover measure mainly due to data 
availability.  
 
Unlike accession and separation rates, stability and instability rates (i.e., the 
fifth and sixth measures in the table) have precise meanings. For example, 50 percent 
instability rate can be interpreted in only one-way: half of the members at the 
beginning of the period leave by the end of the period. However, they do not control 
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the length of service, probably the most important variable associated with turnover. 
To overcome the drawbacks that separation/accession rates and stability/instability 
rates, the survival and wastage rates (i.e., the seventh and eighth measures in the 
table) were introduced. That is, these rates not only have a precise meaning, but also 
control the length of service by restricting themselves to the new members who enter 
during a period. However, the survival and wastage rates can be used only when the 
organizations are quite large. For example, to obtain the cohort of 100 workers 
recommended for this measure by Silcock (1955), we imagine that only quite large 
organizations can have that size of cohort. Therefore, as Price (1977) noted, none of 
the other turnover measures experiences the size disadvantage as seriously as the 
survival and wastage rates although they are the most sophisticated of the turnover 
measures.  
 
In sum, Price (1977) suggested some combinations of turnover measures. For 
example, if an organization is fairly large but not large enough to use the survival 
and wastage rates, the average length of service for leavers can be used with the 
separation rate because this combination can provide two important pieces of 
information about organizational turnover – its location (i.e., who are leaving) and 
volume (i.e., how many are leaving). In the current study, I use separation rates as s 
turnover measure and divide them into voluntary and involuntary turnover. However, 
there is no combination with any other turnover measures in this study simply 
because I found in the pilot survey8 that most municipal police departments do not 
keep turnover records in details, so it is not possible to calculate other turnover 
                                            
8 I surveyed 12 municipal police departments before conducting main survey. 
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measure. In reality, even separation records are not well kept for many years 
especially when the city size is small (e.g., population is under 100,000). 
 
6.3 Turnover causes and effects 
Since the causes and effects of turnover are differently argued, depending on 
turnover studies, it would be meaningful to review how turnover researchers view 
the causes and the effects of turnover, based on the classic turnover theories (Price, 
1977; Mobley, 1982). After briefly summarizing the before-turnover part (i.e., what 
causes turnover?), I review the after-turnover part (i.e., what are turnover effects?) in 
more details.  
 
9According to Price (1977), the degree of satisfaction  is the most important 
factor to voluntary turnover. Namely, higher satisfaction likely results in lower 
turnover rates and lower satisfaction likely leads to higher turnover rates. Price, 
however, noted that the influence of satisfaction to turnover can be moderated by job 
opportunity in the market. For example, if there is little opportunity in a job market, 
even lower level of satisfaction may not lead to higher turnover rate. In addition, 
satisfaction itself may be also affected by other factors such as pay scale, the degree 
of integration 10 , job-related (or instrumental) communication, formal 
communication11, and the degree of centralization. Therefore, we can expect a low 
level of turnover when an organization has a high pay level; a high degree of 
integration; a high level of job-related/formal communication; a low degree of 
centralization; and few opportunities in a job market. Figure 6-1 summarizes the 
                                            
9 This is the degree to which the members of a social system have a positive and affective orientation 
toward membership in the system (Price, 1972). 
10 This is the extent of participation in primary and/or quasi-primary relationships (Blau, 1960). 
11 This is officially transmitted information (Price, 1977). 
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relationships among determinants, intervening variables, and turnover.  
 
Figure 6-1. Relationships between Determinants, Intervening Variables, & Turnover 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pay 
Integration 
Job-related 
Communication 
Formal 
Communication 
Centralization 
Satisfaction Turnover 
Job opportunity 
Source: Price (1977) 
 
Mobley’s (1982) turnover model looks more complicated than the Price’s 
(1977) model. According to Mobley, although the negative relationship between job 
satisfaction and turnover is established well, we need to move beyond the simple 
replication of the satisfaction-turnover relationship toward research on the cognitive 
and behavioral processes that may occur between satisfaction and actual turnover. In 
his expanded model of the employee turnover process (Mobley, Griffeth, & Meglino, 
1979), job satisfaction is affected by individual (occupational and personal) values, 
organizational factors, and labor market factors. The Mobley et al. model also 
includes expectations regarding present job and alternative jobs as variables that 
might affect the perceived attraction of present job and alternative jobs. In addition, 
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the type of gratification (immediate vs. delayed), belief regarding non-work 
consequences of quitting, and impulsive behavior are also added as other affecting 
factors to the model. In sum, the Mobley et al. (1979) tried to explain the reasons of 
turnover in more depths by adding cognitive and behavioral factors to the Price’s 
model. As a result, their model became more complicated.  
 
More than two decades ago, Mobley (1982) noted that the bulk of the 
research on turnover had focused on causes and correlates and relatively less 
attention had been devoted to the consequences of turnover (i.e., the after-turnover 
part), and Mobley’s description about turnover research trends is still right. 
According to Price (1977), turnover may have effects on organizational variables 
such as (1) the number of administrative staff, (2) formalization, (3) integration; (4) 
employee satisfaction, (5) innovation, (6) centralization; and (7) effectiveness (see 
figure 6-2 for the direction of effect).  
 
Price (1977) divided these seven variables into three groups according to the 
amount of supporting data in the literature. Administrative staff, formalization, and 
integration are placed in the first group that has medium amount of supporting data. 
The second group that has small amount of supporting data includes satisfaction, 
innovation, and centralization. The third group has mixed supporting data, and 
includes effectiveness (i.e., organizational performance). Since there has been mixed 
empirical evidence on effectiveness as a result of turnover, Price (1977) concluded 
that the conventional wisdom is probably right in its belief that turnover generally 
has a negative effect on effectiveness in nonlinear fashion. The intermediate and 
final effects of turnover are summarized in figure 6-2.  
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Figure 6-2. The Effects of Turnover 
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administrative staff would increase due to turnover. 
Source: Adapted from Price (1977) 
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While Price (1977) approached turnover effects from the organizational 
perspective (except satisfaction that is an individual level), Mobley (1982) 
differentiated turnover effects according to the three different levels of perspectives 
such as individual, organization, and society. Table 6-2 shows the summary of the 
negative and positive effects of turnover from each perspective.  
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Table 6-2. Turnover Effects on Individual, Organization, and Society 
 
 Individual Organization Society 
Disruption of social and 
communication pattern 
Costs of recruiting, hiring, 
assimilation, and training 
Increased cost of 
production Negative Effects 
Decreased  Replacement costs Regional inability to 
keep industry Satisfaction 
Increased workload Disruption of social and 
communication structure 
 
Decreased Productivity loss  
Commitment 
Decreased Decreased satisfaction 
among stayers 
 
Cohesion 
Increased internal 
mobility opportunity 
Displacement of poor 
performers 
Mobility to new industry Positive Effects 
Stimulation, cross-
fertilization from new 
coworker 
Infusion of new 
knowledge/technology 
Reduced income 
inequity 
Increased cohesion Stimulate changes in policy 
and practice 
Decreased job stress-
related costs 
Increased commitment Increased structural 
flexibility 
 
 Decrease in other 
“withdrawal” behaviors 
 
 Reduction of conflict  
Source: Adapted from Mobley (1982) 
 
For example, as seen in table 6-2, several negative effects can be expected at 
the organizational level such as costs of recruiting and training; productivity loss; 
disruption of social and communication structure; and decreased satisfaction among 
staying employees (i.e., decline in morale). At the same time, positive turnover 
effects are also expected at the organizational level. That is, we may expect 
displacement of poor performers; increased innovation, flexibility, and adaptability; 
and reduction of conflict. Since positive and negative turnover effects usually coexist 
as seen in the table, Mobley (1982) argued that what we need is a mechanism to 
evaluate the net utility of turnover to the organization rather than the traditional 
assumption that turnover has negative effects on the organizational performance.  
 
6.4 Police Turnover Studies 
Like other turnover research, turnover causes have been dominantly focused on by 
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police turnover studies, too. The implicit assumption of police turnover studies is 
that turnover is an important organizational problem, which is costly to the 
organization and therefore, should be reduced (Staw, 1980). According to the 
national surveys that asked police chiefs and sheriffs about the major concerns they 
have, staff shortage due to turnover has been consistently ranked first or second 
among major concerns that police chiefs have (Gettinger, 1984; Manili & Connors, 
1988; Webster & McEwen, 1992). Turnover can be an even more serious concern 
especially among small police agencies because they are particularly inclined to 
reduce law enforcement services while new employees are being recruited or receive 
basic training (Harris & Baldwin, 1999; Warrell, 2000a). 
 
Turnover is also one of big concerns in the field of medical service. Therefore, 
some researchers tried to calculate the costs of registered nurses’ turnover. For 
example, Jones (1990a; 1990b) estimated that recruitment costs were more than 
$10,000 per registered nurse termination which included the unfilled positions, 
hiring costs, orientation and training costs, and new nurses’ low productivity. When 
taking indirect and hidden turnover costs into account, however, Johnston (1991) 
estimated that turnover costs per registered nurse might exceed $25,000. Likewise, 
Phelan (1991) contended that $12,000 was a conservative estimate of the 
replacement cost for a single police officer. But, when we take indirect and hidden 
turnover costs into account as Johnson (1991) did, turnover costs per police officer 
may be more than $25,000. Harris and Baldwin (1999) summarized the possible 
costs and the negative effects of police officers’ turnover as follows. Turnover of 
police officers may (1) increase recruitment, selection, and replacement costs; (2) 
increase training and development costs, including more on-the-job orientation and 
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supervisory coaching costs; (3) lower productivity while new officers learn their 
jobs; (4) disrupt programs and organizational efficiency; and (5) decrease morale 
among officers who remain.  
 
Theoretical studies about the causes of police turnover show that job 
satisfaction level (Favreau & Gillespie, 1978; Wilson & McLaren, 1950) and job 
stress (Bopp, 1974; McDowell, 1971; Reiser, 1974) have been regarded as the most 
probable reasons of turnover. For example, according to the congruency theory 
suggested by Moriarty and Field (1990; 1994), when the expectations of new police 
officers are not met during early years of their careers, the incongruency between 
their expectation and real experience leads to police officers’ voluntary turnover. 
While some empirical research exploring the negative relationship of job satisfaction 
with pay and benefits, and turnover rate (Hoffman, 1993; McIntyre, 1990; Phelan, 
1991; Teske, 1976; Wales, 1988) confirmed their predictions, other empirical studies 
found the importance of management to raise their employees’ overall satisfaction to 
reduce turnover rates (Lipson, 1987; White, 1991).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © Yongbeom Hur 2007 
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VII. Turnover-Performance Relationships and Hypotheses 
 
In this chapter, I review theoretical backgrounds for different arguments of turnover-
performance relationships and also I review some empirical research that tested the 
arguments about turnover effects. At the end of this chapter, I establish some 
hypotheses about turnover effect on organizational performance and the moderating 
role of human resource management (HRM) system in the context of police 
organizations. Before beginning to review theoretical backgrounds for different 
arguments about turnover effects, I briefly outline different kinds of arguments about 
turnover effects, based on Shaw, Gupta, and Delery (2005) in the introduction 
section.  
 
7.1 Introduction 
Recently, Glebbeek and Bax (2004) pointed out that the research on turnover is 
dominated by analyses in which turnover is treated as the dependent variable. Noting 
that empirical studies that explored the effects of turnover are still rare, Glebbeek 
and Bax asserted that there seems to be no tradition of empirical research into the 
effects of employee turnover (p278). Among a few empirical studies that 
investigated turnover effects, some studies (e.g., Alexander, Bloom, & Nuchols, 
1994; Shaw et al., 2005) demonstrated that turnover has a significant effect on 
organizational performance, and others (e.g., Baron, Hannan, & Burton, 2001; 
Huselid, 1995; Koys, 2001) showed that turnover does not have a significant effect 
at all. These empirical results are consistent with Price’ (1977) categorization. That 
is, Price put organizational performance (or effectiveness) into the group that has 
mixed results – some support negative effects of turnover on effectiveness and others 
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do not - as reviewed in the previous chapter. Furthermore, even among the studies 
that showed the significance of turnover effect, the sign (i.e., positive or negative) 
and the shape (e.g., linear, curvilinear, U-shape, and inverted-U shape) of the 
relationships are different, depending on the studies. 
 
In this situation where there seems to be no consistency of the arguments and 
the empirical demonstration about the relationship between turnover and 
organizational performance, Shaw et al.’s (2005) categorizations help to understand 
the different arguments developed so far. Shaw et al. (2005) categorized the 
arguments about the relationships between turnover and organizational performance 
into four theoretical patterns as follows: (1) the linear negative relationship, (2) the 
inverted-U relationship, (3) the attenuated negative relationship, and (4) the human 
resource management (HRM) -moderated relationship.  
 
According to Shaw et al. (2005), human capital theory (I explain this in the 
next section) appears to provide a formal platform for the arguments such as the 
linear negative, the inverted-U, and the attenuated negative relationships, suggesting 
that organizational performance is determined by the accumulation of firm-specific 
human capital embodied in the work force (Strober, 1990). Therefore, when turnover 
frequently occurs, an organization's firm-specific human capital accumulations 
would be depleted, and therefore the level of organizational performance would be 
lowered.   
 
Beginning from Dalton and Todor’s (1979) question about the traditional 
belief that turnover effects on organizational performance are always negative, the 
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argument of the inverted-U relationship has been developed. In this perspective, as 
suggested by human capital theory, high levels of voluntary turnover are detrimental 
for work force performance. At low to moderate levels, however, voluntary turnover 
may improve work force performance by playing a revitalizing role. That is, due to 
the likelihood of stagnation or trained incapacitation at low levels of voluntary 
turnover, some turnover can be functional in an organization. The argument of the 
attenuated negative relationship is another variation of the human capital theory 
foundation for the turnover-organizational performance relationship, built on 
learning curve theory (I explain this later in this chapter, too). Based on Price's 
(1977) proposal that successively higher amounts of turnover will be found 
ultimately to produce, more often than not, successively lower amounts of 
effectiveness at a decreasing rate, Shaw et al. (2005) explained that voluntary 
turnover has negative effects on work force performance (i.e., organizational 
performance) by diminishing firm-specific human capital accumulations, but these 
losses are becoming less severe as turnover rate is getting higher (i.e., at a decreasing 
rate). 
  
So far, the three different theoretical patterns of the relationships were briefly 
reviewed and these relationships are displayed in figure 7-1. From the perspective of 
management, if the relationship were an inverted-U shape, it would be good if we 
know the turnover level when organizational performance begins to decrease. 
Likewise, if the relationship were a negative attenuated shape, it would be helpful to 
know the turning point (i.e., when the slope becomes closer to zero). If the 
relationship were a negative linear, knowing the slope of the linear relationship 
would be helpful to predict the level of performance at a certain level of turnover. In 
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Shaw et al.’s (2005) studies with concrete pipe manufacturing plants and with 
trucking companies, the negative attenuated relationship was found and the turning 
point of the relationship was actually calculated.  
 
Figure 7-1. Alternative Forms of the Relationship of Voluntary Turnover and 
Organizational Performance  
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Source: Shaw, Gupta, and Delery (2005)  
Although Shaw et al. (2005) classified the arguments of the relationship 
between turnover and organizational performance into four patterns, the HRM-
moderated relationship (the fourth one) can be related to any of the other three 
patterns. Regardless of the shape or the sign of the relationship, the HRM-moderated 
argument predicts that an organization with inducement- and investment-oriented 
HRM system is more likely to lead to a more negative relationship between turnover 
and organizational performance, whereas an organization characterized by less 
inducement- and investment-oriented HRM system is expected to have a less 
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negative relationship. For example, figure 7-2 shows the difference of turnover 
effects on performance between an organization with control HRM system and an 
organization with commitment HRM system when the relationship between turnover 
and organization performance is negative and linear. As seen in the figure, an 
organization with control HRM system would have higher performance level (point 
A on y-axis) than an organization with commitment HRM system (point B on y-axis) 
at the same turnover rate. In other words, as turnover rate increases, performance 
would decrease at higher rate (i.e., a bigger negative slope) in an organization with 
commitment HRM system than in an organization with control HRM system. 
 
 
Figure 7-2. HRM-moderated Relationship 
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7.2 Theoretical argument for the linear negative relationship  
The argument for the linear, negative relationship between turnover and 
organizational performance mainly comes from human capital theory initiated by 
 96
 
Schultz (1961). Scholars who support human capital theory usually emphasize the 
specific knowledge employees might have when they leave. For example, Pencavel 
(1972) argued that the employer has to balance the advantages of operating with a 
low turnover rate against the costs of higher remuneration paid to keep his labor 
force contented. Therefore, if most employees do not have specific knowledge in a 
company, their turnover is less likely to influence organizational performance in a 
negative way. That is, spending too much money to keep low turnover rate in this 
case may not be a good idea in terms of cost and benefit. Alchian and Demetz (1972) 
and Williamson (1985) also argued that the firm experiences no dislocation costs 
when human asset specificity is negligible and any team effects are of a primitive 
kind.  
 
The advice that if you want a good job, get a good education embodies the 
essence of human capital theory (Strober, 1990). Although this theory was originally 
developed to explain the relationship between education and earning, Strober (1990) 
emphasized that human capital theory says more than the positive relationship 
between educational level and income. Becker (1962) suggested a particular 
mechanism explaining education effects on earning by human capital theory as 
follows:  
 
(1) Education increases skills 
(2) Productivity is going up by increased skills 
(3) Higher productivity is then rewarded through higher earnings.  
 
In fact, human capital theory has been challenged. For instance, researchers 
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ask a question of whether education/experience raises earnings by raising 
productivity or by other behavioral relationships. According to Strober (1990), the 
productivity connection between education/experience and earnings has been 
explained by alternative theories such as screening hypothesis, efficiency wage 
models, internal labor market theories, and radical theory, all of which have 
challenged the human capital theory. Below are the brief reviews of those theories. 
 
The screening hypothesis is that education is positively correlated with 
earnings not because additional education yields higher productivity, but because 
employers use additional education as a screen, or filter, or signal to hire better-
educated workers into jobs that pay more. Blaug (1976) even predicted that the 
human capital theory would gradually fade away to be swallowed up by the new 
theory of signaling (a variant of the screening hypothesis) formulated by Spence 
(1973; 1974) and (Arrow, 1973). According to the signaling theory, employers may 
pay higher wages to more educated employees even if education has no effect on 
productivity. The signaling theory assumes that potential workers with relatively 
high ability levels can invest more cheaply in education than can employees with 
lesser ability1. Therefore, higher ability workers can “signal” their higher level of 
ability productivity to employers. Now from the employer’s perspective, if 
employers find those with more education more productive, they will continue to use 
education as a signal of higher productivity even though education itself has nothing 
to do with productivity enhancement.  
 
Efficiency wage models challenge human capital theory with respect to the 
                                            
1 If a person has relatively higher cognitive ability, he or she can go through school with less effort 
and less pain than a person with lower level of cognitive ability. 
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connections between experience and productivity, and between productivity and 
earnings. According to this theory, employers may pay workers less than their value 
added during the early years of employment, but pay them more than their value 
added in later years, which provides incentives for employees to remain with the 
firm and continue to remain maximally productive. The internal labor market theory 
explains why wages at non-entry level positions do not depend on supply and 
demand while external labor markets set wages based on supply and demand. The 
internal labor market theory explains that non-entry level jobs are filled not from the 
external market but through promotion and transfer of those who are already 
employed by the firm. Therefore, administrative rules and procedures are the 
determinants of the level of wages, not supply and demand. Finally, radical theorists 
believe that education does increase productivity but the link between education and 
productivity is not skill acquisition, as human capitalists maintain, but the 
reproduction of the class structure of society. That is, schools teach students from the 
working class those skills and behaviors that are useful in working-class occupation, 
but they teach middle- and upper-class students skills and behaviors needed to 
assume leadership roles in society.  
 
In sum, although the human capital theory has been challenged by some 
alternative theories, it still explains well the connection between training/education 
and performance at an individual level and most arguments about turnover effects on 
organizational performance are based on this theory as Shaw et al. (2005) noted. 
According to the human capital theory, skills and knowledge would be increased by 
education or training and human resources loss (i.e., turnover) with those skills and 
knowledge likely have negative effects on organizational performance, especially 
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when those skills and knowledge are specific. In other words, if those skills and 
knowledge acquired through education or training are not specific, organizational 
performance may not be influenced even when organizations experience a high 
turnover rate.  
 
7.3 Theoretical argument for the inverted-U relationship  
The inverted-U relationship predicts that organizational performance would be 
increasing if turnover levels are from low to middle because turnover may play a 
revitalizing role to an organization for that range. However, high levels of turnover 
may be detrimental to organizational performance due to the same reasons that were 
explained in the human capital theory.  
 
Staw (1980), like a few other turnover researchers (e.g., Abelson & 
Baysinger, 1984; Dalton et al., 1979; Price, 1977), paid attention to positive 
consequences of turnover as well as negative consequences. Staw (1980) observed 
that traditionally the implicit assumption underlying turnover study has been that 
turnover is an important organizational problem, so it should be reduced. Although 
the costs of turnover may include (1) selection and recruitment costs, (2) training and 
development costs, (3) operational disruption, and (4) demoralization of 
organizational membership, Staw (1980) identified some moderating variables that 
can serve to minimize those adverse effects of turnover. That is, turnover will be less 
costly for persons in lower level positions, in plentiful labor markets, in non-
interdependent roles, and from non-cohesive work groups. Staw (1980) also 
identified some positive consequences of turnover such as increased performances, 
reduction of entrenched conflict, increased mobility and morale, and innovation and 
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adaptation although the benefits of turnover are less obvious than the costs of 
turnover because they are less quantifiable and less attainable in the near-term.  
 
The traditional perspective about a new employee’s performance assumes 
that the performance of a new employee is initially low and, only after getting 
experience, reaches the level of the preceding employee (i.e., J- or S- shape curve). 
Unlike the traditional perspective, Staw (1980) argued that newcomers may be more 
highly motivated than the old employees and may possess greater abilities and 
training. Therefore, Staw (1980) suggested the inverted-U shaped relationship 
between tenure in the organization and performance. However, for some jobs such as 
social work, nursing, and police work in which the psychological demands of the job 
are relatively high, Staw explained that “early burn-out” or ”bureaucratic” curve 
might describe the relationships better. That is, as some scholars argued, employees 
in those jobs tend either to conform more to a bureaucratic role (Blau & Scott, 1962; 
Van Maanen, 1975) or to a psychological 'burn-out' in which employees distance 
themselves from the client being served (Maslach, 1978). 
 
Basically Staw argued that performance is generally a joint function of skills 
and effort. While experience may contribute positively to job skills and knowledge, 
effort or motivation may be at its highest when the individual first arrives in the 
organization especially for psychologically high demanding jobs. In sum, Staw 
(1980) contributed to forming the inverted-U shaped argument about the relationship 
between turnover and organizational performance through pointing out the positive 
effects of turnover and suggesting a different approach to the relationship between 
performance and employee’s tenure in the organization. 
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Dalton and Todor (1979) also contributed to initiating the inverted-U 
relationship between turnover and organizational performance by emphasizing the 
positive consequences of turnover, but they pointed out the positive effects of 
turnover not only from the organizational perspective but also from the economic, 
sociological, and social psychological perspectives. From the organizational 
perspective, Dalton and Todor (1979) criticized most organizational theorists who 
had only focused on the negative aspects of turnover, and argued that turnover might 
increase organizational effectiveness through the higher chance of innovation 
because the process of mobility brings “new blood” and new ideas into the 
organization. From the economic perspective, Dalton and Todor argued that neither 
one person nor one firm should suffer from turnover with the assumption that wages 
and marginal product are equal (i.e., marginal productivity theory). Based on 
Gitlow’s argument (1971), Dalton and Todor argued that an employee, as a rational 
and income-maximizer, will respond to existing structure of wages by moving away 
from employment of less net attractiveness and toward employment of relatively 
greater attractiveness according to marginal productivity theory. Therefore, turnover 
would increase net national product, reduce inequitable distribution of income, and 
contribute to the long-term growth rate of the economy from the economic 
perspective.  
 
Furthermore, Dalton and Todor (1979) argued that from the sociological 
perspective, society does not necessarily gain by the reduction of turnover in the 
organization because the reduction of turnover may involve important dysfunctions 
to society. In other words, society's social and economic advancement could be 
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accomplished by vertical (i.e., promotion) and horizontal mobility (i.e., turnover). In 
fact, Blau and Duncan (1967) early argued that job changes are important 
components of the vertical mobility process and horizontal migration has become 
increasingly effective as a selection process by which individuals are channeled to 
places where their potential can be realized more fully. Likewise, Adams (1963) also 
argued that mobility might serve to reduce inequality or inequity in social exchange. 
Dalton and Todor, citing Golant’s (1971) argument, also reviewed the positive 
function of turnover from the psychological and social psychological perspectives, 
and argued that an individual's decision to initiate a particular movement (i.e., 
turnover) can be defined as an adjustment process in an adaptive system maintaining 
its homeostatic level, .  
 
      Unlike other researchers (i.e., Dalton and Todor, 1979; Staw, 1984) who 
indirectly suggested the inverted-U shape, Abelson and Baysinger (1984) directly 
showed why the relationship between turnover and organizational performance 
should  be inverted-U shape using cost concepts. Abelson and Baysinger argued 
that total turnover cost (TTC) is the combination of retention cost (RC) associated 
with attempts to reduce the turnover rate and turnover cost (TC) associated with the 
separation of incumbent employees plus the costs of searching for and training new 
employees. As seen in figure 7-3, the optimal level of aggregate turnover for most 
organizations will be greater than zero because RC will be the highest when an 
employer wants to maintain turnover rate at the level close to zero and TC will be the 
highest when turnover rate is at its highest level. Therefore, RC curve and TC will 
move in an opposite direction and the intersection can be an optimal point for TTC 
(i.e., minimum cost)  
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Figure 7-3. Optimal Organizational Turnover 
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According to Abelson and Baysinger (1984), even when one focuses solely 
on the turnover of employees whom the organization prefers to retain, there is some 
portion of the turnover rate that is not necessarily organizationally dysfunctional. 
Since total turnover cost (TTC) is viewed as a mixture of RC and TC (i.e., U-shaped 
dot line) as seen in figure 7-3, the relationship between organizational performance 
and turnover rate will be consequently inverted-U shape2. Abelson and Baysinger 
(1984) explained that at a very low rate of turnover, organizational performance is 
low because excessive financial resources and opportunities for productive 
organizational structure and management process are being inappropriately 
sacrificed in an effort to prevent the voluntary separation of preferred employees, 
                                            
2 When TTC is at its lowest level, organizational performance (OP) is at it highest level because we 
can say that OP and cost are in opposite positions. Therefore, we can draw inverted-U shape 
relationship between OP and turnover as seen in figure 7-5. 
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which can be dysfunctional. Likewise, at a very high rate of turnover, excessive 
turnover costs are being incurred in an inappropriate attempt to reduce retention cost, 
therefore cost saving through low wages and poor work conditions may not be 
enough to cover the cost incurred due to turnover.  
 
Since turnover costs (TC) and retention costs (RC) may differ among 
different organizations, Abelson and Baysinger (1984) argued that the optimal rate of 
turnover  (i.e., at the lowest point of total turnover cost as seen in figure 7-3) would 
be different, depending on organizations. They also argued that these costs such as 
TC and RC, in turn, should vary systematically with individual, organizational, and 
environmental attributes that influence costs at any given rate of turnover for the 
organization as a whole, as well as individually perceived costs and benefits of 
quitting/staying behavior 
 
7.4 Theoretical argument for the attenuated negative relationship  
This perspective was built on the sociological literature on turnover and learning 
curve theory. Originally, Price (1977) proposed that successively higher amounts of 
turnover would be found ultimately to produce, more often than not, successively 
lower amounts of effectiveness at a decreasing rate.  
 
From this perspective, researchers argue that turnover would have negative 
effects on work force performance by diminishing firm-specific human capital 
accumulations, but these losses would be less severe and the negative effects of 
turnover on organizational performance would be ameliorated at a high level of 
turnover. Therefore, as Shaw et al. (2005) noted, this argument implies that a linear, 
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negative formulation may underestimate the negative effects of turnover at a low 
turnover rate and overestimates the effects of turnover at a high turnover rate.  
 
As seen in figure 7-4, if turnover is at a low level (i.e., L on x-axis), the 
predicted level of organizational performance is H1 when the relationship is linear 
and negative, whereas the predicted level of organizational performance is L1 when 
the relationship is attenuated and negative. Therefore, if the true relationship is 
attenuated and negative, the reduced performance would be lower than the 
organization level that linear, negative relationship predicts. Likewise, if turnover is 
at a high level (i.e., H on x-axis), the predicted level of organizational performance is 
L2 when the relationship is linear, negative, but the predicted level of organizational 
performance is H2 when the relationship is attenuated, negative. Therefore, if the 
true relationship is attenuated and negative, the expected organizational performance 
would be overestimated if we think the relationship is linear, negative. 
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Figure 7-4. The Linear and the Attenuated Negative Relationships 
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Why are the negative effects less severe when turnover is at a high level? 
According to Shaw et al.’s (2005) explanation, when turnover is at a low level, 
input-throughput-output processes are disrupted and energy and resources are 
redirected from safety concerns in order to maintain operations as skill levels are 
reduced by turnover. When turnover is very high, however, increases in turnover 
beyond some point are likely to be minimally disruptive because the organization is 
already geared toward continual work force replacement. The amelioration of 
negative turnover effects at a high turnover can be also explained by learning curve 
theory. Logan (1992) basically explained the learning curve theory, based on Newell 
and Rosenbloom's (1981) power law. According to the power law displayed in the 
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equation as below, the time taken to perform a task decreases as a power function of 
practice.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
RT = a + bN-c 
 
Where, 
RT: reaction time 
a: the asymptote 
b: the difference between initial and asymptotic 
performance;  
N: the amount of practice 
c: the learning rate. 
 
In the equation, we see that if c (i.e., learning rate) is getting higher, b (i.e., the 
difference between initial and asymptotic performance) is getting smaller with the 
assumption that N (i.e., the amount of practice) is same. We can see this relationship 
with ease in figure 7-5 where the functions differ only in the learning rate (c). Logan 
explained this relationship with the instance theory of automacity. According to 
Logan, when subjects have no experience on a task, they solve the problems by 
applying a general algorithm. Then the solutions produced by the algorithm are 
encoded into memory and retrieved when the problems are encountered again. After 
sufficient practice, performance will become automatic in that all problems can be 
solved by memory retrieval. Although Logan’s theory is about individual 
psychological behavior, it can be applied to an organizational phenomenon such as 
turnover. For example, when turnover is at a low level, an organization may not 
know how to deal with it properly, so organizational performance may decrease 
quickly. However, when turnover rate continues to increase, an organization may 
come to know how to handle it from the experience (i.e., sufficient practice). 
Therefore, organizational performance is less likely to be much affected. Of course, 
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the learning rate may vary, depending on the kind of skills and knowledge 
employees need to learn or the industrial fields. 
 
Figure 7-5. Examples of Power Functions 
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Note: the functions differ only in their exponents and the value of the exponent (i.e., learning rate) appears below 
each function. Each function begins at the same point and asymptotes at zero.  Source: Logan (1992)  
 
7.5 Theoretical argument for the HRM-moderated relationship  
So far I reviewed theoretical backgrounds for the arguments about turnover effects 
on organizational performance, such as the negative linear, the inverted-U, and the 
attenuated negative relationships. Some turnover researchers (Arthur, 1994; Guthrie, 
2001; Shaw, Delery, Jenkins, and Gupta, 1998) also argue that human resource 
management (HRM) systems may have a moderating effect on the relationship 
between turnover and organizational performance such that the negative effects of 
turnover would be severer in an organization with commitment (or inducement) 
HRM characteristics.  
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For example, if HRM characteristics of an organization have a moderating 
effect on the relationship between turnover and organizational performance as they 
argued, the linear, negative relationship would be different depending on HRM 
characteristics an organization has, as seen in figure 7-6. As seen in the figure, even 
at the same level of turnover, the expected level of organizational performance is 
lower (i.e., L on the y-axis) in an organization with commitment HRM 
characteristics than an organization with control HRM characteristics 
 
Figure 7-6. Example of the HRM-moderated Relationship 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The argument of the human resource management-moderated relationship 
has been developed, based on Arthur (1994), Guthrie (2001), and Shaw, Delery, 
Jenkins, and Gupta (1998). While the concept of fit (or the congruence) between 
organizational policies and practices has emerged as an important subject of study 
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Note: Based on the assumption that there is a negative, linear relationship between turnover and performance 
 110
 
among contingency theory researchers, Arthur (1994) argued that the negative 
relationship between turnover and organizational performance would be stronger 
among organizations whose human resource management (HRM) systems were 
characterized by the use of inducement- (e.g., high pay and benefits level and 
procedural justice) and investment (e.g., training and job stability)-oriented HRM 
system. In those organizations, employees are expected to do their jobs with more 
discretion and experience, rather than just following rules and standard operation 
procedures (SOPs) that directly instruct employees to do what they are supposed to 
do in a certain manner. Under these circumstances, new employees are more likely 
to have difficulty in doing their jobs because they do not have enough experience 
and less guidance (i.e., rules and SOPs) is provided. In his empirical research, Arthur 
(1992) performed cluster analysis and categorized 30 steel minimills3 into two 
groups - cost reduction group and commitment maximizing group, based on 
industrial relations functions as seen in table 7-1. Later Arthur (1994) changed each 
group’s name into control HRM system and commitment HRM system to be 
consistent with previous research on human resource strategy (Lawler, 1986; Walton, 
1985). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
3 They begin the steel making process with steel scrap instead of iron ore. 
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Table 7-1. Two Systems of Workplace Industrial Relations 
 
Type of System Industrial relations 
functions Cost Reduction Commitment Maximizing 
Broadly defined jobs Organization of 
work 
Job tasks narrowly defined 
No formal employee complaint/ Employee relations Formal dispute resolution 
procedures 
grievance mechanisms 
 
Little communication/socialization 
efforts 
 
Regularly share 
business/economic information 
with employees 
Low skill requirement High percent of skilled workers Staffing/supervision 
  
Intense supervision/control Self-managing teams 
Limited training efforts More extensive, general skills 
training 
Training 
Limited benefits More extensive benefits Compensation 
  
Relatively low wages Relatively high wages 
  
Incentive-based All salaried/stock ownership 
Source: Arthur (1992) 
 
 
Unlike an organization with commitment HRM system, employees are 
treated more like replaceable commodities in the organizations characterized by low 
inducement and investment practices (i.e., control HRM system). Under these 
circumstances, the negative relationship between turnover and organizational 
performance would be attenuated because new employees can easily follow up what 
prior employees did with more rules and SOPs provided that guide behavior in 
relatively more situations (Guthrie, 2001). According to Arthur (1994), the goal of 
control HRM systems is to reduce direct labor costs, or improve efficiency, by 
enforcing employee compliance with specified rules and procedures and basing 
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employee rewards on some measurable output criteria, whereas commitment HRM 
systems shape desired employee behaviors and attitudes by forging psychological 
links between organizational and employee goals. In sum, Arthur (1994) argued that 
organizations with control HRM systems might benefit from employee turnover up 
to some point and after that there may begin to be negative turnover effects on 
manufacturing performance.  
 
The different effects of turnover on organizational performance can be also 
explained by Graen’s (1976) role-making theory. According to Graen, role-making 
systems are those processes whereby the participant in the organization: (a) acquires 
acknowledge about the content of the constraints and demands placed upon his 
behavior and the sources of those constraints and demands, (b) receives and sends 
persuasive communications regarding his behavior in the role, (c) accepts a 
particular pattern of behavior, and (d) modifies this pattern over time. Graen (1976) 
argued that the particular way a person comes to behave in his or her organizational 
role may be a function of the formal, written job descriptions, when the person is 
progressing from the status of “newcomer” to that of “established incumbent” in that 
position. We can imagine that under control HRM system, there are relatively more 
rules and procedures and more detailed formal job descriptions, so it would take less 
time for newcomers to catch up the performance level of former employees than 
under commitment HRM system. 
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7.6 Empirical studies of turnover effect 
Table 7-2 summarizes the hypotheses of empirical studies that explored the turnover-
performance relationship. Since the table includes most of the recent empirical 
turnover studies, it is meaningful to review each empirical study in more depth. 
 
In their study, Alexander, Bloom, and Nuchols (1994) hypothesized that 
registered nurses’ (RN) turnover is likely to have significant and negative effects on 
hospital performance because RNs directly participate in the core technology of 
hospitals. After finding that RN turnover is associated with lower hospital operating 
efficiency (i.e., H1 is supported as seen in the table), Alexander et al. suggested the 
four possible reasons for cost inefficiency due to RN turnover. Firstly, costs of 
recruiting and orienting replacement nurses are incurred; secondly, costs are incurred 
from using temporary agency nurses to fill vacancies; thirdly, we can imagine 
reduced efficiency of team-based care on patient care units, and finally, 
administrative costs are incurred to supervise new nurses who have not internalized 
the production norms of the hospital. In addition to those four possible reasons, as 
Pencavel (1972) argued, turnover of an employee with specific knowledge [e.g., 
registered nurses in Alexander et al.’s (1994) study] that can be acquired through 
education or training may be another reason of efficiency decreasing. Reflecting 
Mueller and Price’s (1989) advice that cross-sectional data are problematic for 
testing hypotheses about the consequences of turnover, Alexander et al. measured 
turnover costs at different times such as one year after turnover and two years after 
turnover. Rather than confirming the argument of the inverted-U shape relationship 
(H2 in their study, see table), Alexander et al. (1994) confirmed the human capital 
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theory (Strober, 1990; Pencavel, 1972) that predicts a linear, negative relationship 
between turnover and organizational performance. 
 
Table 7-2. Empirical Research on the Turnover-Performance Relationship 
 
Studies Hypotheses related to turnover effects With sample 
Alexander et al. (1994) H1: Higher registered nurse (RN) turnover in hospitals is associated with lower hospital 
operating efficiency (supported).  
With 333 hospitals  
H2: Relative to hospitals with high or low turnover among staff RN, hospitals with 
moderate turnover will experience greater operating efficiency (not supported). 
Arthur (1994) H1: Turnover will be higher in control human resource systems than in commitment 
human resource systems (supported).  
With 30 minimills  
H2: There will be a stronger negative relationship between turnover level and 
manufacturing performance in commitment human resource systems than in control HR 
systems (supported). 
McElroy et al (2001) H1. Involuntary turnover-that is, dismissals-will be positively related to organizational 
performance measure (not supported).  
With 31 sales regions in which 
about 5,200 employees working at 
a national financial services 
company headquartered in a mid-
western state 
 
H2. Voluntary turnover will not be significantly related to organizational performance 
(not supported). 
 
H3. Reduction-in-force will exhibit a negative relationship with organizational 
performance measures (supported) 
Koys (2001) H1. There is a significant relationship between Year 1’s unit-level employee satisfaction 
(positive), organizational citizenship behavior (positive), and employee turnover 
(negative) and Year 2’s unit-level profitability (not supported for turnover effect) 
 
With 28 stores in a regional 
restaurant chain  
H2. There is a significant relationship between Year 1’s unit-level employee satisfaction 
(positive), organizational citizenship behavior (positive), and employee turnover 
(negative) and Year 2’s unit-level customer satisfaction (not supported for turnover 
effect). 
Guthrie (2001) H1. There is positive association between the use of high-involvement work practices 
and employee retention and firm productivity (supported)  
With 164 multi-industry firms in 
New Zealand that have more than 
100 employees 
Glebbeek and Bax (2004) H1. The overall relationship between employee turnover and firm performance has an 
inverted U-shape (not supported)  
A temporary job agency that has 
110 offices spread throughout The 
Netherlands. 
 
 
Shaw et al. (2005) H1a. There is a significant negative relationship between voluntary turnover rates and 
work force performance (not supported).  
Study 1 - 141 plants of the 
American Concrete Pipe 
Association 
 
H1b. The relationship between voluntary turnover and work force performance is 
curvilinear, such that higher performance levels are evident as voluntary turnover 
increases initially, but the relationship becomes negative as turnover rates rise (not 
supported). 
 
Study 2 – 299 trucking 
organizations  
H1c. The relationship between voluntary turnover and work force performance is 
curvilinear such that the relationship is generally negative, but is attenuated as turnover 
rates rise (supported) 
 
H1d. The relationship between voluntary turnover and work force performance is 
moderated by HRM inducements and investments such that the negative relationship is 
attenuated when HRM inducements and investments are low (not supported). 
 
Note 1. All data were collected in the U.S. except Guthrie (2001) and Glebbeek and Bax (2004). 
Note 2. Multivariate regression was performed for all studies except McElroy et al. (2001) who used 
partial correlation and Koys (2001) who used bivariate regression. 
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Arthur (1994) tested hypotheses about turnover effect on organizational 
performance, using the results of a previous study (i.e., Arthur, 1992) that adopted 
cluster analysis technique to empirically identify two types of human resource 
management systems (i.e., control HRM and commitment HRM). In his empirical 
study, Arthur concluded that (1) specific combinations of policies and practices are 
useful in predicting differences in performance and turnover across steel minimills, 
and (2) HRM systems moderate the relationship between turnover and 
manufacturing performance such that there is a stronger relationship between 
turnover and manufacturing performance in an organization with commitment HRM 
system than in an organization with control HRM system. 
 
McElroy, Morrow, and Rude (2001) and Koys (2001) used simple methods 
such as partial correlation and bivariate regression to investigate turnover effects on 
organizational performance. In their study in which the regional subunit of finance 
company constituted the unit of analysis, McElroy et al. (2001) found that only 
reduction-in-force had significant effects on organizational performance among 
voluntary turnover, involuntary turnover, and reduction-in-force as seen in table 7-2. 
Unlike previous studies that used cross-sectional data, Koys (2001) used longitudinal 
data in the study. Although the relationship between turnover and organizational 
performance did not turn out significant, the results indicated that organizational 
performance such as profitability and customer satisfaction is significantly 
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influenced by HR outcomes such as employee satisfaction and organizational 
citizenship behavior4 rather than vice versa. 
 
Guthrie (2001) examined the relationship between firms’ use of high-
involvement work practices and employee retention and productivity, using the 
sample that consisted of multi-industry firms with more than 100 employees in New 
Zealand. Since Guthrie selected the sample from multi-industries outside of the U.S., 
it actually offered a test of whether or not Arthur’s (1994) results can be generalized 
beyond the small, U.S., single-industry sample. The results indicated that employee 
turnover was associated with decreased productivity when high-involvement work 
practices (i.e., commitment HRM system) were extensively adopted, whereas 
employee turnover was associated with increased productivity when those high-
involvement practices were not much adopted (in other words, control HRM 
practices were adopted). High involvement work practices represent a significant 
investment in human capital. Therefore, these findings are supportive of generalizing 
Arthur’s (1994) study. Guthrie concluded that although high-involvement work 
practices may enhance employee retention, greater use of these practices may also 
increase firms’ exposure to disruptions associated with employee turnover at the 
same time.  
 
Glebbeek and Bax (2004) investigated if Abelson and Baysinger’s argument 
of inverted-U relationship between turnover and performance is correct. Following 
                                            
4 According to Organ, D. W. 1988. Organizational citizenship Behavior. Lexington, MA: Lexington 
Books., there are five categories of organizational citizenship behavior. Conscientiousness means 
employees carry out individual task performance well beyond the minimum required levels. Altruism 
implies that they give help to others. Civic virtue suggests that employees responsibly participate in 
the political life of the organization. Sportsmanship indicates that people do not complain, but have 
positive attitudes. Courtesy means that they treat others with respect. 
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Koys’ (2001) approach to overcome the problem of causal interpretation of cross-
sectional analysis, Glebbeek and Bax employed cross-lagged regression analysis5 
and found that reversed causality was not the case. By adding the squared term of 
turnover to the regression equation, the authors tested the Abelson and Baysinger’s 
hypothesis and concluded that although curvilinearity was clearly indicated, the 
nature of this nonlinearity (inverted-U or U shape) was not strongly supported, based 
on the results.  
 
6Shaw, Gupta, and Delery (2005) tested four alternative  hypotheses about the 
relationship between voluntary turnover and organizational performance. In their 
study, they found that the relationship was curvilinear, such that the relationship was 
generally negative, but was attenuated as turnover rates rose. Since this result is 
different from the Glebbeek and Bax’ (2004) results that indicated an inverted-U 
relationship (although the results did not provide compelling evidence for it), Shaw 
et al. suggested two probable reasons as follows. The first reason may come from the 
fact that Glebbeek and Bax used total turnover rate rather than voluntary turnover 
that was used in Shaw et al’s study, based on the argument that quits and discharges 
are distinct phenomena (McElroy et al., 2001; Shaw et al., 1998). The second 
probable reason is that trained incapacity and stagnation underlying the inverted-U 
proposition may be more relevant in some organization than others.  
 
In sum, only a few hypotheses were supported in the empirical studies that 
explored turnover effects on organizational performance. That is, the negative, linear 
                                            
5 If the reversed-causality theory held, later year’s turnover should have been more strongly related to 
early year’s performance than vise versa. 
6 They are the linear negative relationship, the inverted-U relationship, the attenuated negative 
relationship, and the HRM-moderated relationship as explained previously 
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relationship and attenuated, negative curvilinear relationship were supported in 
Alexander et al.’s (1994) study and Shaw et al.’s (2005) study, respectively. In 
addition, Arthur (1994) showed the significant moderating role of human resource 
management (HRM) system in the relationship between turnover and organizational 
performance and Guthrie (2001) confirmed Arthur’s (1994) finding with multi-
industry sample, indicating that Arthur’s results can be generalized.  
 
7.7 Hypotheses on turnover effect and the moderating role of HRM system 
As Shaw et al. (2005) pointed out, the existing arguments about the relationship 
between turnover and organizational performance are based on human capital theory. 
That is, specific knowledge (i.e., acquired through education or training) may impose 
particular costs on the employer if an employee with specific knowledge quits. In the 
police departments, we do not expect that any newcomer can properly perform the 
police job without enough training. Experience on the job seems to be necessary to 
perform police job properly even with proper training. In other words, police jobs 
require a certain level of specific knowledge and experience. Therefore, I basically 
expect the negative effects of turnover on police performance according to human 
capital theory. More specifically, I expect an inverted-U relationship that predicts 
negative turnover effects on police performance after a certain level of turnover, 
based on Staw (1980), Abelson and Baysinger (1984), and Dalton and Todor (1979).  
 
As we reviewed previously, Staw (1980) argued either a narrowly or widely 
inverted-U relationship between turnover and performance especially for the jobs 
such as police works or nursing that demand much psychologically. Therefore, in the 
police organizations, turnover may have positive effects on performance rather than 
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negative effects until a certain level of turnover. Abelson and Baysinger (1984) also 
predicted the inverted-U shape relationship for all organizations using the cost 
concepts such as total turnover cost (TTC) concept, turnover cost (TC), and retention 
cost (RC). Under this approach, the optimal level of aggregate turnover for most 
organizations will be greater than zero because RC will be the highest when an 
employer wants to keep the turnover rate close to zero and TC will be the highest 
when turnover rate is at its highest level. Since the RC curve and the TC curve move 
in an opposite direction, the intersection can be a minimal cost point for TTC as seen 
in figure 7-3 before. That is, a minimum level of cost requires a certain level of 
turnover (i.e., above zero), and this also means the highest level of organizational 
performance. Dalton and Todor (1979) viewed turnover effects from the different 
perspectives such as organizational, economic, sociological, and socio-psychological, 
and argued that turnover might increase organizational effectiveness through the 
higher chance of innovation because the process of mobility brings “new blood” and 
new ideas into the organization. In sum, the inverted-U shape relationship is 
expected between turnover and police performance as below. 
 
    H3. Turnover initially has a positive effect on police performance until a certain 
level of turnover and has a negative effect on police performance after that 
point. (i.e., the relationship between turnover and police performance is 
inverted-U shape). 
 
In the public sector, there are relatively more rules and procedures that 
employees are required to follow than in the private sector. Therefore, we may say 
that public organizations (e.g., police organizations in this study) are more likely to 
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have control-oriented human resource management (HRM) system. This general 
tendency in the public sector, however, does not necessarily mean that every public 
organization has a similar control-oriented HRM system. That is, for some reasons 
such as financial conditions, task demands, and political environment, some 
organizations may have more control-oriented (or less commitment-oriented) HRM 
systems and others may have more commitment-oriented (or less control-oriented) 
HRM systems.  
 
Likewise, in the private sector, although we generally expect that firms are 
more likely to have commitment-oriented (less control-oriented) HRM systems than 
in the public sector, some firms employ control-oriented (less commitment-oriented) 
HRM systems, others employ commitment-oriented (less control-oriented) HRM 
systems. Arthur (1992) argued that firms usually choose their HRM systems (i.e., 
control-oriented or commitment-oriented HRM), depending on their business 
strategies. Youndt et al. (1996) also argued that manufacturing strategy (i.e., cost 
manufacturing strategy 7 8 and quality manufacturing strategy ) moderates the 
relationship between HRM systems and operational performance. That is, a cost 
manufacturing strategy will positively moderate the relationship between 
administrative HRM system and performance; and a quality manufacturing strategy 
will positively moderate the relationship between Human-Capital-Enhancing HRM 
system and performance. 
 
                                            
7 Organizations can create customer value by either reducing costs. In many cases, programmed 
production systems and highly structured jobs have become de facto methods for deskilling 
manufacturing workers and reducing their discretion. 
8 This focuses on continually improving manufacturing processes to increase product reliability and 
customer satisfaction. In this setting, the technical and problem-solving skills of employees tend to be 
more important. 
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In the current study, rather than trying to find out the reasons why a police 
organization employs a certain kind of HRM system – it may be another research 
topic, I investigate if HRM characteristics an organization might have (i.e., control-
oriented and commitment-oriented HRM) moderate turnover effects on 
organizational performance in the public sector. I assume that police organizations 
have different HRM characteristics due to different reasons such as financial 
situation, task demands, or political environments. According to Arthur (1994) and 
Guthrie (2001), in those organizations with commitment HRM system, employees 
are expected to do their jobs with more discretion and experience, rather than by 
many rules and procedures that directly instruct employees to do what they are 
supposed to do in a certain manner. Therefore, if an employee quits in that 
organization, we can expect that newcomers may have difficulties in doing their jobs 
due to lack of experience and enough written guides. According to the role making 
theory (Graen, 1976), the formal, written job descriptions are critical to the way a 
person comes to behave in his or her organizational role. We can imagine that an 
organization with a control HRM system usually tends to have more formal job 
descriptions than an organization with a commitment HRM system, so newcomers 
come to reach the expected level of performance within a relatively short time. 
 
Figure 7-7 shows that same turnover levels may mean different things to the 
organizations, depending on the HRM system they have. In the figure, for an 
organization with commitment HRM system (or less control HRM system), point 
“A” on the x-axis appears to exceed optimal turnover rate (TO0), so more turnover 
would reduce organizational performance if the relationship between turnover and 
organizational performance is inverted-U shaped. For an organization with control 
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HRM system, however, point “A” does not exceed the optimal turnover rate (TO1) 
yet, so more turnover may increase organizational performance until the optimal 
turnover rate (TO1) is reached. That is, as seen in L1 and L2 that are tangent lines on 
the points in which vertical dot line of point A meets the curves, the slope of L2 is 
positive while the slope of L1 is negative. In sum, I expect that the turnover effects 
on the police performance would be moderated by the HRM systems (or the bundle 
of HRM practices) that police organizations might have. Therefore, I establish the 
hypothesis as below. 
 
Hypothesis 4. The negative effects of turnover on police performance are 
greater in an organization with more commitment-oriented human resource 
management (HRM) characteristics than in an organization with more control-
oriented HRM characteristics.  
 
Figure 7-7. Optimal Turnover Rates with Different HRM Systems 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L2 
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HRM system Control 
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Note: This is based on the assumption that there is an inverted-U shape relationship between turnover  
and police performance and the optimum level of turnover is smaller in an organization with  
commitment HRM system than in an organization with control HRM system 
Copyright © Yongbeom Hur 2007 
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VIII. Crime Control and Related Factors 
 
8.1 Introduction  
According to Worrall (2005), there are two major perspectives of crime control: 
operational and political perspectives. Since the operational perspectives are 
concerned about due process when crime is controlled, the main question will be 
how the justice system should operate. In other words, a delicate balance has to be 
achieved between crime control and due process perspectives (Packer, 1968). Unlike 
the operational perspectives, the political perspectives (consisting of the liberal and 
conservative perspectives) are interested in the causes of crime, the consequences of 
crime for society, and what to do to deal with crime. In the current study, I am 
basically interested in the causalities of crime and factors influencing crimes rather 
than how the justice system should operate. Therefore, I review the crime control 
literature from the political perspective.  
 
In this chapter, I review the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) 
program that has been conducted, based on the Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act signed by President Clinton in 1994. The COPS program intended 
to lower crime occurrence and to provide a better safety feeling by putting additional 
sworn officers on the street (i.e., hiring grants), improving technology (i.e., Making 
Officer Redeployment Effective grants1), and paying more attentions to distressed 
neighborhoods or jurisdictions with economic challenges (i.e., innovative grants). 
                                            
1 The COPS' Making Officer Redeployment Effective (More) program expands the amount of time 
current law enforcement officers can spend on community policing by funding technology, equipment, 
and support staff, including civilian personnel. 
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Therefore, it is meaningful to see how the COPS program planned to accomplish its 
goals (i.e., the logic model). After reviewing the COPS program, I review what the 
literature found in response to the question of whether hiring more police officers 
reduces crimes – the most common and simple question in the traditional policing, as 
well as in the literature about the effectiveness of police in reducing crime. I also 
review the Service Efforts and Accomplishments (SEA) indicators for crime control 
suggested by the Governmental Accounting Standards Board and crime control 
effectiveness measures that Ammons (1996) suggested for crime control, which may 
suggest the effectiveness measures of the police. In the conclusion section, I suggest 
a Crime Control Model that reflects the influencing factors found in the literature. 
 
8.2 The Crime Act and the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS)  
In 1994, President Clinton signed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement 
Act (hereinafter, the Crime Act). Of the $30 billion in expenditures authorized by the 
Crime Act, nearly $9 billion was allocated for Title I, which is also known as the 
“Public Safety Partnership and Community Policing Act of 1994” (Roth & Ryan, 
2000a). The crime act pursued two objectives: one is to increase the number of 
sworn officers on the street2, and the other is to adopt community-oriented policing 
(Gaffigan, Roth, & Buerger, 2000). Gaffigan et al. (2000) explained that community 
policing stressed greater police responsiveness to the community at several levels, 
including more personal service; greater citizen input into police priorities; increased 
police attention to previously ignored “quality of life” issues; and an expanded 
commitment to crime prevention. According to Trojanowicz, Kappeler, Gaines, and 
Bucqueroux (1998), community policing is both a philosophy and organizational 
                                            
2 Responding to perceptions of increased levels and viciousness of violent crime during the late 1980s, 
presidential candidate Bill Clinton pledged to put 100,000 new police officers on the streets on the 
Nation, as part of his campaign.  
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strategy – a philosophy that allows the police and residents to work together in new 
ways to solve problems and an organizational strategy encompassing 
decentralization and individual autonomy that supports the philosophy. Title I, the 
legislative basis for the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) program, 
listed four specific goals3 intended to change both the level and practice of policing 
in the United States (Roth et al., 2000a).  
 
When we look at the logic model of the COPS program in figure 8-1, we see 
that the program output is not to directly lower crime occurrence that belongs to 
community outcomes (the far right box in the figure). Rather it aims to increase 
arrests (or clearance rates) through problem solving, partnership building, crime 
prevention, and reorienting the organization. According to the logic model, through 
problem solving, partnership building, and crime prevention, we can also achieve 
high levels of social/physical quality of life, informal social control, information 
sharing, and police respect/satisfaction; and the decreased fear of crime as 
community outcomes. The logic model expects crime reduction by the combination 
of increased arrests and other community outcomes mentioned above. In the logic 
model, we also see that there are mutual negative effects between crime occurrence 
and arrests. That is, a high level of crime occurrence is likely to result in a low level 
of crime clearance, probably due to an increased workload; and high level of crime 
clearance is likely to result in low level of crime occurrence according to deterrence 
theory. As seen in the figure, organization reorientation (including officer discretion, 
capacity for change, and so on) is one of the expected COPS program outputs, and 
other program outputs such as problem solving, partnership building, and prevention 
                                            
3 (1) to increase the number of officers deployed in American communities, (2) to foster problem 
solving and interaction with communities by police officers, (3) to encourage innovation in policing, 
and (4) to develop new technologies for assisting officers in reducing crime and its consequences.  
 126
 
 127
                                           
can be achieved through organization reorientation. 
 
To test if the COPS program has significant negative effects on crime, Zhao, 
Scheider, & Thurman (2002) focused on the effects of COPS Office grants that were 
awarded between 1994 and 1998 on crime rates in 6,100 cities between 1995 and 
1999. According to the results, they argued that hiring grants and innovative grants4 
had negative and significant effects on violent and property crimes. More specifically, 
Zhao et al. found a negative and significant effect of COPS grants (i.e., increased 
officers) on the crimes in the cities with more than 10,000 populations but did not 
find the similar effects in the cities with less than 10,000 populations. They 
speculated that in the smaller cities, additional officers may be involved in a wide 
variety of community policing, and this interaction with residents would result in 
more crime reporting due to increased trust in police. Therefore, the effects of 
increased police officers on reduced crime rates might be cancelled out by the 
increased crime reports.
 
4 Hiring grants are designed to directly assist local law enforcement in the deployment of additional 
community police officers and innovative grants fund specialized programs targeted at specific 
jurisdictions or categories of crime and social disorder. 
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   Figure 8-1. Logic Model of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) Program                 
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8.3 Traditional policing 
Although some studies (e.g., Zhao et al, 2002) support the effect of increased number 
of police officer on crime control, there has been a debate for decades in response to 
the one simple question, “Does hiring more police officers reduce crime?” Traditional 
policing prizes deterrence theory and people who favor more police on the streets 
argue that the more visible the police presence is, the more likely it is that would-be 
criminals will be deterred from violating the law (Worrall, 2005). According to 
Ehrlich’s (1972) classic law enforcement study espousing deterrence theory, people 
can be discouraged from committing crime by the threat of either serious sanctions or 
apprehension. In this section, I review some major studies that investigated if 
traditional policing (i.e., increasing police level and expenditures) effectively 
suppresses crime rates.   
 
The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment (KCPPE), one of the most 
important policing studies relevant to police hiring, was conducted with three groups 
of patrol beats during 1972 and 1973. Each group consisted of five areas. The first 
group (it was called the proactive beats) received two to three times the normal level 
of patrol; the second group (it was called the reactive beats) received no patrol and 
only responded to calls for service; and the third group (it was called the control 
beats) kept police patrol levels to normal. In the results of the research, Kelling, Pate, 
Dieckman, & Brown (1974) found that the level of patrol had no effect on crimes5 
that were suppressible by patrol. That is, the levels of public safety were almost the 
same in all of the three groups regardless of the police patrol endeavors. 
 
                                            
5 Those crimes are burglaries, auto thefts, larcenies, robberies, and vandalism. 
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While most citizens and government officials were shocked at this result, 
some researchers (e.g., Fienbert, Kinley, & Reiss, 1976; Larson, 1975) criticized the 
KCPPE because it had weak experimental design and small sample size that 
weakened the validation and reliability of the results. Larson (1975) reviewed the 
KCPPE and questioned the approach of the KCPPE mainly on the ground of small 
sample size (i.e., only 15 areas). Larson basically found two major problems. First of 
all, typical patrol intensities in Kansas City were not large enough to encompass the 
range of patrol intensities experienced in other cities. Even a doubling or tripling of 
patrol effort might not adequately reflect routine levels of patrol experienced in other 
cities. The second problem was that patrol visibility in the depleted areas (the reactive 
beats areas) was relatively quite large and it even equaled the pre-experimental levels 
during high workload periods. Consequently, Larson concluded that the KCPPE might 
have fallen short in its attempt to prove or disprove the general value of preventive 
patrol. According to Larson, however, the interesting result was the second problem 
that Larson called as an unexpected by-product to a patrol administrator. That is, 
patrol administrators can reduce the level of patrolling in one area and transfer those 
patrolling officers to other areas (i.e., redeploying) to increase the levels of patrolling 
without causing significant degradations in service if conditions warrant a change in 
the spatial deployment of units within a confined region. 
 
Fienbert et al. (1976) focused on the problems of the KCPPE design. They 
pointed out that there was no actual difference in deploying manpower between the 
control beats group and the proactive beats group, although the manpower was 
doubled in the latter group. They also noted that the KCPPE only dealt with the 
manpower levels although manipulating what officers actually do on patrol (i.e., 
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patrol strategy) might have great effects on the commission of crimes. Fienbert et al. 
criticized that in the KCPPE control was lacking not only in the administration of the 
treatments, but also in the handling of concomitant variables such as variables related 
to dispatch procedures6 7. With respect to the layout of the experimental area , Fienbert 
et al. raised the question of whether randomization was used in assigning the 
treatments to each of the 15 areas to avoid the possibility that officers in the proactive 
beats group may help the adjacent reactive beats group.  
 
In addition to the Kansas City Experiment, there are many studies that 
investigated the relationship between police level (or expenditures) and crime rate 
(e.g., Bahl & Wasylenko, 1978; Cornwell & Trumbell, 1994; Fox, 1979; Greenberg, 
Kessler, & Loftin, 1983; Huff & Stahura, 1980; Kovandzic & Sloan, 2002; Land & 
Felson, 1976; Levitt, 1997; Marvell & Moody, 1996). Indeed, whether a police level-
crime relationship exists is actually one of the most significantly researched questions 
in criminal justice (Worrall, 2005). The findings of some studies that investigated a 
police level-crime rate relationship are summarized in table 8-1. As seen in the table, 
various studies were conducted using different data (i.e., cross-sectional, panel or time 
series data), and ended up with mixed results. While some studies (i.e., Chapman, 
1976; Fujii & Mak, 1980; Greenberg et al., 1983; Greenwood & Wadychi, 1973; 
Hakim, Ovadia, & Weinblatt, 1978; Huff et al., 1980; Jacob & Rich, 1981; Levine, 
1975) found a significantly positive effect of police on crime rates, others (i.e., Bahl et 
al., 1978; Corman & Joyce, 1990; Howsen & Jarrell, 1987; Land et al., 1976; Levitt, 
1997; McPheters & Stronge, 1974; Swimmer, 1974a, b) found a significantly negative 
                                            
6 According to Fienbert et al. (1976), officers in one beat may feel compelled to help out their 
colleagues in adjacent reactive beats, and thus negate the intended effects of the experiment.  
7 All five reactive beats area were adjacent to one or two proactive beats areas in the KCPPE. 
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effect of police on crime rates (i.e., as the number of police increases, crime rates tend 
to decrease)1. Although we are not sure whether a high level of the police leads to 
crime reduction based on the mixed results as seen in table 8-1, some recent studies 
(e.g., Marvell and Moody, 1996; Kovandzic and Sloan, 2002) revealed that as police 
level increases, crime rates tend to decrease.  
 
Marvell and Moody (1996) reviewed 36 major empirical studies that 
investigated the relationship between police level (number of police or police 
expenditures) and crime rates, and found little evidence that supported the effects of 
police efforts on reducing crime. Rather, some studies even suggested that more crime 
leads to more police. Marvell and Moody (1996), however, pointed out that most 
studies suffered from omitted-variable bias and simultaneity problems. Since crime 
rates are usually affected by other factors in addition to police level, omitting those 
influencing variables may cause omitted-variable bias. According to Marvell and 
Moody, the simultaneity problem arises from the fact that crime rates may not only be 
influenced by police level and but also influence police level at the same time, as 
Cornwell and Trumbell (1994) showed in their study. Therefore, the positive effect of 
crime on police levels may counteract the negative effect of police on crime. In their 
study with the sample consisting of 49 states and 56 cities, Marvell and Moody found 
a simultaneous effect between police level and crime rates using the Granger causality 
test8, and explained that the magnitude of the effects of police level on crime rates 
was substantial whereas the size of the effect of crime rates on police level was slight. 
Kovandzic and Sloan (2002) partially replicated Marvell and Moody (1996) with 
                                            
1 These studies found significant results at 5 percent alpha level. 
8 This is a standard econometric procedure for exploring causal direction (Granger, 1969. Investigating 
Causal Relations by Econometric Models and Cross-Spectral Methods, Econometrica 37: 424-438) 
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county-level data collected from Florida for the period 1980-1998, and found that 
there was a relationship between police levels and crime rates, such that increased 
level of crime caused small increases in police levels, while increased police levels 
caused substantial reductions in crime over time.  
 
Table 8-1. Regression Results of Various Studies of Crime-Police Relationship  
 
Study Sample Time Effect of Police on Crime 
Bahl & Wasylenko (1978) 79 cities 1972 Total crime (-)* 
Chapman (1976) 147 Calif. cities 1970 Violent crime (+), Property crime (+)* 
Corman & Joyce (1990) New York City 1970-1986 Robbery (-)* 
Corman, Joyce, & Lovitch (1987) New York City 1970-1984 Property crime (+) 
Cornwell & Trumbull (1994) North Carolina counties  Total crime (+) 
Deutsch, Hakim, & Spiegel (1990) States 1970-1980 Property crime (-)* 
Ehrlich (1973) 47 states 1960 Total crime (-) 
Rape (+)* Fujii & Mak (1980) Hawaii 1961-1975 Murder (-) 
Furlong & Mehay (1981) 38 districts in Montreal 1973 Property (-) 
Greenberg & Kessler(1982) 130 cities 1960, 1962 Violent crime (-) 
Greenberg et al. (1983) 269 cities 1960, 1970 Violent crime (+)*, Property crime (+)* 
Greenwood & Wadycki (1973) 199 SMSAs 1960, 1962 Violent crime (+)*, Property crime (+)* 
Hakim (1980) 94 New Jersey suburbs 1970 Property crime (+) 
Hakim, Ovadia, & Weinblatt (1978) 61 Philadelphia suburbs 1970 Robbery (+)* 
Howsen & Jarrell (1987) 120 Kentucky counties 1981 Robbery (-)*, Larceny (-)*, Burglary (-)* 
Huff & Stahura (1980) 252 suburbs 1970-1972 Violent crime (+)* 
Jacob & Rich (1981) 9 cities 1948-1978 Robbery (+)* 
Land & Felson (1976) Nation 1947-1972 Violent crime (-)*, Property crime (-)* 
Levine (1975) 26 cities 1971 Murder (+)*, Robbery (+)* 
Levitt (1997) 49 cities 1970-1992 Violent (-)* 
McPheters & Stronge (1974) 43 cities 1970 Total crime (-)* 
Mikesell & Pirog-Good (1990) 50 States 1970-1984 Property crime (+)* 
Pogue (1975) 163 SMSAs 1962, 1967 Total crime (+)*, Rape (+)*, Assault (+)* 
Swimmer (1974a) 118 cities 1960 Murder (-)* 
Swimmer (1974b) 118 cities 1960 Violent crime (-)* 
Wellford (1974) 21 cities 1960, 1970 Violent crime (-) 
Source: Adapted from Marvell and Moody (1996) 
Note: Asterisk (*) indicates that the coefficient of police number or police expenditure (per capita) is 
significant at five percent alpha level when crime types (e.g., violent, property, or total crimes) are 
dependent variable. The signs (+/-) indicate that police efforts (i.e., number of sworn officers or 
expenditures) have positive (+) or negative (-) effects on crime occurrences. 
 
 
In this section, I reviewed how traditional policing worked in crime reduction. 
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While some studies found significant effects of police level on crime reduction, others 
found no significant cases probably due to weak research design, small sample size, 
omitting variables, and other reasons. Since a lot of influencing factors are involved in 
crime occurrence, we are less likely to find a right relationship between the police 
efforts and crime occurrences if some factors are omitted.  
  
8.4 Crime clearance and crime rates 
The deterrence theory of traditional policing has been also tested by some studies 
exploring the relationships between crime rates and clearance or arrest rates (this 
implies the certainty of punishment) (e.g., Brown, 1978; Chapman, 1976; D'Alessio & 
Stolzenberg, 1998; Greenburg, Kessler, & Logan, 1979; Logan, 1975; Phillips & 
Votey, 1972; Tittle & Rowe, 1974b; Wilson & Boland, 1976, 1978; Yu & Liska, 1993). 
Those studies investigated the effects of police activities (the outputs of those 
activities can be arrest or crime clearance) on crime control rather than simply looking 
at the effect of increased police level.  
 
Since police departments do not have complete control over the prevention of 
crime, we believe many uncontrollable factors, such as economic conditions, 
employment, household income, population size, and so on, are correlated with crime. 
Therefore, clearance rate can be used as a measure of police performance to avoid the 
influence of those uncontrollable factors. Crime clearance rate is defined as the 
number (or percentage) of crimes that have been “solved” by arrest or “exceptional” 
means (Drebin and Brannon, 1992: 22). According to the FBI’s Uniform Crime 
Reports, an offense is “cleared by arrest” or solved for crime reporting purposes when 
at least one person is (1) arrested, (2) charged with the commission of the offense; and 
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(3) turned over to the court for prosecution. Of course, as Drebin and Brannon noted, 
this definition also has problems because crimes are considered to be cleared even 
when only one of the several persons who are involved in the crime is arrested. An 
“exceptional9” clearance is another variation of a clearance, and the death of the 
offender can be regarded as an exceptional clearance. 
 
Table 8-2 shows some examples of the studies that investigated the effect of 
police activities such as arrest and crime clearance on crime rates. In the table, four of 
the five studies found that arrest rates have negative and significant effects on crime 
occurrence, whereas police levels have relatively more mixed effects on crime rates as 
reviewed in the previous section. As seen in the table, however, among the four 
studies that supported the negative and significant effect of clearance rate on crime, 
three studies (i.e., D’Alessio and Stolzenberg, 1998; Logan, 1975; and Wilson and 
Boland, 1978) tested their hypotheses with only one type (or category) of crime (e.g., 
total crime, major felony, and robbery, respectively), and found negative and 
significant effects on those crimes. In addition, Yu and Liska (1993) pointed out that 
while the predicted negative relationship between the certainty of punishment and 
crime rates was observed, the causal direction of the relationship was rarely evident 
and the relationship may be different depending on the type of crime or some other 
variables.  
 
 
 
                                            
9 According to Uniform Crime Reports, in certain situations, law enforcement is not able to follow the 
three outlined steps under “clearance by arrest” to clear offenses known to them. Many times all leads 
have been exhausted and everything possible has been done in order to clear a case.  
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Table 8-2. The Effect of Crime Clearance Rate (or Arrest Rate) on Crime 
 
Effect of Crime 
Clearance on 
Crime 
Study Sample/Data Method 
147 California cities with 
population between 20,000 and 
100,000 in 1960 and 1970 
Chapman (1976) Regression Property crime (-)*  
Time series 
with daily 
collected data 
D’Alessio and 
Stolzenberg (1998) 
Orange County in Florida for 
184 days in 1991 Total crime (-)* 
98 U.S. cities from 1964 to 
1970 Regression None Greenberg et al. (1979) 
FBI’s crime clearance by arrest 
data for about 3,000 cities form 
1964 to 1968 
Correlation,  Logan (1975) Major Felony (-)*a Path analysis 
35 largest cities in the U.S. in 
1975 Regression Robbery (-)* Wilson and Boland (1978) 
Note:  
a: According to the path analysis results, the causality (i.e., deterrence interpretation) is questionable. 
- Asterisk (*) indicates that the coefficient of crime clearance by arrest is significant at five percent 
alpha level when crime types (e.g., violent, property, or total crimes) are dependent variable.  
- The signs (+/-) indicate that the coefficients of police activity variable (i.e., crime clearance rate) have 
positive (+) or negative (-) sign. 
 
 
With respect to the effect of punishment, Tittle and Rowe (1974a) found 
interesting results in Florida’s cities and counties that a high level of certainty of 
punishment10 (30 percent in their study) must be reached before a substantial decrease 
in crime rates occurs (it is referred to as tipping effect). Brown (1978) noted that Tittle 
and Rowe’s (1974) study of crime rates (reported UCR crimes) and certainty of 
punishment (crimes cleared by arrest/crimes reported) added a potentially significant 
proposition to deterrence theory and the tipping effect11 of sanction certainty reported 
by them is of considerable theoretical import. In fact, Brown (1978) attempted to 
determine whether the tipping effect is peculiar to their data with California and 
                                            
10 Clearance rates are used as a certainty of punishment index in their study. 
11 That is, under a certain level, sanction certainty does not seem to work for deterring crimes. 
However when sanction certainty reaches that level, crime rates decrease substantially. 
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Florida cities and counties. Brown found the tipping effect only in cities and counties 
with small populations and rejected the more general form of the tipping effect 
proposed by Tittle and Rowe (1974). Chamlin (1991) also investigated this 
relationship and reported a negative effect of punishment certainty on crime rates at 
about 40 percent for only small cities. Why do we observe tipping effect in small 
cities? Brown explained that one of main reasons is more social cohesion in the small 
communities. That is, face-to-face contacts, and accompanying information links are 
greater in the smaller cities (or counties) than in big cities (or counties). In addition, 
arrest may be perceived as severer in smaller cities than in larger cities where even 
high probabilities of arrest may have little effect on individuals’ decisions about 
whether to engage in criminal behavior.  
 
Yu and Liska (1993) extended tipping effect studies such as Tittle and Rowe 
(1974), Brown (1978), and Chamlin (1991) by disaggregating the analysis by crime 
and race because Yu and Liska observed that few large cities achieve tipping point for 
most crimes. Yu and Liska tested the hypotheses for three major crimes (rape, robbery, 
and assault) using the Uniform Crime Reports data and the National Crime Survey 
data, and found that the punishment certainty rate12 is higher for racial minorities than 
for racial majorities and the effect of race-specific punishment certainty is non-linear 
including a tipping point, a ceiling point13, or both. Therefore, Yu and Liska’s (1993) 
study suggested that racial minorities may experience the certainty of punishment 
above the tipping point although most citizens (i.e., racial majorities) do not 
experience such level of punishment certainty. 
 
                                            
12 Once a person commits crimes, he or she may be concerned about the possibility of being arrested. 
13 After a certain level of punishment certainty, crime rates are not influenced any more. 
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Phillips and Votey (1972) explained the relationship between crime clearance 
rates and crime occurrence rates from a different perspective. Their argument shows 
how crime occurrence (i.e., offense rate in figure 8-2) is influenced by other 
socioeconomic conditions in addition to crime control efforts that the police make. 
They argued that the level of crime occurrence can be set through the interaction 
between crime generation function (CGF), mainly influenced by socioeconomic 
conditions such as unemployment rate and poverty level and law enforcement 
production function (LEPF) (i.e., crime control by arresting). When law enforcement 
expenditures rise or the state of technology improves, the LEPF curve in the figure 
moves upward and to the right (LEPF ), which moves an equilibrium (A1 0) with higher 
level of offence rate (O ) to a new equilibrium (A0 1) with higher level of clearance and 
lower level of offense rate (O1). Likewise, given law enforcement expenditures do not 
change, when economic conditions worsen, the CGF curve in the figure will move in 
the same manner (CGF ), which leads to a new equilibrium (A1 2) with lower level of 
clearance and higher offense rate (O2) Therefore, they argued that if economic 
conditions worsen, law enforcement expenditures should increase in order to maintain 
the effectiveness of law enforcement (i.e., clearance rate). 
 
Given that new equilibrium point is A2 where economic conditions become 
worse LEPE does not change, even when law enforcement expenditures are increased 
to maintain the same level of crime clearance rate at the new equilibrium (A3), the 
offense rate will be a new offense rate (O3) that is bigger than a original offense rate 
(O0) as seen in the figure. Therefore, they argued that more expenditure on law 
enforcement (i.e., LEPF1 would move further to the right and upward) should be 
necessary when economic conditions are worse if the police want to maintain the 
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same level of crime rates based on auto theft data in their study.  
 
Figure 8-2. The Interaction of Crime Generation and Crime Control 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Phillips and Votey (1972) 
 
 
In sum, Phillips and Votey (1972) showed the mutual interaction between law 
enforcement production function and crime generation function, seeing the crime 
clearance rate as an effectiveness measure of law enforcement agencies. Since crime 
rates and crime clearance rates are set after Enforcement Production Function (LEPF) 
and Crime Generation Function (CGF) interact with each other, Phillips and Votey 
argued that a heavy emphasis on law enforcement to the neglect of economic 
conditions could have the effect of worsening social attitudes in the form of a 
resentment of law enforcement and a general attitude of antagonism between levels of 
society. Therefore, Phillips and Votey concluded that the solution to crime is largely 
one of society’s willingness to pay both the costs of law and order and the costs of 
maintaining healthy economic conditions and social attitudes.  
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8.5 The Service Efforts and Accomplishments (SEA) indicators for crime control 
According to the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) (1987), in 
establishing objectives of financial reporting, governmental financial reporting should 
provide information to assist users in (a) assessing accountability and (b) making 
economic, social, and political decisions. That is, financial reporting should provide 
information to assist users in assessing the service efforts and accomplishments (SEA) 
of a governmental entity. After completing and issuing its Concepts Statement No. 1, 
Objectives of Financial Reporting, the GASB initiated research into ways to improve 
the ability of public-entity financial reports to present information useful in 
monitoring and assessing the results of operations of governmental entities (Drebin et 
al., 1992). Police service is one of the twelve service areas14 of the GASB’s SEA 
research.  
 
Police departments are often called on to provide a wide range of public 
services, but their most visible function relates to crime prevention and suppression of 
crime; and the apprehension of criminal offenders (Drebin et al., 1992). Table 8-3 
shows SEA indicators of different categories for police department’s crime control 
recommended by the GASB’s SEA research. In the bottom row of the table, 
explanatory variables are suggested to provide information on factors that are likely to 
affect the incidence and effects of criminal activity so that measures of output, 
outcome, and efficiency may be viewed in proper context if explanatory variables are 
included in the analysis. In addition, those explanatory variables can be helpful in 
                                            
14 The service areas included in the research are police, fire, public health, hospitals, public assistance, 
mass transit, road maintenance, economic development, elementary and secondary education, 
sanitation collection and disposal, water and wastewater treatment, and colleges and universities.  
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developing ratios to place different jurisdictions on a comparable basis.  
 
Table 8-3. Recommended Police Department SEA Indicators 
 
Indicator Category 
• Budget expenditures 
Inputs • Equipment, facilities, vehicles 
• Number of personnel, hours expended 
• Hours of patrol 
• Responses to calls for service 
Outputs • Crime investigated 
• Number of arrests 
• Persons participating in crime-prevention activities 
• Deaths and bodily injury resulting from crime 
• Value of property lost due to crime 
• Crimes committed per 100,000 Outcomes 
• Percentage of crimes cleared 
• Response time 
• Citizen satisfaction 
• Cost per case assigned to a sworn officer 
Efficiency • Cost per crime cleared 
• Personnel hours per crime cleared 
• Population by age group 
• Unemployment rate 
Explanatory variables • Number of households; number of business firms 
• Land area 
• Demand: calls for service, cases assigned 
Source: Drebin and Brannon (1992) 
 
Although the relationships between inputs and outputs or outcomes are not 
suggested, Drebin and Brannon (1992) emphasized that any outputs or outcomes must 
be viewed in relation to the resource commitment involved. The most important input 
to the police function is human resources, and personnel-related input data that have 
been reported include personnel hours, training hours, total personnel, and number of 
sworn personnel. Although reporting the number of officers per thousand population 
might seem to lend itself to comparisons among cities, Hatry et al. (1992) pointed out 
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the caveats that the number of businesses in and visitors to the community are not 
taken into account; the make-up of the populations may be quite divergent, and the 
expanse of area to cover for the same size population may vary greatly. Due to the 
lack of empirical evidence linking police activities to crime reduction, it is very 
difficult to infer causal relationships between them. Therefore, Drebin and Brannon 
(1992) concluded that what we need is more empirical research that demonstrates the 
relationships between police efforts and crime reduction.  
 
8.6 Crime control comparison among municipalities 
In order to draw an appropriate comparison of police service between municipal 
police departments, Ammons (1996) suggested several performance indicators of 
police for crime control rather than using the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 
Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) data. Ammons pointed out that using the UCR data 
are problematic because of the following reasons. First of all, the UCR data includes 
statistics only on reported crimes. Secondly, crime statistics can only be as accurate as 
the data provided to the FBI by individual police departments. If they intentionally 
misrepresent their performance statistics, the quality of the UCR is thereby 
diminished. Finally, a host of community factors that are uncontrollable other than 
police performance also contribute to a community’s rate of crime.  
15Although the employment  of police officers and support personnel is not an 
end itself, since it is one of the input factors, Ammons explained that public officials 
are interested in staffing levels and frequently are buffeted at budget time by claims of 
inadequate staffing. If a police department consistently ranks below its counterparts 
on various performance indicators, the possibility of understaffing is one potential 
                                            
15 FBI reports municipal police staffing levels per 1,000 population, whereas Bureau of Justice reports 
them per 10,000 population. 
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factor worth exploring – that is, staffing information does have diagnostic value. 
Ammons also noted that patrol availability (or police management proficiency) is the 
other important factor that shows us, combined with staffing level, how many officers 
are “on the street.” League of California Cities (1994) suggested that officers in high-
service-level departments are able to devote at least 45% of their time to patrolling the 
field uncommitted.  
 
Ammons observed that crime rates (crime occurrence per 100,000 
populations) are influenced not only by police efforts and economic factors but also 
by whether a community is rural or urban, population size, and the state or region in 
which it is located. For example, crime rates tend to be lower in cities lying outside 
metropolitan statistical areas and lower in rural counties, whereas crime rates tend to 
be higher in big cities and in the South and West. To adjust the influence of city size 
and locale before making comparison between cities, Ammons (1996, p197) 
suggested projected norm as below.  
 
Statistics for state or region Projected 
norm 
Statistic for population 
cluster = x National average 
 
 
For example, when a city in the South region is interested in the safety level in that 
city by comparing crime rates with those of other cities, Ammons suggested the 
comparison among cities with similar population size and similar location (i.e., 
region) rather than the comparison with national average or with any other city. As 
seen in the formula for the projected norm, we first need to check an average crime 
rate for that population cluster of cities and we also need to check an average crime 
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rate for that region to see if the region that a city is located has relatively higher or 
lower crime rates compared to national average. 
 
With respect to the crime clearance rates, Ammons observed that clearance 
rates tend to be higher in small cities than in big cities, but did not observe a 
difference between states or regions, unlike with crime rates. Response time can be 
also a performance measurement since municipalities often judge their police 
departments in part on the promptness with which they respond to emergencies. 
According to the League of California Cities (1994), high-service-level departments 
should respond to emergencies within five minutes. However, when non-emergency 
calls are included in response statistics, the average response times are often in excess 
of 10 minutes (Ammons, 1996). 
 
8.7 Summary and a suggested crime control model 
Before suggesting a crime control model, I review what ecological (i.e., macro-level) 
factors are involved in crime occurrence, based on Pratt and Cullen’s (2005) meta-
analysis. As we know, crime reduction cannot be easily achieved due to many 
uncontrollable factors that need to be also considered when we investigate if police 
efforts lead to crime reduction. 
 
According to Pratt and Cullen (2005), although scholars pay more attentions to 
the predictors of individual criminality (i.e., micro-level question of why individuals 
break the law) and to formulating theories of individual criminality, the macro-level 
approach reemerged as a salient criminological paradigm in the late 1970s and 1980s. 
Broadly speaking, there are three domains of predictors (i.e., factors to predict 
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crimes): social-structural predictors, socioeconomic predictors, and criminal justice 
system-related predictors. Rather than defining each predictor of crimes, I summarize 
what factors belong to those predictors as follows. First of all, the social-structural 
predictors include racial heterogeneity, non-economic institutions (e.g., religious, 
family, and political institutions), residential mobility, family structure or disruption, 
region, urbanism, sex ratio, education, religion, and firearms ownership. Secondly, 
socioeconomic predictors include percent below the poverty line, inequality, and 
unemployment. Finally, criminal justice system-related predictors include 
incarceration, police force size, arrest ratio, police expenditures, police per capita, and 
get-tough policies (e.g., sentencing policy, firearms policy, and the death penalty). As 
seen in table 8-4 that summarizes rank-ordered macro-level predictors16 of crime, law 
enforcement-related factors are ranked after 20th among 31 predictors of crime, 
whereas social-structural and socioeconomic factors appear to be more influential 
determinants of crimes.  
 
At the beginning of this chapter, I reviewed the logic model of the Community 
Oriented Policing Services (COPS) program. Zhao et al. (2002) found that the hiring 
grants and the innovative grants under COPS program have significant, negative 
effects on controlling crimes, especially when the city sizes are more than 10,000 
populations. I then reviewed one of the most debatable issues in traditional policing, 
the effects of police level on crimes. The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment 
(KCPPE), as one of the most important policing studies relevant to police patrolling 
efforts, was conducted in 1972 and 1973, and Kelling et al. (1974) reported that the 
level of police patrol had no effect on crimes that were suppressible by patrol. 
                                            
16 From the 31 different macro-level predictors of crime across all 214 empirical studies, and 509 
statistical models, the rank ordering is based on the relative magnitude of the mean effect size estimates. 
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However, Larson (1975) and Fienbert et al. (1976) argued that the results of the 
KCPPE might not be valid because it had a weak experimental design and the sample 
size was small. Although some recent studies (e.g., Marvell and Moody, 1996; 
Kovandzie and Sloan, 2002) supported the significant and negative effects of the 
police level on crime, there have been mixed results about the effects of police level 
on crime.  
 
Table 8-4. Rank-Ordered Effect Size Estimates of Macro-Level Predictors of Crime  
 
Rank Macro-Level Predictor Rank Macro-Level Predictor 
1 Strength of noneconomic institutions 17 Residential mobility 
2 Unemployment (length considered) 18 Unemployment (with age restriction) 
3 Firearms ownership 19 Age effects 
4 Percent nonwhite 20 Southern effect 
5 Incarceration effect 21 Unemployment (no length considered) 
6 Social interaction or social tie 22 Socio economic status 
7 Percent black 23 Arrest ratio 
8 Religion effect 24 Unemployment (no age restriction) 
9 Family disruption 25 Sex ratio 
10 Poverty 26 Structural density 
11 Unsupervised local peer group 27 Police expenditures 
12 Household activity ration 28 Get-tough policy 
13 Social support/altruism 29 Education effects 
14 Inequality 30 Police per capita 
15 Racial heterogeneity index 31 Police size 
16 Urbanism   
Source: Pratt and Cullen (2005) 
 
 
I also reviewed the studies that investigated the relationship between crime 
clearance rates (i.e., as a result of police activity) and crime rates. Unlike the studies 
examining the effects of the police level on crime, researchers found relatively 
consistent and significant effects that the police efforts (e.g., clearance rates) had on 
crime. Since crime clearance rates are directly related to the certainty of punishment, I 
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reviewed tipping effect studies (e.g., Tittle and Rowe, 1974; Brown, 1978; Chamlin, 
1991; Yu and Liska, 1993), which showed that above a certain level of punishment 
certainty, crime decreases substantially. Phillips and Votey’s (1972) study showed that 
crime occurrence is associated not only with police efforts to reduce crime (i.e., crime 
clearance rates in their study) but also with socioeconomic conditions (the Crime 
Generation Function in their study). Phillips and Votey’s study indicated crime rates 
are the result of the interaction between the Crime Generation Function and the Law 
Enforcement Production Function (i.e., police efforts to reduce crimes).  
 
In order to provide information to assist users of financial report in assessing 
accountability and making decisions (e.g., economic, social, and political decisions), 
the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) recommended several 
indicators of the Service Efforts and Accomplishments (SEA) for crime control, and 
categorized them into inputs, outputs, outcomes, and efficiency. The GASB also 
suggested that we also need to consider some explanatory variables such as 
population, unemployment, and workload of the police when we examine the SEA for 
crime control. According to Ammons (1996), when we need to make a comparison 
among municipalities to know how well we are doing in controlling crimes, it is 
desirable to use a projected norm for crime control measures such as crime rates and 
crime clearance rates rather than to use a national average of crime control measures 
in order to draw a fair comparison. Ammons noted that crime control measures are 
different, depending on the populations of the cities and the region. 
 
In figure 8-3, I suggest a Crime Control Model, based on the literature I 
reviewed in this chapter. As seen in the figure, crime control outcomes (i.e., crime 
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reduction and safety feeling in the model) are more likely to be affected by social-
structural and socioeconomic factors than the crime control outputs (i.e., crime 
clearance in the model) are affected by them. We also see that the crime control 
outputs are more directly influenced by criminal justice system-related factors 
including the police level. As seen in the model, the crime control outcomes are likely 
affected by exterior environments such as social-structural factors and socioeconomic 
factors, whereas the crime control outputs are likely affected by interior environments 
such as HRM practices, leadership, motivations, and others.  
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In the model, I assume that employee turnover negatively affects the 
relationship between criminal justice system-related factors and crime clearance, 
based on the human capital theory. I also hypothesize that the effects of turnover are 
also moderated by HRM characteristics of the police department among some 
interior environmental factors. Since I predict that the influence of the HRM 
characteristics will be different, depending on the type of HRM characteristics (e.g., 
control HRM and commitment HRM characteristics), I put +/- signs on the influence 
of HRM characteristics on the effects of turnover. Based on the literature that shows 
relatively consistent effects of law enforcement-related factors on crime clearance, I 
expect the positive effects of police expenditure and the number of police personnel, 
and the negative effects of response time of the police on crime clearance. For 
example, I expect that the more police officers per population, the more crimes are 
cleared. I also expect that the faster police respond to the citizen’s request (i.e., the 
shorter time), the more likely crimes will be cleared. In the model, I also noted that 
crime clearance rates are influenced by a crime occurrence level. As Drebin and 
Brannon (1992) pointed out, if more cases are assigned to a sworn officer, workload 
will go up, and crime clearance rates will decrease, consequently. It is obvious that a 
sworn officer needs to take care of more cases if more crimes occur. Therefore, the 
relationship between crime occurrence and crime clearance will be negative. As I 
reviewed in the literature, I  predicted a positive relationship between crime 
clearance level and safety feeling or crime reduction, based on the certainty of 
punishment theory. In other words, the more crimes are cleared, the less crimes 
would occur.  
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According to Pratt and Cullen’s (2005) meta-analysis of crime control 
literature, criminal justice system-related factors are the least influential to the crime 
reduction among the three categories of crime predictors such as criminal justice 
system-related factors, social-structural factors, and socioeconomic factors. The 
inconsistent (i.e., positive, negative, and none) effects of the police level on crime 
reduction in the literature (see table 8-1 of Marvell and Moody’s (1996) review) also 
supported the results of Pratt and Cullen’s (2005) meta-analysis. However, it seems 
inevitable for governments at any level to depend more on the criminal justice 
system-related factors (e.g., increasing police level) because they are much more 
controllable than social structural and socioeconomic factors that are more influential 
but hard-to-control.   
 
In this study, I investigate if HRM characteristics have effects on crime 
control performance of municipal police departments, if turnover influences crime 
control performance, and if HRM characteristics moderate the effects of turnover on 
crime control performance. The goal of crime control is not to achieve outputs, but to 
reduce crimes and increase safety feeling. However, those ultimate outcomes can be 
achieved by achieving outputs such as high crime clearance rates, as seen in the 
model, although other crime predictors such as social-structural factors and 
socioeconomic factors are also involved. If we focus on the effects of turnover and 
HRM characteristics on crime control outcomes rather than on crime control outputs, 
we are less likely to detect the significant relationship due to more uncontrollable 
factors involved. From the management perspective, if we examine the influence of 
employee turnover or specific HRM characteristics on crime control performance, 
we are more likely to find meaningful relationships when we focus on crime control 
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outputs rather than crime control outcomes because the latter is much more 
associated with uncontrollable factors as seen in the model. In sum, I focus on the 
relationships between police efforts and crime clearance rates as a crime control 
output in this study and examine the effects of turnover and HRM characteristics on 
those relationships. 
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IX. Methodology 
 
 
9.1 Survey and data sources 
To collect the data about turnover and HRM characteristics of the municipal police 
departments, in May 2006 I sent surveys to 205 police departments of U. S. cities 
whose population range was between 100,000 and 500,000. While I collected the 
data such as HRM characteristics, turnover, the budget for salary and benefits 
through surveying, the data such as the number of sworn officers, crime occurrence, 
and crime clearance data came from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).  
 
1Before initiating the main survey, pilot questionnaires were sent to 12 cities  
of a wide population range to see if the questionnaires were appropriate for 
collecting the data I wanted and to decide target cities to which main surveys would 
be sent. The pilot survey results indicated that police departments did not seem to 
keep turnover records over time in the small cities, especially when their populations 
were less than 100,000. In addition, responses are less likely from big cities 
especially when their populations are more than 500,000. According to the 
respondents, there are usually too many survey requests from anywhere. This would 
make big cities too selective in responding to surveys. Based on the pilot survey 
results, I decided to survey in-between size cities of which the population range was 
between 100,000 and 500,000. Among the cities with that population range, I 
excluded some cities in which sheriff offices (e.g., Lancaster, CA; Augusta-
Richmond, GA) are in charge of crime control rather than police departments, based 
                                            
1 The population range of the 12 cities was as follows. More than 500,000 - one city; 100,000 ~ 
500,000 - four cities; 10,000 ~ 100,000 - four cities; and less than 10,000 - three cities. 
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on the assumption that their organizational structures and characteristics are different 
from those of police departments.  
 
When I determined the survey target police departments, I tried to get 
endorsement for my research from police organizations2 to increase a response rate, 
but I failed to get their endorsement. Two months after sending the first surveys to 
the target cities, the response rate was about 10 percent. So, I contacted non-
responding police departments and found that majority of the police departments 
seemed to ignore the survey3. I sent the surveys again to the non-responding cities 
and this time the response increased to about 20 percent when one and half months 
had passed. Finally, I sent reminder postcards to non-responding cities and I could 
increase the response rate up to 32 percent (i.e., 65 cities participated as seen in table 
9-1). 
 
As seen in the actual survey (appendix 9-1), before asking the survey 
questions, I made it clear that the survey was only regarding full time employees 
(FTE). That is, I asked them not to include any data about trainees, part-time 
employees, and temporary job employees because there may be different HRM 
characteristics for non-FTE and the organizational performance will be differently 
calculated if non-FET is included, based on the turnover literature (e.g., Shaw et al. 
2005). For example, we imagine that trainees are more likely to quit than FTE and 
there may be more control-oriented HRM characteristics for temporary employees 
rather than more discretion allowed. 
                                            
2 I send the letters to International Association of Chiefs of Police, Police Executive Research Forum, 
and Kentucky State Police Commissioner, asking endorsement for my research. 
3 Generally, staffs in charge of responding to surveys kept them in their drawers and did not do 
anything. In other cases, the survey seemed to be missing. 
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Table 9-1. Survey Participants List 
 
No City State Population No City State
Populatio
n  No City State 
Populatio
n  
1 Chandler AZ 211299  23 Miami FL 376815 45 Albuquerque NM 471856 
2 Mesa AZ 432376  24 Port St. Lucie FL 105507 46 
North Las 
Vegas NV 144502 
3 Tempe AZ 158880  25 St. Petersburg FL 247610 47 Reno NV 193882 
4 Bakersfield CA 271035  26 Tallahassee FL 153938 48 Cincinnati OH 317361 
5 Daly City CA 100819  27 Tampa FL 317647 49 Toledo OH 308973 
6 Fresno CA 451455  28 Columbus GA 185702 50 Tulsa OK 387807 
7 Glendale CA 200499  29 Savannah GA 127573 51 Allentown PA 105958 
8 Long Beach CA 475460  30 Boise City ID 190117 52 Providence RI 176365 
9 Modesto CA 206872  31 Springfield IL 113586 53 Columbia SC 117357 
10 Ontario CA 167402  32 Fort Wayne IN 219495 54 Amarillo TX 178612 
11 
Rancho 
Cucamonga CA 151640  33 Olathe KS 105274 55 Brownsville TX 156178 
12 Santa Ana CA 342510  34 Lexington KY 266798 56 Mesquite TX 129270 
13 Sunnyvale CA 128549  35 
Baton 
Rouge LA 225090 57 Pasadena TX 144413 
14 
Thousand 
Oaks CA 124192  36 Shreveport LA 198364 58 
Wichita 
Falls TX 102340 
15 West Covina CA 108251  37 Ann Arbor MI 114498 59 Alexandria VA 128923 
16 Aurora CO 290418  38 Warren MI 136016 60 
Newport 
News VA 181647 
17 
Colorado 
Springs CO 370448  39 St. Paul MN 280404 61 Norfolk VA 241727 
18 Pueblo CO 103648  40 Kansas City MO 442768 62 
Virginia 
Beach VA 439467 
19 
Coral 
Springs FL 127005  41 Fayetteville NC 124372 63 Bellevue WA 112344 
20 
Fort 
Lauderdale FL 162917  42 Greensboro NC 229110 64 Green Bay WI 101467 
21 Gainesville FL 109146  43 Raleigh NC 316802 65 Madison WI 218432 
22 Hollywood FL 143408  44 Jersey City NJ 239097     
 
Note: Populations are as of July 1, 2003 (source: http://www.citypopulation.de/USA.html) 
 
 
In panel (a) of table 9-2, I summarize the descriptive statistics of population for all 
205 surveyed cities, 65 participating cities, and 140 non-participating cities. As seen 
in the table, it seems that there is no difference of populations between participating 
cities and non-participating cities although participants have a little more populations 
 
than non-participants. To test if there is a relationship between participation in the 
survey and city’s population, I ran analysis of variance and the result is in panel (b) 
of table 9-2. As seen in panel (b) of the table, the participation of the survey is not 
associated with city population. 
 
Table 9-2. Descriptive statistics and analysis of variance (ANOVA) results 
 
(a) Comparing descriptive statistics between participants and non-participants 
 Mean Standard Min. Max. Deviation 
All cities (205) 187,219 92,154 100,138 475,460 
Participants (65) 214,057 107,927 100,819 475,460 
Non-participants (140) 175,408 82,004 100,138 469,032 
 
 
(b) ANOVA results 
Sum of 
square 
Degree of 
freedom 
Mean 
Square Source F Prob > F 
Between groups* 43.39024 202 0.214803 0.43 0.8999 
Within groups 1 2 0.5   
Total 44.39024 204 0.217599   
*: It means between participating cities and non-participating cities 
 
 
In the survey, I asked the questions about HRM characteristics such as job 
design (Q1 ~ Q3), unionization (Q4 ~ Q6), employee voice policy (Q7 ~ Q10), 
compensation (Q11), and staffing (Q12) (see appendix 9-1 for the actual survey 
questionnaires) based on Arthur (1992, 1994) and Walton (1985), who investigated 
the effects of control and commitment HRM characteristics in the private sector. I 
also asked police departments to provide three years’ (2002 ~ 2004) voluntary and 
involuntary turnover data for sworn officers and civilian employees. To collect the 
data about control variables that I use for this study, I asked questions about response 
time (the first column of Q14), number of sworn officers on patrol service (the 
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4second column of Q14), sick leave absence (Q15) , salary and benefit budgets for 
sworn officers and civilian employees (Q16), and caseload per sworn officers (Q17). 
Although most survey participants answered the questions about HRM 
characteristics, turnover data were provided by only about 40 percent of the 
participants5. Most police departments also had a problem providing the data such as 
sick leave absence and caseload per sworn officers, so I could not use those data as 
control variables. 
 
9.2 Factor analysis with HRM characteristics 
As mentioned in the previous chapters, this study examines if HRM characteristics 
(both individually and systematically) have an influence on crime control 
performance of the municipal police, and if HRM characteristics moderate turnover 
effects on crime control performance such that the negative effects of turnover would 
be severer in an organization with commitment HRM characteristics than with 
control HRM characteristics. In order to extract underlying factors of HRM 
characteristics that police departments might have, I ran factor analysis using 
principal component factor method and varimax rotation option (see StataCorp, 
2003).  
 
 
 
 
                                            
4 Turnover studies usually include sick leave absence in the regression analysis as a control variable 
because it may mask the effects of turnover. In this study, I asked participants to provide total sick 
leave days except pregnancy and maternity leaves according to the literature (Glebbeek and Bax, 
2005). 
5 Some cities provided three years’ turnover data, other cities provided only one or two year’s 
turnover data among 40 percent participants.  
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Table 9-3. Expected Results for the Underlying Factors of HRM Characteristics 
 
Question Control Commitment Contents of the questions Number HRM system HRM system 
Number of job classification for sworn 
officers More  Less  Q1-a 
Number of job classification for civilians 
Q1-b More  Less  
Job description for sworn officers (1-3) Discretion not 
allowed Q2 Discretion allowed 1: Discretion not allowed  3: Discretion allowed  
Job description for civilians (1-3) Discretion not 
allowed Q3 Discretion allowed 1: Discretion not allowed  3: Discretion allowed 
The number of registered unions for 
sworn officers Less  More  Q4-a 
The number of registered unions for 
civilians Less  More  Q4-b 
Percent of sworn officers who are eligible 
and join one of the unions Less  More  Q5,6-a 
Percent of civilians who are eligible and 
join one of the unions Less  More  Q5,6-b 
Do you have formal employee 
complaint/grievance resolution 
mechanism 
Q7 No Yes 
6Do you have information-sharing-policy
Q8 No Yes 
Employees’ participation in a wide range 
of issues or in a limited range of issues 
In a limited range 
of issues 
In a wide range  Q9 of issues 
Do you have incentive or bonus system 
Q11 Yes No 
How long does it usually take to recruit 
sworn officers 
It doesn’t take 
long It takes long Q12-a 
How long does it usually take to recruit 
civilians 
It doesn’t take 
long It takes long Q12-b 
 
 
According to Arthur (1992, 1994) and Walton (1985), the expected results of 
the HRM questions in the survey for each control and commitment HRM systems 
are as in table 9-3. That is, based on the literature, we expect that an organization 
with control HRM system would have more number of job classifications for both 
                                            
6 If a department has an information-sharing-policy, most information is usually shared among 
employees regardless whether or not the information is directly necessary to them. 
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sworn officers and civilians, more detailed job description that does not allow 
discretion for both sworn officers and civilians, less number of unions for both sworn 
officers and civilians, lower percentage of employees’ joining unions for both sworn 
officers and civilians, and bonus or incentive system. But we also expect that 
organization with control HRM characteristics would neither have formal employee 
complaint/grievance resolution mechanism nor information-sharing-policy. In 
addition, employees are expected to participate in a limited range of issues, and it 
would not take long to recruits sworn officers or civilians for an organization with 
control HRM characteristics.  
 
 
9.3 Independent Variables 
 
Turnover rates. As reviewed in the previous chapter, turnover is defined as 
the cessation of membership in an organization by an individual who received 
monetary compensation from the organization (Mobley, 1982, p10). Among a variety 
of different turnover measures, such as accession rate, separation rate, stability rate, 
and survival rate7, I adopted the most commonly used measure, the separation rate as 
follows.  
 
 
        (# of quit) or (# of total separation) 
 Separation rate = 
Average # of members on payrolls during the period 
 
                                            
7 The definitions of these turnover measures were reviewed in the previous chapter, based on Price 
(1977 ) and Mobley (1982). 
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Although the combination of two or three turnover measures is suggested for better 
understanding turnover (e.g., Mobley 1982; Price 1977), only separation rates could 
be used for voluntary, involuntary, and total (i.e., voluntary and involuntary turnover) 
turnovers in the current study because most municipal police departments do not 
keep the detailed turnover records that are necessary to calculate other turnover 
measures. Furthermore, even the number of employee separations is not well kept 
over a few years in many police departments, especially when the city size is 
relatively small. In this study, I differentiated voluntary turnover (i.e., initiated by 
employees) from involuntary turnover (i.e., initiated by organizations, death, and 
mandatory retirement) following the suggestions that voluntary turnover and 
involuntary turnover should be dealt with differently because their etiologies and 
effects are different from each other (e.g., McElroy et al., 2001; Shaw et al., 1998). I 
also separated sworn officer’s turnover from civilian employees’ turnover because 
their functions are different and sworn officers are more directly involved in crime 
control. In addition, I combined sworn officer’s turnover and civilian’s turnover to 
investigate if there is another effect of all employees’ turnover that may be different 
from each group’s (i.e., sworn officers and civilians) separate turnover effect. In sum, 
this study used nine kinds of turnover rates as follows. For sworn officers, I collected 
the data of voluntary turnover, involuntary turnover, and total (i.e., voluntary and 
involuntary) turnover. For civilian employees, I collected the data of voluntary 
turnover, involuntary turnover, and total turnover. And for all employees (i.e., sworn 
officers and civilians), I collected the data of voluntary turnover, involuntary 
turnover, and total turnover. 
 
Turnover rate differences. I also used turnover rate differences between year 
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2003 turnover and year 2004 turnover (i.e., deducting 2003 turnover rate from 2004 
turnover rate) as an independent variable. When I found no significant relationships 
in the regression analysis that used different kinds of turnover rates as an 
independent variable, I adopted different kinds of turnover rate differences as an 
independent variable to examine if changes of turnover rates have influences on 
crime control performance. Again, I used the same nine kinds of turnover rate 
differences as in turnover rates. 
 
 
9.4 Dependent Variables 
 
Police performance. Performance is generally defined as effective and 
efficient use of resources to achieve outcomes (Berman, 1998; Morley, 1986; Rosen, 
1993). Unlike for-profit organizations with a clear goal of profit maximization, 
governments at any level are generally forced to pursue several objectives at the 
same time to meet citizens’ various needs. Municipal police departments are not the 
exception. For example, as Skogan (1976, 278-279) noted, the police are expected to 
facilitate the smooth flow of traffic through the city, to intercede in family disputes, 
and often to perform mundane tasks of city management such as checking tavern 
washrooms for the presence of soap and escorting children across busy streets, in 
addition to their traditional role (i.e., crime control). However, the organization of 
police departments and the self-image of their officers are rooted in crime fighting, 
despite the multiplicity of their tasks (Reiss & Bordua, 1967), and crime control still 
comprises a major part of the police service (Bratton, 1998; Moore & Braga, 2004). 
Therefore, rather than measuring the whole performance of the various police 
functions, which is not practical due to data availability, I focus on crime control 
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performance in this study, as Skogan (1976) suggested.  
 
Performance indicators of crime control. Probably the best way to see how 
well crimes are being controlled is to measure the level of crime occurrence. For 
example, if a small number of crimes occurred in a city, we may say that crimes are 
well controlled in that area and, therefore, a good level of safety is provided to its 
citizens. As we know in the suggested crime control model in the previous chapter, 
however, crime occurrence is likely to be influenced by various uncontrollable 
factors such as social-structural factors (e.g., racial heterogeneity) and 
socioeconomic factors (e.g., unemployment rate, poverty level) in addition to police 
efforts (e.g., Pratt et al., 2005). Therefore, even when the police make serious efforts 
to control crimes, it is not likely to observe significant crime reduction if other 
uncontrollable factors work unfavorably in reducing crimes. Likewise, we may 
observe crime reduction even when the police do not make serious efforts to reduce 
crimes if other uncontrollable factors work favorably. 
 
While the positive effects of the police level (e.g., the number of sworn 
officers and expenditure level) on reducing crimes have been debatable, the 
deterrence theory of traditional policing has been supported by studies that 
investigated if high crime clearance rates lead to crime reduction (e.g., Chapman, 
1976; D'Alessio et al., 1998; Wilson et al., 1978). According to the results of those 
studies, crimes are likely to be reduced by increasing the certainty of punishment 
(i.e., a high level of crime clearance). In fact, I found a significant and negative 
relationship (r = - 0.5 ~ - 0.7) between crime clearance rates and crime occurrence 
rates in the current study. As the logic model of the Community Oriented Policing 
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Services Program (Roth et al., 2000b, 3) indicated, police efforts such as police level, 
police expenditures, and quick responses to citizen requests are more directly related 
to crime clearance rather than to crime occurrence. In addition, crime clearance is 
less likely to be affected by the uncontrollable variables, as we reviewed in the 
previous chapter. Since I am more interested in examining the effects of turnover and 
the effect of HRM characteristics on crime control performance of the police, we are 
more likely to find the effects when we focus on crime control output such as crime 
clearance rates rather than focusing on crime control outcomes such as crime 
reduction and safety feeling because the latter is more associated with uncontrollable 
factors that may screen the effects of turnover and HRM characteristics. 
  
In sum, as a crime control performance measure for the police, the crime 
clearance rate has more advantages than the crime occurrence rates in the current 
study. The Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) data are the most widely used criminal 
statistics in the U.S. and have been maintained by FBI. In the current study, I only 
used crime clearance rates for UCR part I crimes as dependent variables and did not 
count crime clearance rates for UCR part II crimes because part II crimes are less 
severe than part I crimes and get less attention from the police accordingly. As we 
reviewed in the previous chapter, clearance rate is usually defined as the number (or 
percentage) of crimes that have been “solved” by arrest or “exceptional” means 
(Drebin and Brannon, 1992, p22). An offense is “cleared by arrest” or solved for 
crime reporting purposes when at least one person is (1) arrested, (2) charged with 
the commission of the offense; and (3) turned over to the court for prosecution. An 
“exceptional” clearance is another variation of a clearance, and the death of the 
offender can be regarded as an exceptional clearance. In this study, I did not adopt 
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crime clearance rates for each individual crime. Rather, total violent crimes 
(hereafter, violent crimes) and total property crimes (hereafter, property crimes) are 
used as dependent variables. Based on the classification of the UCR Part I, in the 
study, violent crimes consist of murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault; and 
property crimes consist of burglary, larceny, and motor theft. Since violent crimes are 
usually more urgent, thus have higher priority than property crimes when the police 
assign their efforts to clear them, and it is reasonable to treat them separately.  
 
9.5 Control Variables 
Based on the crime control literature, I included three factors that are normally 
expected to influence the crime clearance rates: police level (i.e., the number of 
patrol police officer per 10,000 populations), police expenditure level (i.e., budget 
for salary and benefits per employee), and crime occurrence rate (i.e., crime 
occurrence per 10,000 populations). As seen in the suggested crime control model, 
there may be other factors involved in producing crime clearance rates, such as 
response time, police strategies (e.g., patrolling), and get-tough policy. However, I 
could not include them as control variables due to data unavailability. Although I 
tried to collect the data such as response time and patrolling efforts by asking 
questions in the survey, few police departments could provide those data.  Social-
structural factors and socioeconomic factors are also included in the crime control 
model I suggested, but those factors are more likely to have influences not on crime 
clearance rates but on crime occurrence (or crime reduction) as seen in the model.  
 
 
Although crime occurrence rates are negatively influenced by crime 
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clearance rates as seen in the crime control model, we also see that crime occurrence 
rates have negative influence on crime clearance rates at the same time (i.e., 
simultaneous relationship). For example, a higher level of crime occurrence may 
lead to higher workloads for the police departments, and this, in turn, will lower the 
level of crime clearance rates. However, no cancel-out effects are expected in this 
simultaneous relationship because the correlation sign of each relationship is 
commonly negative. That is, we expect that high clearance rates will lead to low 
crime occurrence rates, and low crime occurrence rates will lead to high clearance 
rates. In this study I did not include organization age as a control variable, unlike 
other turnover effect studies (e.g., Arthur, 1994; Guthrie, 2001; Shaw et al. 2005), 
because most cities were founded a long time ago, unlike for-profit organizations. 
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X. Results and Discussion  
 
10.1 Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Table 10-1 summarizes means and standard deviations for the dependent variables, 
the independent variables, and the control variables, and the correlations between 
them. In table 10-1 we observe that there are negative relationships between crime 
clearance rate and crime occurrence rates for both violent (r = - 0.51, p < 0.01) and 
property (r = - 0.69, p <0.01) crimes, as expected.  
 
No significant correlations were found between traditional policing (number 
of police level and level of police expenditure) and crime clearance rates. That is, we 
only observe suggestive, positive relationships between the number of patrol police 
officers per 10,000 population and crime clearance rates (r = 0.27 for the violent 
crime clearance rate; r = 0.10 for the property crime clearance rate) and between the 
salary and benefits budget per employee and the crime clearance rates (r = 0.28 for 
the violent crime clearance rate; r = 0.14 for the property crime clearance rate). We 
also generally observe negative correlations between turnover rates and crime 
clearance rates and between turnover rate differences and crime clearance rates, 
indicating the importance of human resources in crime controlling. Since we do not 
observe high correlations between any variables1 in the table, we need not be 
concerned about multicollinearity in the regression analysis. 
 
 
                                            
1 Although high correlations exist between some independent variables (e.g., variables 7 and 10; 
variables 8 and 10; variables 9 and 10), they do not cause multicollinearity in the regression analysis 
because different independent variables are not included in the regression equation at the same time.  
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Table 10-1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 
 
Note: year 2004 data 
 
 
10.2 HRM characteristics of municipal police departments 
Although I asked various questions about HRM characteristics in the survey, it 
turned out that some questions were not appropriate in the context of municipal 
police departments. For example, according to the results, recruiting time for sworn 
officers is not much related with cautiousness in selecting employees unlike in the 
Variable Obs Mean Std. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Dev. 
1. Crime clearance rate 
for total violent crimes 60 45.08 14.51 1.00              
2. Crime clearance rate 
for total property crimes 60 17.30 7.90 .77 1.00             
3. Violent crime occurrence   
per 10000 populations 62 66 39 -.51 -.48 1.00            
4. Property crime occurrence  
per 10000 populations 63 482 192 -.70 -.69 .81 1.00           
5. Number of patrol police 
officers per 10000 
populations 42 11 6 .27 .10 -.06 -.10 1.00          
6. Salary and benefits  
per employee 51 82974 63025 .28 .14 -.19 -.49 -.25 1.00         
7. Voluntary turnover 
per 100 sworn officers 45 5.66 2.84 -.22 -.24 .26 .19 -.01 -.26 1.00        
8. Voluntary and involuntary 
turnover per 100 sworn 
officers 42 6.39 3.29 -.19 -.23 .26 .20 -.02 -.28 .99 1.00       
9. Voluntary turnover 
per 100 employees  
48 6.62 3.50 -.17 -.20 .09 .10 -.06 -.32 .91 .90 1.00      (sworn and civilian) 
10. Voluntary and involuntary 
turnover per 100 employees 
(sworn and civilian) 45 7.25 3.58 -.14 -.19 .10 .11 -.04 -.35 .88 .90 .98 1.00     
11. Voluntary turnover rate 
difference  
44 .17 2.78 -.24 -.26 -.12 -.11 .08 -.08 .31 .25 .17 .17 1.00    per 100 sworn officers 
12. Voluntary and involuntary 
turnover rate difference 
per 100 sworn officers 41 -.04 3.01 -.23 -.34 -.09 -.09 .12 -.04 .26 .47 .13 .11 .82 1.00   
13. Voluntary turnover rate 
difference per 100 
employees (sworn and 
civilian) 
46 .19 2.55 -.13 -.28 -.24 -.17 .15 -.20 .30 .28 .36 .35 .86 .76 1.00  
14. Voluntary and involuntary 
turnover rate difference 
per 100 employees 43 -.11 2.50 -.14 -.32 -.17 -.21 .23 -.09 .25 .23 .31 .32 .81 .72 .95 1.00 
  (sworn and civilian) 
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private sector, rather it is more related with how often municipal governments recruit 
new employees. Therefore, if a city government does not recruit new employees 
frequently, it will take longer to fill in vacancies than a city government with a 
frequent recruiting. Unionization is another example. Most employees seem to join 
at least one of the unions as long as their government allows unionizations for sworn 
officers and civilian employees at the police department. Therefore, I could not tell 
the difference in the degree of unionization among police departments except when 
unions are not allowed for the police employees. In this study, I tried to include a 
variety of HRM characteristic variable as long as they showed an acceptable level of 
internal consistency reliability. 
 
I checked internal consistency reliability of different sets of HRM 
characteristic variables by using Cronbach’s alpha. Since a widely-accepted social 
science cut-off is 0.7 (Nunnally, 1978), I chose one set that included relatively more 
HRM characteristic variables and had over 0.7 Cronbach’s alpha. As seen in table 
10-2, the chosen HRM variable set included different HRM characteristics such as 
job classifications for sworn officers and civilian employees, job descriptions for 
sworn officers and civilian employees, information sharing policy, employee’s 
participation in a wide range of issues, and performance-related incentive system. 
Although the chosen HRM variable set include the mix of continuous variables (i.e., 
job classification numbers for sworn officers and civilian employees), dichotomous 
variables (i.e., information sharing policy, employee’s participation in a wide range 
of issue, and performance-related incentive system), and trichotomous variables (i.e., 
job descriptions for sworn officers and civilian employees), I ran factor analysis with 
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2them.  The chosen HRM variable set, however, did not include recruiting time for 
sworn officers and civilians and unionization-related variables due to the reasons I 
explained previously.  
 
Table 10-2. Cronbach’s Alpha for the Chosen Set of HRM Characteristic Variables 
 
Item Obs Avg. inter-item Alpha correlation 
51 0.3269 # of job classification for sworn officers 
50 0.3425 # of job classification for civilian employees 
Job task description for sworn officers 65 0.2155 (1: most details 3: discretion allowed) 
Job task description for civilian employees   65 0.401 (1: most details 3: discretion allowed) 
Information sharing policy 
(1: yes 0: no) 62 0.2544 0.7436 
Employee’s participation in a wide range of 
issues (1: yes 0: no) 62 0.2452 
Performance-related incentive system 63 0.2605 (1: yes 0: no) 
   
Test scale  0.2929 
 
 
 
When the variable set of HRM characteristics was determined, I ran factor 
analysis using principal components factor method, and rotated the results with 
varimax option3 in order to extract underlying factors with the expectation that 
commitment HRM characteristics and control HRM characteristics are separately 
identified. I obtained two factors, both of which had more than one eigenvalue4. As 
seen in table 10-3, uniqueness5 is not very high except civilian employees’ job 
classification number (v2) and Job task description for civilian employees (v4). 
                                            
2 Although factor analysis with mixed variables of continuous and dichotomous variable may result in 
clustering around variables, I ran factor analysis with those mixed variables because at least those 
dichotomous and trichotomous variables are ordinal level of measurements, so that we can do factor 
analysis (e.g., UCLA website information about the factor analysis with non-continuous variables, 
http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/courses/ed231a1/notes2/morefa.html). 
3 I assumed that commitment HRM factor and control HRM factor were not related. 
4 The eigenvalue for a given factor measures the variance in all the variables that is accounted for by 
that factor. As a rule of thumb, when eigenvalue is more than one, we can retain as an extracted factor. 
5 It is the percentage of variance for the variable that is not explained by the factors. 
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According to Walton (1985) and Arthur (1992, 1994), we expect that an organization 
with commitment HRM characteristics is likely to have smaller number of job 
classification, more discretion-allowed job description than an organization with 
control HRM characteristics. We also expect that an organization with commitment 
HRM characteristics is likely to have information-sharing policy, and encourage 
their employees to participate in a wide range of issues, whereas an organization 
with control HRM characteristics is likely to have a performance-related incentive 
system. Table 10-3 shows that factor 1 and factor 2 have consistent HRM 
characteristics according to the definitions of control HRM characteristics and 
commitment HRM characteristics except job task description for civilian employees. 
Therefore, I can conclude that factor 1 represents commitment HRM characteristics 
and factor 2 represents control HRM characteristics.  
 
Table 10-3. Obtained Factors of HRM Characteristics 
 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Variable/ Question No. Uniqueness Loading Loading 
# of job classification for sworn officers (v1) / Q1a 0.19831 0.69098 0.48321 
# of job classification for civilian employees (v2) / Q1b 0.1286 0.68322 0.51668 
Job task description for sworn officers (v3) / Q2 
0.93074 0.12085 0.11912 (1: most detailed 2: middle 3: discretion allowed) 
Job task description for civilian employees (v4) / Q3 
-0.08762 0.54984 0.68999 (1: most detailed 2: middle 3: discretion allowed) 
Information sharing policy (v5) / Q8 
0.93788 -0.0042 0.12036 (1: yes 0: no) 
Employee’s participation in a wide range of issues (v6) 
0.88571 0.08528 0.20824 (1: yes 0: no) / Q9 
Performance-related incentive system (v7) 
-0.82435 -0.11769 0.30659 (1: yes 0: no) / Q11 
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10.3 The effects of HRM characteristics on crime control performance 
In the previous chapters, I hypothesized that a certain kind of HRM characteristics 
would have positive effects on crime control performance from the universalistic 
perspective. Based on the literature, I expected that commitment HRM system and 
its individual HRM practices both have positive effects on crime control 
performance as below. 
 
 
H1. Municipal police departments that have individual practices of commitment 
HRM system are more likely to have better crime control performance respectively.  
(1) Broad job classification,  
(2) More discretion allowed 
(3) Formal complaint/grievance resolution mechanism 
(4) Information-sharing-policy  
(5) Employees’ participation encouraged in a wide range of issues,  
(6) No bonus or incentive system for individuals, and  
(7) More selective staffing  
 
H2. Municipal police departments that have commitment HRM systems are more 
likely to have better crime control performance. 
 
 
In order to test these hypotheses, I ran regression with independent variables such as 
each individual practice of commitment HRM – from broad job classification to 
more selective staffing as seen in hypothesis 1 – and the extracted HRM factors that 
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seem to represent commitment (factor 1) and control (factor 2) HRM characteristics 
as seen in the previous section. Clearance rates for violent crimes and property 
crimes are used as dependent variables as I explained in the previous section of this 
chapter. I also included three control variables that are normally expected to 
influence the crime clearance rates: police level (i.e., the number of patrol police 
officer per 10,000 populations), police expenditure level (i.e., budget for salary and 
benefits per employee), and crime occurrence rate (i.e., crime occurrence per 10,000 
populations). Although other factors may be involved in producing crime clearance 
rates, such as response time, police strategies (e.g., patrolling), and get-tough policy 
as seen in the suggested crime control model in the previous chapter, I could not 
include them as control variables due to data unavailability. In order to examine how 
each HRM practice and extracted HRM factors contribute to explaining the variance 
of crime control performance – checking adjusted R2 in table 10-4 – in addition to 
exploring the effect of those HRM practices and factors, I conducted stepwise 
regression. As in the table, first, I ran regression with only three control variables 
(model C) and added different individual HRM practices and HRM factors. The 
regression results are summarized in table 10-4 and table 10-5. As seen in table 10-4, 
neither individual HRM practices (M1 ~ M7) nor HRM systems (M8 and M9) have 
significant effects on violent crime control performance. In sum, I failed to show 
meaningful effects of individual HRM practices and extracted HRM factors on 
violent crime control performance. Some possible reasons are as follows. Violent 
crime clearance rates (i.e., dependent variable) are more likely affected by public 
attentions than policing resources and human resource management practices. For 
example, if a violent crime gets more public attention, we imagine that the police 
tend to make efforts to clear that crime. Small number of observations might be 
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another reason. Even among 65 participating cities, they usually answered some 
questions that do not require much time for answering.  
 
Table 10-4. Effects of HRM Practices on Violent Crime Control Performance 
 
C M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9 Models Variables 
Violent crime occurrence -.13 -.20† -.16 -.14† -.14† -.14 -.15† -.13 -.23* -.19† per 10000 populations (C1) 
Salary and benefit per employee (C2) -.00 -.00 -.00 -.00 -.00 -.00 -.00 -.00 -.00 -.00 
Number of patrol police officers 
per 10000 populations (C3) .40 1.33 1.56 .02 .70 .52 .28 .59 1.81 1.77 
Number of job classification  
for sworn officers (M1)  -.54         
Number of job classification  
for civilian employees (M2)   -.14        
Job task descriptions for sworn officers  
(1: detailed 3: discretion) (M3)    -5.88       
Job task descriptions for civilian employees  
(1: detailed 3: discretion) (M4)     5.66      
Information sharing policy  
(1: yes, 0: no) (M5)      -4.00     
Employees' participation  
in a wide range of issues (1: yes, 0: no) (M6)       -15.7    
Incentive or bonus system,  
based on performance? (1: yes, 0: no) (M7)        -.83   
Commitment  
HRM factor (M8)         -8.6  
Control  
HRM factor (M9)          -2.64 
           
F 1.00 1.37 1.62 1.12 1.04 .81 2.01 0.83 2.45† 1.56 
2Adjusted R .01 .06 .10 .02 .00 .00 .13 .00 .22 .10 
 
Note - Dependent variables are violent crime clearance rates †p＜ .10 
 - Unstandardized coefficients are reported * p＜ .05      
 - Number of observations: 21-31 ** p＜ .01      
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Table 10-5. Effects of HRM Practices on Property Crime Control Performance 
 
 
C M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9 Models 
Variables 
Property crime occurrence -.03** -.04** -.04** -.03*** -.03** -.03** -.03** -.03** -.03** -.04** per 10000 populations (C1) 
Salary and benefit per employee (C2) -.00 -.00 -.00 -.00† -.00 -.00 -.00 -.00† -.00 -.00 
Number of patrol police officers 
per 10000 populations (C3) -.13 -.34 -.23 -.47 .06 -.42 -.25 -.08 -.39 -.46 
Number of job classification  
for sworn officers (M1)  -.42         
Number of job classification  
for civilian employees (M2)   -.05        
Job task descriptions for sworn officers  
(1: detailed 3: discretion) (M3)    -5.41*       
Job task descriptions for civilian 
employees (1: detailed 3: discretion) (M4)     3.42      
Information sharing policy  
(1: yes, 0: no) (M5)      -5.16     
Employees' participation  
in a wide range of issues (1: yes, 0: no) 
(M6) 
      -7.33*    
Incentive or bonus system,  
based on performance? (1: yes, 0: no) (M7)        -2.11   
Commitment  
HRM factor (M8)         -3.62  
Control  
HRM factor (M9)          -.38 
           
F 4.32* 3.09* 3.03* 5.44** 3.80* 4.24* 5.12** 3.14* 3.67* 2.88† 
2Adjusted R .25 .27 .27 .37 .27 .32 .37 .23 .35 .27 
 
Note - Dependent variables are property crime clearance rates †p＜ .10 
 - Unstandardized coefficients are reported * p＜ .05      
 - Number of observations: 21-31 ** p＜ .01      
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Unlike violent crime cases, however, we observe bigger adjusted R2 for the 
property crime cases. Basically the variance of property crime control performance 
(i.e., clearance rates in this study) was well explained with traditional policing efforts 
and most individual HRM practices, and HRM systems also contributed to 
explaining the variance of property crime control performance (see adjusted R2 in 
table 10-5) although most of them didnot have significant effect on property crime 
clearance. As in violent crime cases, we do not observe significant influences of 
traditional policing efforts on crime control performance. Rather, we observe that 
crime occurrence rates are the most significant factor for both violent and property 
crime cases. That is, the more crimes occurred, the fewer crimes are cleared.  
 
When we look at the effects of individual HRM practices and HRM 
characteristics (i.e., commitment and control HRM), two kinds of individual HRM 
practices, job task descriptions for sworn officers (M3) and employees' participation 
in a wide range of issues (M6), show significant effects on crime control 
performance (p < 0.5). Unlike my prediction, however, there are negative 
relationships between those individual HRM practices of commitment HRM 
characteristics (i.e., M3 and M6) and property crime control performance. With 
respect to the effects of HRM characteristics, we do not observe any significant cases. 
Therefore, no hypotheses (H1 and H2) about the effect of commitment HRM 
practices and HRM characteristics (i.e., commitment and control HRM 
characteristics) were supported. 
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Interpretation of the results. Why did we not observe significant effects of 
individual HRM practices or HRM characteristics on crime control performance? 
Are there not significant correlations between those individual HRM practices or 
HRM characteristics and crime control performance in the municipal police 
departments? We may not answer those questions in this study. Probably, we may 
find the answers in the relationship between HRM practices/systems and 
organizational strategies/directions in the context of municipal police departments, as 
we reviewed in chapter four. Although I found two underlying factors of various 
HRM characteristics that municipal police departments might have, it is less likely 
that those HRM practices and characteristics are formed in consistency with 
organizational strategies, unlike for-profit organizations. Likewise, each individual 
HRM practice is also less likely to be determined from the viewpoint of 
organizational strategy. That is, commitment HRM practices and characteristics may 
not be the proper option to improve organizational performance in the municipal 
police departments, even though we need to more investigate this research topic in 
order to confirm this speculation. According to organizational characteristics such as 
defender, prospector, analyzer, and reactor suggested by Miles and Snow (1984), 
police organizations, like most public organizations, may belong to reactors who do 
not have consistency between strategy and environment and between strategy and 
process. 
 
Among different competitive strategies such as innovation, quality 
enhancement, cost reduction suggested by Schuler and Jackson (1987), it appears 
that police organizations may have cost reduction strategy when we consider the 
expected role behaviors of each strategy (see section 4.5). Especially when the police 
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need to show that safety environment is being provided to the citizens, the police 
tend to pay attention to quantity and results (e.g., crime clearance rate, crime 
occurrence rate) rather than to quality (e.g., citizen’s satisfaction, due process when 
crime is controlled). If the police are usually under the pressure to show their cities 
are safer than other cities, we can imagine that they are more likely to adopt cost 
reduction strategy, based on Shuler and Jackson (1987), and therefore control HRM 
practices may be more appropriate to have a better crime control performance.  
 
As explained in chapter four, Wright and McMahan (1992) argued that in the 
private sector HRM practices and activities are likely to be determined by proactive, 
strategically intended decisions, whereas non-strategic models (i.e., resource 
dependence and institutional model) may be more persuasive to explain the HRM 
practices and activities in the public sector. According to the interview with a sworn 
officer at the local police department, major parts of the HRM characteristics are 
more likely to be determined by the personal preferences of police chiefs. For 
example, if a police chief likes subordinates to participate in a wide range of issues, 
employees are encouraged to do so. The problem in this situation is that those HRM 
practices are not proactive, strategically intended decisions. Even when a police 
department has HRM practices that really contribute to improving organizational 
performance, a new police chief may change them, simply according to his or her 
preference. As Lengnick-Hall and Lengnick-Hall (1988) argued, achieving 
competitive advantage through human resources requires that theses activities should 
be managed from a strategic perspective because integration provides a broader 
range of solutions for solving complex organizational problems, and reciprocity in 
integrating human resource and strategic concerns limits the neglect of human 
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resources as a vital source of organizational competence and competitive advantage.  
 
10.4 Turnover effects on crime control performance 
In order to investigate if turnover has significant effects on crime control 
performance, I conducted stepwise regression analyses separately with two different 
dependent variables: the violent crime clearance rate and the property crime 
clearance rate. Firstly, I ran regression with only three control variables, and then I 
added different types of turnover rates respectively (i.e., voluntary, involuntary, and 
total turnover rates for both sworn officers and civilians) as an independent variable. 
Finally, I added a quadratic term of each turnover rate variable in each regression 
equation, following the conventional way to check whether the relation shapes are 
linear or curvilinear (Glebbeek and Bax 2004, 284). No significant cases were found 
when I used turnover rates as independent variables and the results are not shown in 
this paper. 
 
Stepwise regression. After finding no significant relationships in the 
regression results using the turnover rate as an independent variable, I ran regression 
with different kinds of turnover rate differences as independent variables to examine 
if turnover changes have effects on crime control performance. Table 10-6 (a & b) 
shows the regression results when violent crime clearance rate was used as a 
dependent variable and table 10-7 (a & b) shows the results when property crime 
clearance rate was used as a dependent variable. Like the regression analysis with 
turnover rate itself, I added turnover rate difference variables respectively after 
running regression with only three control variables. That is, I added different kinds 
of turnover rate differences such as sworn officer’s voluntary turnover rate 
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difference (in model A-1), sworn officer’s total (i.e., voluntary and involuntary 
turnovers) turnover rate difference (in model B-1), all employee’s (i.e., sworn 
officers and civilians) voluntary turnover rate difference (in model C-1), and all 
employee’s total turnover rate difference (in model D-1). Although I checked the 
effects of civilian employee’s turnover rate difference (voluntary and involuntary) on 
the crime control performance, I found no significant results and omitted the results 
in the table. As in table 10-6 (a & b) and table 10-7 (a & b), I only included the 
regression results of sworn officer’s turnover rate differences and total employee’s 
(i.e., sworn officers and civilian employees) turnover rate differences. After adding 
each turnover rate difference separately, I added a quadratic term of each turnover 
rate difference (i.e., in model A-2, B-2, C-2, and D-2) to check whether the shape of 
relationship is linear or curvilinear. Finally, I added commitment HRM factor and its 
interaction term (i.e., in model A-3, B-3, C-3, and D-3) and control HRM factor and 
its interaction term (i.e., in model A-4, B-4, C-4, and D-4) to examine if HRM 
characteristics moderate the effects of turnover on crime control performance. 
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Table 10-6-a. Turnover Effects on Violent Crime Control Performance and  
Moderating Effects of HRM Factors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 A-1 A-2 A-3 A-4 B-1 B-2 B-3 B-4 
Model
Variabl
Violent crime occurrence 
-.13 -.14 -.11 -0.29 -0.19 -0.13 -0.11 -0.27 -0.19 per 10000 populations 
Salary and benefit per employee .01 .01 .01 0.00 0.00 .01 .01 0.00 0.00 
Number of patrol police officers 
per 10000 populations .40 1.62 1.68 3.05 4.77* 1.38 1.36 2.95 4.57* 
Voluntary TRD 
per 100 sworn officers (A)  -2.63 -3.36 -2.12 -2.24     
Quadratic term (A2)   .72 1.19 1.05     
Voluntary and involuntary TRD 
per 100 sworn officers (B)      -2.07 -2.34 -1.38 -1.19 
Quadratic term (B2)       .60 1.14 1.02* 
          
Commitment    -7.35    -4.19  HRM factor (F1) 
Control      -9.98    -10.50 HRM factor (F2) 
aF1 * TRD    -1.63    -1.63  
F2 * TRDa     0.16    1.03 
          
F 1 2.13 2.29† 2.37† 1.49 2.14 2.28 1.61 2.62 
2Adjusted R .01 .18 .23 .18 .35 .20 .26 .22 .43 
Note - TRD is the acronym of turnover rate difference †p＜ .10 
 - Turnover rate difference = 2004 turnover rate – 2003 turnover rate * p＜ .05      
 
 - Unstandardized coefficients are reported ** p＜ .01      
 - Number of observations: 21-31 ***p＜ .001     
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Table 10-6-b. Turnover Effects on Violent Crime Control Performance and  
Moderating Effects of HRM Factors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 C-1 C-2 C-3 C-4 D-1 D-2 D-3 D-4 
Model
Variabl
Violent crime occurrence 
-.13 -.22* -.18* -0.32* -0.27*  -0.21* -.17* -0.24 -0.24*  per 10000 populations 
Salary and benefit per employee .01 .01 .01 0.00 0.00  .01 .01 0.00 0.00  
Number of patrol police officers 
per 10000 populations .40 .03 .34 0.77 1.58  .09 .21 0.95 1.68  
Voluntary TRD 
per 100 employees (officer and 
civilian) (C) 
-4.34†   -2.45 -4.12* -3.30     
2Quadratic term (C )   1.62** 1.60 1.04      
Voluntary and involuntary TRD 
per 100 employees (officer and 
civilian) (D) 
     -1.99 -3.66* -1.89 -4.42*  
Quadratic term (D2)       1.60** 0.66 0.86  
          
Commitment    -7.28    -8.81  HRM factor (F1) 
Control      1.72     0.71  HRM factor (F2) 
aF1 * TRD    -2.45    1.54  
F2 * TRDa     2.24     3.35  
          
F 1 1.65 4.84** 4.15* 3.01† 1.54 5.28** 3.38* 3.53* 
2Adjusted R .01 .10 .47 .60 .48 .09 .49 .53 .54 
Note - TRD is the acronym of turnover rate difference †p＜ .10 
 - Turnover rate difference = 2004 turnover rate – 2003 turnover rate * p＜ .05      
 
 - Unstandardized coefficients are reported ** p＜ .01      
 - Number of observations: 21-31 ***p＜ .001     
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Table 10-7-a. Turnover Effects on Property Crime Control Performance and 
Moderating Effects of HRM Factors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 A-1 A-2 A-3 A-4 B-1 B-2 B-3 B-4 
Model 
Variable
Property crime occurrence 
-.03*** -.04*** -.03*** -0.03  -0.04**  -.04*** -.03*** -0.02  -0.03*  per 10000 populations 
Salary and benefit per 
employee .01* .01 .01 0.00  0.00*  .01 .01 0.00  0.00*  
Number of patrol police 
officers 
per 10000 populations 
-.13 -.13 -.02 0.82  1.10  -.04 .01 0.70  1.04  
Voluntary TRD 
per 100 sworn officers (A)  -1.87* -2.47** -1.81  -2.23**      
Quadratic term (A2)   .57** 0.65*  0.74**      
Voluntary and involuntary 
TRD per 100 sworn officers 
(B) 
     -1.94* -2.17** -1.50  -1.59*  
Quadratic term (B2)       .50** 0.57  0.67**  
          
Commitment     -3.21     -1.48   HRM factor (F1) 
Control      -2.53     -2.70  HRM factor (F2) 
aF1 * TRD    1.14     0.82   
F2 * TRDa     -1.50     -1.19  
          
F 4.32* 5.62** 8.69*** 6.66** 8.33** 6.15** 9.99*** 7.4** 11.77** 
2Adjusted R .25 .47 .65 .73 .77 .51 .69 .75 .83 
Note - TRD is the acronym of turnover rate difference * p＜ .05      
 - Turnover rate difference = 2004 turnover rate – 2003 turnover rate ** p＜ .01      
 
 - Unstandardized coefficients are reported ***p＜ .001     
 - Number of observations: 21-31  
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Table 10-7-b. Turnover Effects on Property Crime Control Performance and 
Moderating Effects of HRM Factors 
 
 
 C-1 C-2 C-3 C-4 D-1 D-2 D-3 D-4 Variable Model 
Property crime occurrence 
-.03*** -.05*** -.04*** -0.03  -0.04*  -.05*** -.04*** -0.03**  -0.04*  per 10000 populations 
Salary and benefit per 
employee .01* .01** .01* 0.00  0.00  .01** .01* 0.00*  0.00  
Number of patrol police 
officers 
per 10000 populations 
-.13 -.16 -.04 -0.53  -0.47  -.08 -.04 -0.50  -0.44  
Voluntary TRD 
per 100 employees (officer 
and civilian) (C) 
 -2.38** -2.94** -3.01*  -2.97*      
2Quadratic term (C )   .60* 0.54  0.91*      
Voluntary and involuntary 
TRD per 100 employees 
(officer and civilian) (D) 
     -2.49** -2.84** -1.81*  -2.85*  
Quadratic term (D2)       .45* -0.04  0.51  
          
Commitment     -2.95     -7.65*   HRM factor (F1) 
Control      0.00     0.34  HRM factor (F2) 
aF1 * TRD    0.88     2.00*   
F2 * TRDa     -1.51     -0.64  
          
F 4.32* 8.46*** 10.7*** 6.52** 6.87** 10.7*** 11.1*** 15.52*** 5.53* 
2Adjusted R .25 .58 .69 .72 .73 .64 .70 .93 .70 
 
Note - TRD is the acronym of turnover rate difference * p＜ .05      
 - Turnover rate difference = 2004 turnover rate – 2003 turnover rate ** p＜ .01      
 
 - Unstandardized coefficients are reported ***p＜ .001     
 - Number of observations: 21-31  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 183
 
Turnover effects on crime control performance. In the previous chapter, I 
hypothesized that police performance would be influenced by employee turnover 
such that there might be an inverted-U shape relationship between turnover and 
crime control performance as below, based on the turnover literature: 
 
H3. Turnover initially has a positive effect on police performance until a certain 
level of turnover and has a negative effect on police performance after that point. 
(i.e., the relationship between turnover and police performance is inverted-U shape). 
 
Above all, the results showed that crime control performance is significantly 
influenced by turnover change, although turnover change influences crime control 
performance in a different way from the prediction in the hypothesis 3. That is, there 
is a U-shape relationship between the turnover rate differences and the crime 
clearance rates6. In the violent crime cases (i.e., table 10-6), models C-2 and D-2 
have positive and significant coefficients of the quadratic terms, and in the property 
crime cases (i.e., table 10-7), models A-2, B-2, C-2, and D-2 have positive and 
significant coefficients of the quadratic terms. In sum, the hypothesis 3 in which I 
predicted an inverted-U shape relationship between employee turnover and crime 
control performance was not supported although the results confirmed significant 
effects of turnover on crime control performance. 
 
Practical interpretation of turnover effects and turning points. Since the 
relationships between the turnover rate differences and the crime clearance rates are 
U-shaped, there are turning points where the slope is zero. In this study, I calculated 
                                            
6 In the quadratic equation, ax2 + bx + c = 0, we know that the graph is U-shaped when the coefficient 
of x2 (i.e., a) is positive and inverted U-shaped when it is negative. 
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the predicted turning points by taking derivative of the quadratic expressions (Q: ax2 
+ bx + c = 0) as other turnover studies did (e.g., Shaw et al. 2005). Since the 
equation Q’s derivative is 2ax + b =0, x = - b/2a. For example, in model A-2 of the 
property crime cases, the predicted turning point can be calculated by inserting a and 
b values into the formula, x = -b/2a. Therefore, the turning point is 2.17 [i.e., - (-
2.47)/2(0.57)] standard deviations from the mean or 6.14 percent of the sworn 
officer’s voluntary turnover rate difference7 between 2004 and 2003. Likewise, in 
models B-2, C-2, and D-2 of the property crime cases, Z values are 2.17, 2.45, and 
3.16 standard deviations from the mean and their actual turnover rate differences are 
6.49, 6.44, and 7.79 percent, respectively. In the violent crime cases, Z values are 
1.27 in model C-2 and 1.14 in model D-2, and their actual turnover rate differences 
are 3.17 percent and 2.74 percent, respectively.  
 
As seen in figure 10-1, the relationships between the turnover rate differences 
and the crime clearance rates are curvilinear. Therefore, if we think the relationship 
is linear and negative, in the part between point A and point B, the negative effects 
of turnover change will be underestimated, and the part before point A or after point 
B, the negative effects of turnover will be overestimated. Theoretically, crime 
clearance rates will increase after passing turning points as seen in figure 10-1, but 
according to the standard normal distribution probability table (Wonnacott & 
Wonnacott, 1990, 672), the possibility that the Z value is more than 2.17 (i.e., the Z 
value in figure 1) is less than 1.5 percent, which means it is very rare to find 
observations after the turning point if the Z value of the turning point is 2.17. 
                                            
7 To convert Z value to actual turnover rate difference, the formula Z = (x-mean)/standard deviation is 
used. Therefore, x = Z *(standard deviation) + mean. When inserting Z, standard deviation, and mean 
(check table 3 for standard deviation and mean of sworn officer’s voluntary turnover), x = 
(2.17)(2.78) + 0.11 = 6.14.  
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Therefore, as Shaw et al. (2005) suggested, we may interpret the shape of the 
relationship as attenuated, negative instead of U-shaped especially for the property 
crime cases. In the current study, only one out of 44 observations has more than 6.14 
percent turnover rate difference (i.e., Z = 2.17) in the sworn officer’s voluntary 
turnover cases. 
 
 
Figure 10-1. The Relationship Between the Sworn Officer’s Voluntary Turnover Rate    
Difference (TRD) and Crime Clearance Rates 
 
 
 
Sworn officer’s voluntary TRD 
High 
Crime 
Clearance 
Rate 
 
Low 
Crime 
Clearance 
Rate 
0% 0.11% 2.89% 5.67% 8.45%
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Property crimes 
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When we see the violent crime cases, only two models (C-2 and D-2) have 
the significant coefficients of the turnover-related terms, whereas all models have the 
significant coefficients of the turnover-related terms in the property crime cases. This 
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may mean that the violent crime clearance rates are less influenced by turnover 
changes than the property crime clearance rates. The predicted turning points are 
also smaller in the violent crime cases than those in the property crime cases. That is, 
as the turnover change increases, the turning points of the negative effects are earlier 
reached in the violent crime cases than in the property crime cases. Since violent 
crimes are usually more urgent, more police officers are likely to be assigned even 
when the police experience the lack of human resources. Therefore, for the violent 
crime cases, negative effects of turnover change would cease at some point of 
turnover rate difference and positive effects may begin8 (see the dotted curve in 
figure 10-1). But we need to be careful to interpret this because police departments 
may not assign more police officers to clear violent crime cases when they really 
suffer from lack of human resources at their departments.   
 
When we compare the negative effects of turnover rate differences between 
the sworn officers (model A-2 and B-2) and the civilian employees, we observe that 
the civilian employee’s turnover rate difference does not have significant effects on 
neither violent crime clearance rate nor property crime clearance rate as expected 
(the results are omitted). Interestingly, however, all employees’ (i.e., sworn officers 
and civilians) turnover rate differences have significant and negative effects on the 
crime control performance as seen in models C-2 and D-2 of table 10-6 and table 10-
7 9 . Therefore, we may need to pay attention to all employees’ turnover rate 
                                            
8 Since Z-values of turning points for the violent crime cases are relatively small than those for the 
property crime cases, it is practically possible to observe police departments who experience 
increased crime control performance after the turning point unlike the property crime cases. 
9 More sworn officers might be the reason. That is, in most cases police departments have more than 
two times as many sworn officers as civilian employees. Therefore, in property crime clearing cases 
although civilian employee’s turnover change does not have significant effects on the crime clearance 
rates, all employees’ turnover change may show significant effects simply because the effect of sworn 
officers is much bigger than that of civilian employees. 
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differences as well as the sworn officer’s turnover rate differences. When we look at 
the correlation coefficients of the control variables, we observe that the property 
crime occurrence rate has more negative effects on the property crime clearance rate 
than the violent crime occurrence rate does on the violent crime clearance rate as 
expected. Since violent crimes tend to get more public attention, the police may 
focus more on clearing violent crimes regardless of workloads each sworn officer 
has due to increased crime occurrence. 
 
 
10.5 The moderating effects of HRM factors on turnover effects  
With respect to the moderating effects of HRM characteristics, I predicted that the 
negative effects of turnover might be bigger when municipal police departments 
have commitment HRM characteristics, based on human capital theory.  
 
H4. Negative effects of turnover on police performance are greater in an 
organization with more commitment-oriented human resource management (HRM) 
characteristics than in an organization with more control-oriented HRM 
characteristics.  
 
As in table 10-6 (a & b) and table 10-7 (a & b), in most cases, we do not 
observe significant moderating effects of HRM characteristics on turnover 
consequences although adjusted R2 was increased in most violent and property crime 
clearance cases10. Only one significant case [model D-3 in table 10-7 (b)] indicates 
                                            
10 For violent crime clearance cases - i.e., table 10-6 (a) and (b), adjusted R2 was increased in A-4, B-4, 
C-3, C-4, D-3, and D-4. For property crime clearance cases - i.e., table 10-7 (a) and (b), adjusted R2 
was increased in A-3, A-4, B-3, B-4, C-3, C-4, D-3 and D-4. Adjusted R2 decreases if irrelevant 
variables are added in the regression equation. 
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that when a police organization has commitment HRM characteristics, the 
relationship between turnover change and crime control performance will be linear 
rather than curvilinear. In most cases, however, there still existed attenuated, 
negative relationships between the turnover rate differences and the crime clearance 
rates after adding HRM factors and interaction terms to the regression equations.  
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XI. Summary and Conclusion 
 
 
11.1 HRM characteristics and crime control performance 
From the universalistic perspective, I predicted that municipal police departments 
with individual commitment HRM practices or commitment HRM system are likely 
to have better crime control performance. In this study, however, no significant 
relationships were found between HRM practices or system and crime control 
performance. Thererfore, my predictions about the influence of individual 
commitment HRM practices and commitment HRM characteristics (i.e., H1 and H2) 
were not supported.  
 
From the strategic perspective, the results might be interpreted such that there 
is inconsistency between commitment HRM practices or system and organizational 
strategies that the police departments might have. Based on the literature (e.g., 
Lengnick-Hall and Lengnick-Hall, 1988; Schuler and Jackson, 1987; Miles and 
Snow, 1984), integration between HRM practices and organizational strategies or 
organizational characteristics is necessary to have a better organizational 
performance. Maybe control HRM practices and control HRM characteristics are 
more fitted to the municipal police organizations although the study showed only 
suggestive results1. As an alternative explanation, municipal police organizations 
may be less likely to have consistency between strategies and environments. Police 
organizations may be one of the “reactors” who do not have good alignment among 
                                            
1 As seen in table 10-4 and 10-5, the narrower job take description for sworn officers a municipal 
police a police department has or the narrower range of issues employees are encouraged to 
participate in, the higher clearance rate for property crimes the police department has (p < .5). In 
addition, the commitment HRM factor seems to have more negative effects on crime control 
performance than the control HRM factor for both violent and property crimes although those effects 
are not significant. 
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strategy, structure, and process (Miles and Snow, 1984). 
 
According to Wright and McMahan (1992), the formation of HRM practices 
in an organization can be explained by strategic and non-strategic models, and the 
latter models such as institutional and political forces models seem to better explain 
the dysfunctional determinants of HRM practices in the municipal police 
departments. The determinants of HRM practices in the public organizations are not 
likely to be the results of rational strategic decision-making processes, but rather 
likely to be derived from institutional and political forces, so it is hard to expect the 
positive relationship between HRM practices or characteristics and organizational 
performance in the municipal police departments. 
 
 
11.2 Turnover effects on organizational performance & HRM moderating 
effects 
 
Since I found attenuated negative relationships between turnover rate differences and 
crime clearance rates, the human capital theory was also supported in the public 
sector. As reviewed in the previous chapter, however, the results did not support the 
prediction about the relationships between turnover and crime control performance 
(i.e., H3 was not supported). Unlike my prediction that the relationship would be an 
inverted-U shaped between turnover and crime control performance, the results 
showed an attenuated, negative relationship between turnover change and crime 
control performance.  
 
 According to the results, the crime control performance was not influenced 
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by turnover itself; rather it was influenced by turnover changes (i.e., turnover rate 
difference) unlike extant turnover studies, mostly conducted in the private sector. 
The possible interpretation of the difference between the current study and the other 
turnover studies is as follows. Probably most police organizations might be already 
used to their usual levels of turnover – in fact the police departments need to get used 
to a certain level of turnover due to a long recruiting time2. Therefore, their 
organizational performance is not less likely to be affected by the turnover itself if 
their turnover rates are within the usual ranges they have usually experienced. 
However, when the turnover level becomes higher than a usual level, the police 
organizations might need extra time to adjust themselves to this change and this 
might lead to organizational performance reduction. For example, some police 
organizations may have higher turnover levels than others, but this does not 
necessarily lead to reduced crime control performance if those turnover levels are 
within normal ranges they usually experience. Likewise, even when a police 
department has a lower turnover rate than others, their crime control performance 
might be worse than others if their current turnover level is much higher than a usual 
turnover level - that is, if they experience a big turnover change between the current 
and the past years.  
 
As mentioned before, the attenuated, negative relationships were found in 
this study. As reviewed in chapter seven, Shaw et al. (2005) and Newell and 
Rosenbloom (1981) provided hints about why the relationship was attenuated and 
negative. From the organizational control perspective, Shaw et al. (2005, 52) 
explained, “As skill levels are reduced by turnover, input-throughput-output 
                                            
2 According to the survey, the average length of recruiting and filling vacancies for sworn officers is 
195 days. 
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processes are disrupted and energy and resources are redirected from safety concerns 
in order to maintain operations.” When turnover is very high, Shaw et al. argued that 
turnover is less likely to be disruptive because the organization is already geared 
toward continual work force replacement. The learning curve theory also helps us 
understand the attenuation of the relationship. Newell and Rosenbloom (1981) 
argued that the time taken to perform a task (i.e., short time means a high level of 
performance) decreases as a learning rate increases. In the context of police 
organizations, we can imagine that if a municipal police department experiences a 
positive3, bigger turnover rate difference than other police departments, they will 
come to better know how to handle turnover in a proper manner than others, and this 
will lead to smaller negative effects of the turnover change on organizational 
performance. 
 
According to the results, turnover effects on the crime control performance 
were not moderated by the HRM characteristics (i.e. H4 was not supported). 
Although I could extract two underlying HRM characteristic factors4 as HRM 
characteristics that police departments might have, I only found suggestive results 
that indicated moderating effects of HRM characteristics. That is, I found that in an 
organization with control HRM characteristics it took a little bit longer to reach the 
bottom level of crime control performance when turnover changes. Why did we not 
observe significant moderating effects of HRM characteristics? One of the reasons 
might come from that the survey questions were mainly based on the extant studies 
(e.g., Arthur, 1994; Guthrie, 2001) that examined HRM factor’s moderating role in 
                                            
3 Positive turnover change means the turnover rate in the current is bigger than the previous year in 
this study. 
4 Both extracted HRM factors had more than 0.7 Cronbach’s alpha 
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the private sector, instead of developing the questions that would be more proper to 
identify the HRM characteristics of the municipal police departments. Another 
reason might be due to the different organizational characteristics between private 
and public organizations. Since there are relatively more rules and guidelines for the 
public employees than employees in the private sector, newcomers may not have 
much difficulty in catching up the performance level former employees might have 
reached even when a police department has more commitment HRM characteristics. 
Therefore, we may not find the difference in turnover effects between organizations 
with different HRM characteristics. 
 
11.3 Implications and limitations 
This study may be one of the first studies that not only empirically confirmed the 
importance of human resources (i.e., human capital theory) in effective delivery of 
public services, but also investigated the consequences of employee turnover in the 
public sector. In this study, I investigated if best HRM characteristics and 
commitment HRM system have significant effects on crime control performance 
from the universalistic viewpoint. Although we need more studies to reach a 
conclusion about the effects of HRM characteristics, the contingency perspective 
might be more persuasive to explain the relationships between HRM characteristics 
and organizational performance than the universalistic perspective, at least in the 
municipal police departments. That is, in the context of municipal police 
departments that seem to have military organizational characteristics, universalistic 
HRM practices or commitment HRM characteristics are less likely lead to a high 
level of organizational performance due to inconsistency between HRM practices 
and organizational strategies. 
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Since we found significant effects of turnover change on crime control 
performance unlike other turnover studies in the private sector, we may need to 
understand that the way human resources influence organizational performance is 
different from that in the private sector due to the different characteristics of 
environments that surround organizations. As reviewed in the previous chapter, 
recruiting process in the governments is different from that in the private sector. That 
is, police departments usually have to wait longer until the openings are filled than 
for-profit organizations because recruiting activities are less frequent in the police 
departments.  
 
Since we found attenuated, negative relationships between turnover change 
and crime control performance, cautions are required in predicting the negative 
effects of turnover in the police departments. That is, we may overestimate or 
underestimate the negative effects of turnover depending on the range of turnover 
change if we think the relationship between turnover change and crime control 
performance linear and negative. Although we only found suggestive evidence that 
indicated the moderating role of HRM characteristics on turnover effects, control 
HRM characteristics are more likely to alleviate the negative effects of turnover 
change on crime control performance. Of course, we need more studies to generalize 
the finding of this research about the effects of HRM characteristics and turnover 
effects on organizational performance to other public organizations. However, the 
findings in this study may help set up HRM policies especially when quality 
employees tend to quit (i.e., we suffer from “brain drain” phenomenon) especially at 
the federal government level. 
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Due to limitations of this study, we need to be careful to interpret the findings 
as follows. First, I explored the effects of the turnover change (i.e., turnover rate 
difference) only on the crime control performance. Although we may say that crime 
control has comprised a major part of the police mission, the results might be 
different if the study focused on other aspects of police functions such as traffic 
control, increasing safety feeling, and community problem solving. Second, the 
results of this study may be only applicable to the cities whose population ranges are 
between 100,000 and 500,000. As some police turnover studies pointed out (e.g., 
Hoffman, 1993; Warrell, 2000b), even low level of turnover can be detrimental to 
crime control functions especially in small cities. Therefore, unlike the results of this 
study, turnover itself may have significant, negative effects on crime control 
performance in those small cities. Third, maybe we might have found significant 
effects of HRM characteristics on turnover effects and on crime control performance 
if the survey was conducted with different HRM questions to identify more specific 
HRM characteristics of municipal police departments. Finally, needless to say, we 
need more empirical studies before the results of this study can be generalized even 
at the municipal police departments.  
 
 
(Bernstein, 1955; Downs, 1967; Lowi, 1979; Moe, 1989; Olson, 1982) 
(Barnard, 1938; Machiavelli, 1965; Nash, 1952) (Goodnow, 1900; Weber, 1965; Wilson, 1887) (Barnard, 1938; Bernstein, 1955; DiIulio, 1987; Heclo, 1977; Kaufman, 1960; Simon, 1976) (Downs, 1967; Hirschman, 1970; Niskanen, 1971; Tullock, 1965) 
(Lawrence et al., 1986) (Chubb et al., 1990; Peterson et al., 1989) (Kaufman, 1985) 
(Price, 1972) 
(Blau, 1960) 
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix 2-1. Typical mission statements of municipal police departments 
 
 
Dayton, OH 
“We, the members of the Dayton Police Department, are committed to providing the highest quality of 
professional police service.  We strive in all that we do to protect life, enforce the law, preserve order, 
protect property and arrest violators.  In cooperation with the citizens and with reverence for the law, 
we commit ourselves to improving the safety and quality of life.” 
 
Indianapolis, IN 
“We are dedicated to upholding the highest professional standards while serving the community in 
which we work and live. We are committed to the enforcement of laws to protect life and property, 
while also respecting individual rights, human dignity, and community values. We are committed to 
creating and maintaining active police/community partnerships and assisting citizens in identifying 
and solving problems to improve the quality of life in their neighborhoods.” 
 
Jacksonville, FL 
“The mission of the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office is to protect the lives and property of the citizens of 
this community, to preserve the peace and to prevent crime and disorder while constantly guarding 
personal liberties as prescribed by law.” 
 
Atlanta, GA 
“The mission of the Atlanta Police Department is to reduce crime and promote the quality of life, in 
partnership with our community.” 
 
Austin, TX 
“Our mission is to protect and serve Austin's diverse community so that residents and visitors feel, 
and are, safe.” 
 
Phoenix, AZ 
"Our mission is to ensure the safety and security for each person in our community." 
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Appendix 9-1. Actual survey sheet with a cover Letter 
 
 
May, 2006 
 
To whom it may concern: 
 
We are investigating human resource issues and characteristics of police departments 
that can affect their performance. We are particularly interested in the effect of 
employee turnover on police departments. The relationships among employee 
turnover, human resource management (HRM) system policies and practices, and 
organizational performance have been studied in the private sector, but remain 
unexamined in the public sector.  
 
Since this research will help identify factors that affect police department 
performance, your participation in this survey is very important. The findings of the 
research will help establish proper human resource management policy to enhance 
the performance of police organizations. 
 
We hope that this study will yield important findings that may help police 
departments improve their operations. 
 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
 
Edward T. Jennings, Jr.                         Yongbeom Hur 
Professor and Director                          Ph.D. Candidate  
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Please provide contact information below. 
 
Name:                                      
Title/Position:                                
Department:                                 
E-mail address:                              
Phone Number:                              
 
 
If you have questions, please contact Yongbeom Hur (Ph.D. candidate),  
research associate. (E-mail: yhur2@uky.edu; phone: 859-523-8149) 
 
Martin School of Public Policy and Administration 
University of Kentucky 
415 Patterson Office Tower 
Lexington, KY 40502 
 
 
Please return this survey as soon as possible. If you need to ask other sections or 
departments to answer some questions, please do so, although it may take additional 
time. Thank you very much in advance for your participation. 
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All questions in this survey are only regarding full time employees (FTE). Please 
do not include any data about trainees, part-time employees, and temporary job 
employees. 
 
 
Q1. How many job classifications are there in your department? 
a. For sworn FTE: 
b. For civilian FTE: 
 
Q2. Which of the following best describes sworn FTE’s job tasks in your 
department? 
a. Job tasks are described in detail, and sworn FTEs are expected to strictly follow 
them. That is, discretion is not allowed in most situations. (  ) 
b. Although job tasks are described in detail, sworn FTEs are allowed to use 
discretion in many situations. (  ) 
c. Job tasks are described generally, and sworn FTEs are expected to use 
discretion in many situations. (  ) 
 
Q3. Which of the following best describes civilian FTE’s job tasks in your 
department? 
a. Job tasks are described in detail, and civilian FTEs are expected to strictly 
follow them. That is, discretion is not allowed in most situations. (  ) 
b. Job tasks are described in detail, but civilian FTEs are allowed to use discretion 
in many situations. (  ) 
c. Job tasks are described generally, and civilian FTEs are expected to use 
discretion in many situations. (  ) 
 
Q4. How many unions are registered in your department? 
a. For sworn FTE: 
b. For civilian FTE: 
 
Q5. How many FTEs at your department are eligible to join unions? 
  a. Sworn FTE: 
  b. Civilian FTE: 
 
Q6. How many FTEs at your department are members of unions? 
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a. Sworn FTE: 
b. Civilian FTE: 
Q7. Does your department have a formal employee complaint/grievance resolution 
mechanism?   
 
Yes    No 
 
 
Q8. If a department has an information-sharing-policy, most information is usually 
shared among employees regardless whether or not the information is directly 
necessary to them. Does your department have a similar information-sharing-policy?  
 
Yes    No 
 
 
Q9. Which of the following best describes your department. 
A. Employees are encouraged to participate in a wide range of issues. (  ) 
B. Employees are encouraged to participate in a limited range of issues. (  ) 
 
 
Q10. If you check “A” at question 9, please indicate the issues that employees are 
encouraged to participate in. 
 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Q11. Does your department have any kind of incentive or bonus system, based on 
performance? 
 
Yes   No 
 
 
Q12. How long does it usually take to recruit new employees? 
- Sworn FTE: 
- Civilian FTE: 
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The following questions are about necessary data in this study. Although it may 
not be easy to provide the data for prior years, please provide as much as possible. 
 
 
Q13. Please provide the following information about turnover. Voluntary turnover 
means quitting and voluntary retirement (i.e., termination initiated by employees). 
Involuntary turnover means all other types of turnover (e.g., mandatory retirements, 
death, layoffs). If data are not available for sworn and civilian FTEs separately, 
please provide data for total police FTEs in the bottom row. 
 
 
Year 2002 2003 
Number of Number of Number of Number of Number of Number of Items Voluntary Involuntary Voluntary Involuntary FTE* FTE* Turnovers Turnovers Turnovers Turnovers 
Sworn FTE       
Civilian FTE       
Total Police 
FTE       
 
Year 2004 
Number of Number of Number of Items Voluntary Involuntary FTE* Turnovers Turnovers 
Sworn FTE    
Civilian FTE    
Total Police 
FTE    
*: Number of FTEs on the payroll at the end of each year. 
 
 
Q14. Please provide the following information about response time and patrol 
service.  A top priority call includes immediate threat to life, violent criminal act in 
progress, suspect pursuing citizen, imminent critical danger, or the possibility of 
major property loss. 
 
Average time Number of  
From receipt of top priority call Sworn FTEs  
To arrival On patrol service 
  2002 
  2003 
  2004 
 202
 
 
 
 
 
Q15. Please provide the following information about absenteeism due to sickness. If 
data are not available for sworn and civilian FTEs separately, please provide 
absenteeism data for total police FTE. 
 
 
Year Classification Number of absenteeism* 
  Sworn FTE 
2002  Civilian FTE 
  Total police FTE 
  Sworn FTE 
2003  Civilian FTE 
  Total police FTE 
  Sworn FTE 
2004  Civilian FTE 
  Total police FTE 
*: Total sick leave days except pregnancy and maternity leaves. 
 
 
Q16. Please provide the following information about salary and benefit budgets of 
your department? If data are not available for sworn and civilian FTEs separately, 
please provide budget data for total police FTE. 
 
Year Classification Salary and benefit budget (unit: $1,000) 
For sworn FTE   
For civilian FTE  2002 
For total FTE   
For sworn FTE   
For civilian FTE  2003 
For total FTE   
For sworn FTE   
For civilian FTE  2004 
For total FTE   
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Q17. Please provide the following information about caseload and crime clearance. 
When you calculate caseload, count all number of crimes assigned (i.e., regardless of 
UCR part I or part II crimes) 
 
Number of Caseload per  Caseload per  Caseload per sworn FTE Number of 
Violent crimes Sworn FTE  Sworn FTE  Assigned to investigate Property crimes  Cleared per  Assigned to investigate Assigned to investigate UCR part I violent & 
property crimes 
Cleared per 
Sworn FTE assigned Violent crimes Property crimes Sworn FTE assigned 
  2002    
  2003    
  2004    
 
Thank you very much!!! 
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Reducing Negative Effects of Turnover: 
Can We Do It with Human Resource Management? 
Conference on American Society of Public Administration  
Washington, D.C., Mar 2007 
 
How Do Human Resources Matter in the Public Sector?  
Exploring the Consequences of Turnover for Municipal Police Performance 
Southeastern Conference on Public Administration 
Athens, GA, Sep 2006 
 
Turnover, Performance, and Human Resource Management in the Public Sector:  
Focusing on Municipal Police Service  
Conference on Academy of Management 
Atlanta, GA, Aug 2006 
 
Does Turnover Matter in the Public Sector?                               
Conference on Midwest Political Science Association 
Chicago, IL, Apr 2006 
 
 
PUBLISHED TECHNICAL PAPER 
Debt Capacity and Debt Limits: A State Road Fund Perspective. 2004. Kentucky 
Transportation Center, University of Kentucky, with Merl Hackbart and Suzanne Sapp 
 
 
 
SERVICE 
LEXINGTON KOREAN UNITED METHODIST CHURCH 
Chair, Parish-Pastors Relations Committee, 2006 
Chair, Administration Board, 2005  
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